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Abstract 
The Politics and Philosophy of Wyndham Lewis's Representations of the 
Body examines the significance of representations of the body in the 
written work, both theoretical and fictional, of Wyndham Lewis. The 
central question of the thesis is: how does the body function as a ground 
for identity in Lewis's work? This question is addressed by looking at five 
thematic areas of Lewis's work, each of which forms the basis of a chapter: 
reality, mind-body dualism, gender, race, and the crowd- 
The work of Slavoj Zizek is used to argue that Lewis's theoretical 
work is characterised by an antipathy towards `the passion for the Real' 
and a desire to maintain a belief-sustained sense of `reality'. As a result, the 
body has an ambivalent status: it is both an emblem of the `reality' of the 
personality and a threat to it, representing its unavoidable `thingness', its 
`Real', as it were. This ambivalence is best expressed in Lewis's fiction, 
where the weaknesses and inconsistencies of his theories are dramatised 
and exposed. 
Lewis's ambivalence towards the body results in a split between his 
theory and his rhetoric, a split that is particularly noticeable in his work on 
gender and race, in which initially racist and sexist language is undercut by 
his theoretical discomfort with the biological grounds of such rhetoric. 
This ambivalence characterises Lewis's often controversial politics, which 
cannot be understood without it being taken into account. 
The thesis concludes that Wyndham Lewis had a fundamentally 
ambivalent attitude toward the body: it fails to provide a solid ground for 
identity, and yet it refuses to melt completely into air. This persistence of 
the body makes it a crucial sticking point, and Lewis produces compelling 
and contradictory images of it which attest to its implacable significance in 
his work. 
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Introduction 
In this thesis I am going to explore the politics and philosophy of 
Wyndham Lewis's representations of the body. I will focus my research on 
Lewis's written work, not because there is nothing to be said about his 
pictorial representations of the body, but because there is too much, and to 
try and say it all here would be to stretch my thesis too wide and to spread 
my analysis too thin. 
I will look mainly at the work Lewis produced between the two World 
Wars: his major theoretical work Time and Western Man (1927), parts of 
which are examined in detail in Chapter One and the Conclusion, forms 
the historical and conceptual centre of the material considered. I will 
consider both his fictional and non-fictional work, not only because Lewis 
produced valuable work in both genres, but also because he often treats 
similar themes in them, sometimes in significantly divergent ways. 
My concern is not simply to map out the varying ways in which Lewis 
represented the body - the intricate verbal mechanics of the 
defamiliarisation and grotesque detail he specialised in and deployed to 
great effect - but to consider what the body meant for him and the role it 
played in his political and philosophical, as well as his imaginative, vision. 
I do not believe that these three spheres - the political, the philosophical, 
the imaginative - can be easily separated, if they can be separated at all; 
but neither do I believe that they can be simply amalgamated and treated 
as interchangeable and exactly equivalent. To give perhaps the most 
obvious example, the wrongness of Lewis's politics in the 193os cannot be 
theorised away by sophisticated reference to his aesthetics, but the 
tangible achievements of his artistic work cannot be simply nullified by 
horrified mention of his support for Hitler. 
My interest in the political, philosophical, and imaginative aspects of 
Lewis work crystallises around questions of the body, its representations, 
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and its significance. From the first reading of Lewis it is clear that the body 
is of great importance to him, that it is something which excites his 
imagination and which is focussed on with great intensity. However, it is 
not at all clear exactly what its significance is, and it raises many intriguing 
questions. Does Lewis represent the body as obdurately solid, or as 
something more malleable and fluid? Does Lewis see the body as a 
uniform and universal aspect of human existence, or as differentiated into 
various types? Does Lewis perceive the body as dangerous threat or as a 
reassuring support? Can the body be a ground for mind or is it always its 
enemy? Does Lewis indeed see any fundamental difference between body 
and mind? Does Lewis see the body functioning as a tool of modernity, or 
as an object that resists it? Does the body possess a greater or a lesser 
degree of reality than other objects in the world? 
There are many such questions raised by Lewis's representations of 
the body, but the central question my thesis attempts to answer is: how 
does the human body function as a ground for identity in Lewis's work? I 
will consider this question with reference to five main themes, devoting a 
chapter to each of them. 
My first chapter will look at Lewis's treatment of reality both in his 
theoretical work, represented here by Time and Western Man, and in his 
fiction, in particular the novels The Childermass (1928) and The Revenge 
for Love (1937). I will examine the notions of belief and reality that Lewis 
develops in Time and Western Man using the concept of `the passion for 
the Real' developed by the Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Zizek, and argue 
that Lewis's opposition to such a `passion' is a defining feature of his work, 
and one which puts him at odds with much modernist thinking. Using 
Lewis's own ideas as well as Zizek's theory, I will analyse the way in which 
reality and `the Real' operate in Lewis's fiction, with particular focus on his 
representations of the body, and argue that his fiction exposes and 
dramatises inconsistencies and flaws in his theory. In particular, I will 
argue that in the fiction the absolute repression of `the Real' advocated in 
Time and Western Man is shown to be a quixotic and unachievable task, 
and that the representation of the body plays a key role in this realisation. 
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The question of the reality or otherwise of the body is one which has 
significant implication for the question of grounding, and the way in which 
Lewis's characters struggle with the alternatives of an unreal and vapid 
groundlessness, and an inescapable grounding in ultra-real physical 
materiality is one which is reflected in his work as a whole. 
Chapter Two will look at the way in which mind-body dualism 
operates in Lewis's work. Lewis is often portrayed by critics as being 
intrinsically a dualistic thinker, with dualism forming the conceptual core 
of his work. I will argue that although dualism is a central and unavoidable 
feature of Lewis's work it is best viewed as a conceptual strategy to manage 
reality and bestow meaning on the world, rather than as an innate 
personal predisposition. I will begin my analysis of Lewis's dualism by 
looking at the Vorticist `play' Enemy of the Stars (1914) which, with its 
central conflict between the characters of Arghol and Hanp, is often taken 
as a prime example of Lewis's dualism. I will argue that if the play is read 
carefully another opposition, more fundamental than that between Arghol 
and Hanp, is revealed, and that if this deeper dualism is taken into account 
the work's social and political content is made clear, and its apparent 
atavism disappears. I will argue that the `philosophy' of Enemy of the Stars 
is primarily concerned with creating distinction out of indistinctness, a 
concern that is also present in the essays Lewis included in his volume of 
short stories The Wild Body (1927). Both essays, `Inferior Religions' and 
`The Meaning of the Wild Body', attempt to define the theoretical basis for 
the stories that precede them, in particular focussing on Lewis's idea of the 
comic and laughter. Mind-body dualism is a key concept in both essays but 
is treated significantly differently, a divergence which indicates not only 
the importance of dualism for Lewis, but also its difficulty. The problems 
in grounding the distinction between laugher and laughed-at that Lewis 
has in these essays is symptomatic of his general problem of grounding 
difference. Men Without Art (1934) continues the concern with mind-body 
dualism and laughter, and tries to produce a theory of satire, an attempt 
which severely weakens any notion of distinction, and which finally 
renders dualism useless and absurd. This collapse of dualism represents 
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Lewis's realisation that metaphysical distinction cannot be grounded in the 
body, but that an absurd and uniform physicality can. 
Gender is the focus of Chapter Three, which develops Chapter Two's 
fairly abstract inquiries into distinction by looking at a specific and 
controversial example of distinction, that between the feminine and the 
masculine. I begin my analysis by looking at Lewis's ideas about 
masculinity in The Art of Being Ruled (1926), where he proposes a non- 
naturalistic model of masculinity in which performance plays a central 
role. Lewis's notion of the performative nature of masculinity is a reaction 
to what he saw the decline of a traditional ideal of masculine responsibility 
in modernity and its subservience to social and political fashions. Rather 
than try to re-entrench a traditional, naturalistic masculine position Lewis 
moves towards abandoning a masculine position altogether, casting it as 
an historically produced illusion, rather than as an unalterable fact of life. 
The First World War is a crucial event in Lewis's history of masculinity, 
and I follow my analysis of The Art of Being Ruled with analyses of some 
of the short stories Lewis wrote during wartime: `The French Poodle' 
(1916), `Cantleman's Spring-Mate' (1917), and `The War Baby' (1918). 
These stories, I will argue, prefigure his later ideas about masculinity, and 
show that even early in his career Lewis was calling into question a 
naturalistic and unproblematic idea of masculinity. In these wartime 
stories and in The Art of Being Ruled the male body is not seen as a 
support for masculinity, but as one of the factors which contribute to its 
downfall and exposure as an illusion. I continue my analysis by looking at 
Lewis's first published novel Tarr (1918), often taken to be an expression 
of a very masculine avant-garde position, but which, I will argue, is in fact 
subtly critical of such ideas and satirises rather than supports its main 
character's pretensions to distinction. The gendered body, I will argue, 
does not function as a ground for identity or distinction in Lewis's work, 
but rather works against such ideas, undermining them and exposing them 
to ridicule. 
Chapter Four examines Lewis's ideas about race, which, due to his 
support for Nazism in the 1930s, is one of the most controversial areas of 
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his work. Rather than focus exclusively on his pro-Nazi works of the 1930s, 
I will look at how the concept of race develops in his theoretical work 
between 1927. and 1948, and analyse the changes in his thinking over this 
period. I start my analysis by looking at The Lion and the Fox (1927), 
Lewis's book on Shakespeare, in particular the appendix which deals with 
the question of race, its influence, or lack of, on Shakespeare, and its 
usefulness in the study of culture. The Lion and the Fox presents a fairly 
straightforward anti-race position which denies the agency of inherited 
characteristics in the development of genius. Paleface (1929) is more 
ambivalent in its attitude towards race, and a disparity between Lewis's 
rhetoric and his theory opens up, a disparity which defines much of his 
subsequent thinking. Hitler (1931), the first and most notorious of Lewis's 
pro-Nazi works, enthusiastically adopts Nazi race theory, but, I will argue, 
its enthusiasm is contradicted, perhaps even undermined, by the detail of 
Lewis's writing which still shows signs of the anti-race position of his 
earlier work. The move from The Lion and the Fox to Hitler is one which, I 
will argue, entails an almost complete reversal of Lewis's attitude to the 
body and to the determining power of race. That there is a reversal does 
not mean that Hitler can be explained away as an anomaly, but that any 
account of Lewis's support for Nazism must take it into account if it aspires 
to thoroughness. Lewis's thought undergoes another reversal, this time 
much more ostentatiously, in The Hitler Cult (1939), the book in which he 
publicly repudiated his support for Nazism, and which contains a limited 
yet significant critique of the theoretical basis of his previous positions. 
Lewis's repudiation of race reaches its apogee in America and Cosmic Man 
(1948) in which he praises the supposed racelessness of the United States. 
This late position, which seems to prefigure a vacuous and idealistic form 
of postmodernism indicates not so much Lewis's political rehabilitation 
but the fundamental weakness of his thinking about race, and his inability 
to come to terms with the body. By stressing the supposedly utopian 
groundlessness of America, Lewis does away with the body altogether and 
floats away into unreal and insignificant wishful thinking. 
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My final chapter looks at images of the crowd in Lewis's writing, and 
how his attitude towards the crowd, and towards the individual, changed 
throughout his career. I begin my analysis by looking at the two versions of 
`The Crowd Master' (1915 & 1937), a short fictional piece which is set in 
part in the patriotic crowds of volunteers that assembled in London 
immediately before Britain's entry into the First World War. By comparing 
the two versions, I am able to define two different ways of looking at the 
crowd in Lewis's work, and examine his worry that the distinction between 
the individual and the crowd was a tenuous, perhaps even illusory one. 
This concern with distinction from the crowd is also dealt with in `The 
Code of a Herdsman' (1917), a fictional set of instructions detailing how to 
go about being a `Herdsman'. Although at first glance `The Code' may seem 
like one of the most elitist of Lewis's writings, I will argue that it displays 
considerable anxiety about the possibility of distinction. Lewis's interest in 
the crowd continued into the 192os and 193os and a number of essays 
deal, at least in part, with this problem. I will look at `The Politics of 
Artistic Expression' (1925), `The Foxes' Case' (1925), and `The Artist as 
Crowd' (1932), and examine the different attitudes towards the crowd and 
the possibility of distinction that they contain. Lewis's attitude towards the 
crowd was not a simple and static one, and changed over time, however 
two distinct poles are discernable in it: the idea of total separation from 
the crowd, and the idea of total integration with it. The interplay of these 
two poles is closely connected to Lewis's similar concerns with the body: 
can the body be the final guarantee of the individual's separation from the 
crowd, or is it material evidence of the individual's fundamental identity 
with it? It is the connection between the body and the crowd that provides 
the focus of my analysis of The Apes of God (1930), a novel in which the 
crowd plays an important part, even if it never positively appears. The last 
part of The Apes of God, `The General Strike', is haunted by the spectres of 
both the revolutionary crowd and the internal organs of the body, and even 
though neither appears directly their power is made manifest. I will argue 
that in many ways both the crowd and the body can be seen to occupy the 
space of `the Real' discussed in Chapter One. 
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My thesis concludes with an examination of Lewis's claim, made in 
Time and Western Man, that his identity is grounded in an organ of the 
body, namely the eye. This claim presupposes the possibility of the 
separation of a single organ from the body which contains it, and as such 
could be read as a manifestation of the fragmentation that much of Time 
and Western Man criticises. Lewis's claim is also complicated by his own 
criticism in Time and Western Man of vision as a way of approaching 
reality, and the gulf between his use of the eye as a ground for his own 
identity and this criticism of it as a basis for the philosophy of others is 
symptomatic of the ambivalence of the body in his thinking. This 
ambivalence towards the body as a ground for identity is, I will argue, the 
key feature of Lewis's thinking about and representations of the body, and 
one which helps understand the peculiarities of his political, philosophical, 
and imaginative work. 
Before the thesis proper begins, I will look briefly at an early work of 
Lewis's which displays many of the issues and questions which will be of 
concern throughout this thesis, and which it is useful to delineate early on. 
Imaginary Letters (1917-18), a fictional set of correspondence sent by 
William Bland Burn from the revolutionary city of Petrograd in 1917 to his 
wife, Lydia, in London, display some of the key features of Lewis's 
intellectual and imaginary treatment of the body, and a brief survey of this 
text provides a useful introduction to this thesis. 
Burn displays some attitudes and characteristics often encountered 
in Lewis's writing, most notably the conviction of his own superiority to 
most other people. The first letter contains a long explanation by Burn, in 
response to a question of Lydia's, as to why he cannot be happy. Burn 
rephrases her original question - `Why not be happy? ' - in a way which 
makes clear his conviction of his distinction from and superiority to the 
mass: `That is, why not abandon the plane of exasperation and 
restlessness, and be content with the approximations and self-deceits of 
the majority? ' (IL, 3). Here, simple happiness is seen as a quality of the 
majority and synonymous with unenlightened self-deception and 
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intellectual fuzziness. In contrast, Burn's unhappiness, his `exasperation 
and restlessness', is seen, by him at least, as the inevitable outcome of his 
intellectual activity and taste for truth. This distinction between the 
happily unenlightened mass and a few enlightened but discontented 
individuals is one which appears frequently in Lewis's work. It should not, 
however, be taken as the only attitude that he held, or even one that he 
held very securely. 
Burn's superior attitude encompasses misogyny as well as snobbery, 
and throughout Imaginary Letters he is condescending, when not simply 
insulting, to Lydia. For Burn, the intellectual superiority which he believes 
he possesses is a masculine quality: `a sense of values', which he claims his 
wife lacks, is, he says, `very roughly a masculine corner' (IL, 3). His dim 
view of women is confirmed when he claims that Yorke, their male infant 
child, `was older than [Lydia] when he was born' (IL, 4). At one point he 
tells her that: `You are after all, my dear lady, only a reproductive machine, 
painted up in order not to be too unappetising. But you are a machine that 
has two legs which enable you at any time to run away if you feel inclined' 
(IL, 19). This view of women as nothing more than child-producing 
automata may seem irredeemably misogynist; however, it is worth noting 
that the woman has legs with which she can `run away' if she wants to. 
While this detail may not dispel the general air of misogyny, it does 
indicate a certain anxiety at its heart: that women are not completely 
under the control of men, or even their own biological mechanisms. 
Feminine desire - here, the desire to `run away' - is seen as disruptive, 
and even in these two sentences undermines the masculine logic at work: 
the woman is `not only' a machine, but also something which may wish to 
flee. This may seem just like so much quibbling, but in Chapter Three I will 
show that Lewis's attitudes towards women are not always as simply 
misogynist as they may appear and reveal intriguing complexities when 
read carefully, complexities which do not redeem Lewis and recast him as 
a feminist, but which help understand his thought more fully. 
It could be argued that Burn's misogyny is shared by Lewis: none of 
Lydia's letters is printed, and this possibly could be seen as denying Lydia 
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a voice of her own. However, we do get a sense of her arguments from 
Burn's response to them and his occasional quotation of them in his 
letters, and, as the letters progress, we get a sense of her action as well. 
Lydia's arguments are not, on the evidence we are given, the passive and 
weak ones we might expect from Burn's characterisation of her, and at 
times she expresses ideas remarkably similar to ones expressed by Lewis 
himself. For example, Burn quotes Lydia as writing of him that: 
Being so disgusted with people suggests a naive idealism. We are all 
ridiculous, looked at properly, by means of our little forked bodies. 
We are disgusting physically (except a few in their fluffy and velvety 
youth). So why carp, and glare, and sheer off? Take life, in the 
English-civilized way, as a joke; our funny bodies and their peculiar 
needs, our ambitions, greeds, as comic stunts of an evidently 
gentleman-creator, who is most unquestionably "a sport. " (IL, 5) 
Lydia's position, apart perhaps from its invocation of a squire-like deity, is 
remarkably similar to ideas proposed by Lewis in later works, most notably 
in his theories of the comic developed in The Wild Body and Men Without 
Art, discussed in Chapter Two. Indeed, Lewis's work in general is haunted, 
I will argue, by the spectre of a basic physical commonality that reduces all 
intellectual effort to absurd examples of `naive idealism'. This is not to say 
that the supercilious `disgust' which Lydia complains of in Burn is not also 
present in Lewis's work, but merely to insist that it always coexists with a 
more cynical and egalitarian sense of disgust. Lewis's disgust speaks with 
two conflicting voices: a disgust with others and a disgust with everybody, 
including the one disgusted. In this thesis, I will contend that when 
reading Lewis we need to be alert to this other voice, backgrounded though 
it may be, in order to grasp the fullness and complexity of his work. 
Burn responds to Lydia's argument by claiming that `we are obviously 
in the position of Ulysses' companions' and that `there is nothing that [he] 
resents[s] more than people settling down to become what is sensible for a 
swine' (IL, 5). This idea of animal nature of the human - or more precisely 
the animalised nature: Ulysses' companions, of course, started off as fully 
human - is another recurrent feature of Lewis's writing, and the disgust 
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and dissatisfaction he feels towards it is one of the motors of his 
imagination. However, Lewis's sense of disgust with this animalisation 
would not be so great if he did not fear it to be universally true, and Burn's 
defiance of his own proposition risks coming across as, to use one of 
Lydia's words, `ridiculous': `I will still stalk about with my stumpy legs, and 
hold my snout high, however absurd it may be' (IL, 5). Burn ends the first 
of his letters with an admission of his own desire for fleshy pleasures, 
writing that: `I wish, Lydia, you were here, with your body rasping under 
mine now. We could beat out this argument to another tune' (IL, 6). 
Although Burn seems to be a complete snob who believes in his own 
superiority and detachment, his account of genius is one in which, perhaps 
surprisingly, the masses play an important, if unconscious, role. For Burn, 
genius comes from the embodiment of the mass, rather than complete 
transcendence of it: 
All the full and tragic artists partake of the destiny of the popular 
hero; thousands of people contribute to their success only in this case 
without meaning to; each man or woman hands in his or her fraction 
of vitality; wherever they go, there is a great crowd with them. Their 
brain is a record of their sympathies, people pour in and are piled up, 
with a persistent classification, until giant-like and permanent 
images, the "types" of drama or fiction are produced: Raskolnikoffs, 
Golyadkins and Alioshas. It is the sense of power bestowed by this 
throng that enables them to create so hotly, and with so unreasonable 
a faith. (IL, 13) 
This attribution of the power of `the full and tragic artists' to the `throng' 
may seem to clash with the spirit of Burn's pronouncements, but this 
cohabitation of a disdain for and a recognition of the power of the crowd is, 
as we will see in Chapter Five, a feature of Lewis's work. 
Burn's recognition of the importance of the crowd for the individual 
does not extend to a related pair of concepts, mind and body. Burn 
declares that: `One truth, however, I have tested enough for it to be no 
more experimental. [... ] The body does not matter the smallest fraction 
where the mind is concerned' (IL, 16). Burn's reasons for belief in this 
supposedly universal truth seem rooted in his own particular physical 
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circumstances: he is, by his own admission, a very ugly man, but claims: `I 
can imagine beauty as fluently and fully as if I had the head of Apollo' (IL, 
16). Burn's belief in his ability to transcend his body relies on a belief in the 
incorporeal soul: `The twists in a body can only impress themselves on a 
spirit that dwells constantly therein. Mine comes back to its disgraceful 
bed, and lies cramped and ill in it' (IL, 16). 
Although Burn claims to be entirely sure of what he is saying, he can 
still imagine Lydia's critical response to it. He claims that 'Goethe's god- 
like person gave him plenty of calm sleep', but is aware that `If I said too 
much you would sneer and think that the grapes were sour!! ' (IL, i6). 
Lydia's attitude is also present in Hanp's claim in Enemy of the Stars, 
examined in Chapter Two, that Arghol's `philosophy' is `Sour grapes! ' (ES, 
l06). In both cases the voice of a subordinate character interrupts the 
protagonist's excursion into idealism with a rude reminder of the material 
conditions in which they find themselves. This undermining of idealism, as 
well as its initial expression, is an important feature of Lewis's thought, 
and shows once again the two conflicting voices at work. 
As Imaginary Letters progresses Burn slowly comes to realise that 
his wife has been having an affair with a friend of his, who is in fact the 
father of Lydia's child. Imaginary Letters ends with Lydia demanding a 
divorce and leaving for America, a development which undermines Burn's 
ostensible detachment and superiority. Lydia also tells Burn that he is not 
the father of Yorke, an idea that Burn finds impossible to accept. Burn's 
disbelief is unconvincing as there are several hints in earlier letters that 
Yorke may not be his child: there are several references to Burn's friend 
Villerant who is in London with Lydia, and who Burn suspects `of having 
smiled at my naivete' (IL, 4). Burn himself ponders the fact that `Yorke, by 
a miracle (the miracle of your beauty, I suppose) appears to have escaped 
the contamination of my flesh', and even asks himself `perhaps I am not 
Yorke's father' before reassuring himself `I am. I should know that tell-tale 
rump anywhere' (IL, 15,19). In the last letter we learn that Lydia questions 
Burn's faith in the size of his and his son's rump, asking him `Cannot you 
think of anyone else with a large bottom? ' (IL, 25). Burn answers `I cannot' 
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and ends his last letter: `So I presume you are fooling. I believe you are still 
in London' (IL, 25). Given the numerous indications of Lydia's infidelity 
Burn's self-confident disbelief seems an absurd response to the reality of 
the situation. The biological, in the guise of large bottoms, fails to provide 
Burn with the ground for his belief that he is Yorke's father: Burn turns to 
the biological for reassurance of his own position and finds no such thing, 
yet still stubbornly persists in his now groundless belief of his paternity. 
This turn to the body to provide a ground for belief, and the subsequent 
discovery that it delivers something quite different from what it appeared 
to promise is a recurrent pattern in Lewis's representations of the body, 
and one which I will explore further in the chapters that follow. 
The final triumph of the biological over masculine intellectualism 
could be read either as the body's comic undermining of the absurd 
aspirations of the mind, or as the mind's inexorable and tragic defeat by 
the treacherous flesh. In Imaginary Letters the comic reading takes 
precedence - Burn's reaction to Lydia's infidelity in the last letter is so 
absurd that it is impossible to see him as a tragic hero - but in Lewis's 
work in general there is always a tension between these two possibilities. 
The question of whether the autonomy of the mind from the body, or at 
least the appearance of its autonomy, is to be cherished or to be mocked is 
one of the central questions of Lewis's work. 
Imaginary Letters is a good introduction to Lewis's thinking about 
the body as it shows its essential ambivalence: he articulates both the idea 
that the body is insignificant and the idea that it is of fundamental 
importance. This tension in his thinking will be explored in the chapters 
that follow, and is closely related to the central question of this thesis, the 
question of grounding. For Burn, the body is, theoretically at least, not a 
ground for identity, but when faced with the biological fact of Lydia's 
adultery his theoretical position becomes strained and absurd, and he 
undergoes something like a crisis of identity. It would be unwise to identify 
Lewis too closely with Burn, but the questions that Imaginary Letters 
raises - of detachment and distinction, of separation and autonomy, of 
truth and certainty, of the tragic, the comic, and the absurd, of the material 
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and the ideal - are ones which follow Lewis's representations of the body 
throughout his career, and are the ones upon which this thesis will attempt 
to cast some light. 
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In Wyndham Lewis's short-story `A Soldier of Humour' (1927) the 
narrator, Kerr-Orr, remarks that `I am disposed to forget that people are 
real - that they are, that is, not subjective patterns belonging specifically to 
me'; and admits that his `joke-life [... ] has for its very principle a denial of 
the accepted actual'. ' Although the character of Kerr-Orr is not simply 
Lewis, there is a similar concern with reality in Lewis's writing in general, 
and the `denial of the accepted actual' is a central concern of both his 
theoretical work and his fiction. In this chapter, I will use the work of 
Slavoj Zizek, in particular his elaboration of Jacques Lacan's notion of `the 
Real', to explore and elucidate some of the problems of reality in Lewis's 
work. I will look in detail at Time and Western Man (1927), Lewis's major 
work of cultural and philosophical criticism, and novels The Childermass 
(1928) and The Revenge for Love (1937). 
In Welcome to the Desert of the Real (2002) Slavoj Zizek, following Alain 
Badiou, claims that `the key feature of the twentieth century' was `the 
"passion for the Real [la passion du reel]"', arguing that: 
The ultimate and defining moment of the twentieth century was the 
direct experience of the Real as opposed to everyday social reality - 
the Real in its extreme violence as the price to be paid for peeling off 
the deceptive layers of reality. 2 
I Wyndham Lewis, `A Soldier of Humour', in The Complete Wild Body, ed. Bernard 
Lafourcade, (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1982), p. 17. 
2 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and 
Related Dates, (London & New York: Verso, 2002), pp. 5-6; the whole of the first chapter, 
`Passions of the Real, Passions of Semblance', is very useful, pp. 5-32. 
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Such a concern can be seen in much of modernism, from the Imagist 
imperative for `Direct treatment of the "thing"', to the desire of writers 
such as Virginia Woolf and D. H. Lawrence to reach the reality overlooked 
by realist fiction. 3 However, the modernist `passion for the Real' is given 
its clearest expression in Marinetti's `The Foundation and Manifesto of 
Futurism' (1909): 
Let's break out of the horrible shell of wisdom and throw ourselves 
like pride-ripened fruit into the wide, contorted mouth of the wind! 
Let's give ourselves utterly to the Unknown, not in desperation but 
only to replenish the deep wells of the Absurd! 4 
In contrast to this enthusiastic plunge into the violent unknown, 
Wyndham Lewis's work is motivated by the desire to avoid `the Real'. 
However, Lewis was not an advocate of the unreal but rather of what Ziiek 
would term `reality'. Zizek's distinction between `the Real' and `reality' 
provides a useful theoretical lens through which Lewis's work can be 
looked at again, and I will briefly clarify this distinction before analysing 
Lewis's texts. 
In Zizek's work the distinction between `reality' and `the Real' is 
based on the idea that: 
the reality of the social universe [is] an illusion that rests on a certain 
"repression, " on overlooking the real of our desire. This social reality 
is then nothing but a fragile, symbolic cobweb than can at any 
moment be torn aside by an intrusion of the real. 5 
3 F. S. Flint, `From Poetry March 1913', in Imagist Poetry, ed. Peter Jones, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 129; Virginia Woolf, `Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown', 
first published 1924, in Collected Essays, Vol. I, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1966), pp. 
319-37; D. H. Lawrence, Letter to Edward Garnett, 5 June 1914, in The Collected Letters 
of D. H. Lawrence, 2 Vols., ed. Harry T. Moore, (London, Melbourne, Toronto: 
Heinemann, 1962), p. 282. 
4 Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, `The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism', first 
published i9o9, trans. R. W. Flint, in Art In Theory: 19oo-1990: An Anthology of 
Changin5j Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison & Paul Wood, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 146. 
5 Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular 
Culture, (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 17. 
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For Zizek the maintenance of this fragile `reality' involves the 
establishment of a boundary between it and `the Real': `the barrier 
separating the real from reality is therefore the very condition of 
"normalcy": "madness" [... ] sets in when this barrier is torn down'. 6 Zizek 
argues that this barrier is maintained by fantasy, which, he argues `is on 
the side of reality', and is essential to its maintenance. He claims that: 
when the phantasmic frame disintegrates, the subject undergoes a 
"loss of reality" and starts to perceive reality as an "irreal" 
nightmarish universe with no firm ontological foundation; this 
nightmarish universe is not "pure fantasy" but, on the contrary, that 
which remains of reality after reality is deprived of its support in 
fantasy.? 
In Zizek's eyes `the Real' is associated with the `irreal': when fantasy- 
sustained `reality' breaks down `the Real' appears in the form of the `irreal'. 
`Reality', however `real' it may appear, is sustained by fantasy, whereas `the 
Real', fantastic and irreal as it seems, is completely devoid of fantasy. 
However, it is important to note that `the Real' can never positively appear 
as `the Real': as that which `totally resists symbolization' it can not be 
incorporated into our sense of `reality' in any meaningful way. The `passion 
for the Real' does not ever reach `the Real' but, as Zizek writes, `culminates 
in its apparent opposite [... ] in the pure semblance of the spectacular effect 
of the Real'. 8 However, despite the inherent impossibility of `the passion 
for the Real' Zizek writes that it should not be rejected as `once we adopt 
this stance, the only remaining attitude is that of refusing to go to the end, 
of "keeping up appearances"'. 9 
6 Ziiek, Looking Awry, p. 17. 
7 Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies, (London & New York: Verso, 1997), p. 66. 
8 Gizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, pp. 9-1o. 
9 Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, p. 24. 
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Time and Western Man: 
"`reality" [... ] is not what it usually represents itself to be' 
One of the most interesting aspects of Lewis's treatment of reality in Time 
and Western Man is his exploration of the role of belief in what we 
experience as reality. He writes that: 
For the understanding of "reality, " and to get at the meaning of the 
problems suggested by the term "reality, " there is no term so 
important as "belief. " Reality is in fact simply belief. What you 
"believe in" is a thing's "reality": that is the realistic, not of course the 
logical, account of it. That which a thing ceases to be for you, when 
you cease to believe in it, is "real. " And the sensation that we define 
as "reality" is the thing whose nearest specification is described in the 
word "belief. " To believe in a thing's existence is to experience its 
reality. Reality, then, is simply a way a describing our capacity for 
belief, and the things in which we believe. (TWM, 351) 
Lewis's point here is that the sense of reality depends on belief, and that 
philosophy which enquires too much into the nature of reality and which 
suspends the `common-sense' belief in `common-sense' reality in order to 
make a more truthful account of it, will ultimately lose sight of reality 
altogether. For Lewis, the existence of a sustainable and operative sense of 
reality without an accompaniment of belief is an impossibility. Lewis in 
effect proposes a categorical difference between two types of reality: an 
apparent and believable reality and a real yet unbelievable reality; in which 
the former is the world as it appears to us in consciousness, structured and 
made to appear real by our belief, and the latter the world as it actually is 
and is registered as sensation. This distinction can be seen to prefigure 
Zizek's distinction between `the Real' and `reality', the latter which, 
sustained as it is by the `phantasmic frame' of ideology, is almost identical 
to Lewis's belief-sustained reality. A good illustration of this difference 
between these two realities is given in an unpublished chapter of Time and 
Western Man, in which Lewis writes: 
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The single, isolated, direct sensation, however "real" (as we should 
describe a sensation) in one way and perhaps violent, would not yet 
bear with it the consciousness of reality or of belief. Take any sudden, 
violent sensation. Imagine yourself walking along a platform waiting 
for a train, and that suddenly a "crashing" aeroplane dropped on top 
of you. For an instant, before you were killed, you would be aware of 
the aeroplane. But that instantaneous sensation, without anything 
preceding it or following it, would lack reality. Such an event (for the 
brief moment of your awareness) would have a dream quality. (TWM, 
549) 
The assertion that we cannot comprehend a real event as part of reality 
unless we can relate it to what precedes and follows it suggests that, for 
Lewis, the sense of reality is in some way narrative, that, perhaps 
surprisingly for the great enemy of `Time-philosophy', events which cannot 
be fitted into some temporal order - the instantaneous and unanticipated 
violence of an aeroplane falling on one's head - are perceived as unreal 
and phantasmagoric. Reality for Lewis is not simply sensation, but the 
consciousness of sensation that has been structured and ordered by belief, 
a point he makes quite clearly, writing that `A purely sensational existence 
would not be capable of supplying this notion, "reality, " at all' (TWM, 355). 
This means that, as Lewis writes, "`reality" as a notion, and in its generally 
accepted sense, is not what it usually represents itself to be' but rather is 
something which requires a minimal degree of mediation to become 
operative: 
We need time to think, in short, and the leisure which habit supplies 
us with, to arrive at the notion of the "real"; we require the sort of 
loose, disconnected "self' of our non-sensational, abstract life to get 
this sensation with. The purely sensational creature (like the newly- 
born baby) would not discriminate between itself and the exterior 
world. It would be what happened to it. It would be everything with 
which its senses presented itself. There would be no question of a 
"self. " There would only be a not-self of pure sensation - which is, of 
course, the evangelical christian and communistic "self, " as it is also 
the self of "action" and "function": the time-self. (TWM, 355) 
Lewis's rejection of pure sensation, of the unmediated experience, is one 
which sets him apart from much of modernist thinking, and its insistence 
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on maintaining an operative sense of self is dependent also on retaining 
shared social values. For Lewis, the maintenance of `reality' in the face of 
`the Real' was a task that could not be taken on successfully by the isolated 
individual, but could be achieved by preserving a stable social order. Just 
as for Lewis the real in which we cannot believe (the crashing aeroplane) is 
perceived as having a `dream-quality' and lacking reality, for Zizek `the 
Real' perceived without a `phantasmic frame' also lacks reality and is 
perceived as `an "irreal" nightmarish universe'. This similarity is 
interesting and significant because it indicates that to some extent, and 
without the benefit of hindsight and the sophisticated conceptual 
apparatus of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Lewis had already identified and 
begun to critique something like the twentieth century's `passion for the 
real' in the 192os. 1O 
Lewis's insistence on the importance of belief for our understanding 
of reality is directed against, among others, thinkers who thought they 
could obtain a more direct experience of God, an attack which may seem a 
little paradoxical. Here, to put it in Zizek's terms, Lewis sets the `reality' of 
belief against `the Real' of God, in an attack on the theology of William 
James and others that holds up, perhaps in `bad faith', Catholic orthodoxy 
as being the means by which God can be avoided and belief sustained. 
Lewis makes the seemingly bizarre comment that `it would not be 
paradoxical to say that the catholic position [... ] is that of the irreligious, 
or non-religious mind, in contrast to the God-hungry mysticism of the 
James type' (TWM, 364). 
Lewis's theology may seem a little eccentric, but it continues and 
develops the anti-transcendent aspect of his thinking, that can be first seen 
in his rejection of total abstraction in visual art before the First World War, 
to include both a rejection of the idea of complete corporeal immanence as 
10 Lewis's `purely sensational creature' unable to `discriminate between itself and the 
exterior world' is reminiscent of Lacan's notion of the pre-mirror-stage human subject 
who cannot distinguish `between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt'. Jacques Lacan, `The 
Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytical 
Experience', in Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2001). p. 4. 
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well as that of absolute spiritual transcendence. Lewis writes of `a swarm of 
philosophers more or less inspired by James', who believe, as he sees it, 
that: 
the way to attain God is the direct one of personal "religious 
experience" possessed of "a certitude stronger that that attaching to 
religious truth. " It is the manner of the protestant Reformation, of 
course, the direct plunge to God, not only without mediation or by 
means of reason (with all the dangers of that confusing exercise), but 
with a debased reliance upon some kind of semi-philosophical, half- 
rational image: for clearly no plunge of that sort is entirely "direct, " 
unless a great heat of mystical emotion is called into play, which is 
not usual with philosophers. (TWM, 365) 
Lewis makes it clear that he sees a deep connection between the `God- 
hungry mysticism of the James type' and the Reformation and the 
emergence of Protestantism, a point that is also made in The Art of Being 
Ruled (1926), where he writes that: 
When Luther appealed for the individual soul direct to God, and the 
power of mediating authority was definitively btoken, God must have 
foreseen that he would soon follow His vicerogents. The individual 
soul would later on, had he been God, have known very well that 
when he abandoned God, he would before long himself be 
abandoned. The mediator should have known that too. In any case 
this necessary triad had vanished. The trinity of God, Subject, and 
Object is at an end. The collapse of this trinity is the history also of 
the evolution of the subject into the object or of the child back into 
the womb from which it came. (ABR, 27) 
In the face of this perceived breakdown of `mediating authority' and the 
accompanying regression, Lewis preferred a more traditional and less 
zealous approach: 
How much cleaner, and in the end more efficacious, is the method of 
the catholic, the inventions of Reason rather than the irresponsible 
and lonely gushings of "intuitive" heat. About the wish to seize and 
mingle with the supreme Reality in a passionate attack there is 
something lunatic and egoistic. To maintain this supreme divinity in 
isolation from our imperfection, instead of exacting jealously its 
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democratic descent to where we are, to approach it only circuitously 
and with a measured step, at the risk of appearing unfervid is, it 
would seem, to the human reason and to human taste, the better way. 
(TWM, 365) 
This emphasis on the `lunatic and egoistic' nature of the desire to `seize 
and mingle with the supreme Reality' is indicative of Lewis's rejection of 
`the passion of the Real', and, moreover, is in keeping with his more 
explicitly political wish to maintain an ordered, delineated, and 
hierarchical social structure, as his reference to the `democratic descent' of 
God makes clear. What also becomes obvious is that this unease with 
`mingling' is expressed in terms of what Lewis would see as degraded 
physicality. Lewis considers James's use of a `bar of iron' under the 
influence of magnetism, which of course it cannot express but nevertheless 
affects it, " as a metaphor for the `faith-state', as meaning that to reach 
such a state `we have to "primitivize" ourselves to the extent of reaching 
the mineral world - we do not even stop at the animal' (TWM, 367). Lewis 
objects to this downgrading of the human to the mineral, and also to what 
he sees as the sexual nature of a `faith-state' so achieved: 
The "cheerful and expansive" disturbances [James] elsewhere 
indicates give us a further enlightenment as to what would no doubt 
be the ultimate seat of such experiences, of the "bar-of-iron" order: 
for the "expansive and searching" movements of sex [... ] indicate 
where we should get to in our intimate and personal attack upon 
Deity. It would be very much sans fagon, in the end, that we should 
"experience" our God. In James' highly stimulated bar-of-iron we 
have the link between his later mystical philosophy and the sexual 
character of most mystical religiosity. (TWM, 368) 
11 `It is as if a bar of iron, without touch or sight, with no representative facility whatever, 
might nevertheless be strongly endowed with an inner capacity for magnetic feeling; and 
as if, through the various arousals of its magnetism by magnets coming and going in its 
neighbourhood, it might be consciously determined to different attitudes and tendencies. 
Such a bar of iron could never give you an outward description of the agencies that had 
the power of stirring it so strongly; yet of their presence, and of their significance for its 
life, it would be intensely aware through every fibre of its being. ' William James, The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, first published 1902, (London: Penguin, 1985), Pp. 55- 
6; quoted in TWM, pp. 376-8. 
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Lewis writes that in `the impulsive, tail-wagging, sentimental dog [... ] we 
certainly have a religious animal', and that `the dog's worship of his 
master [is a] "religion" of a more absolute order than any of which man is 
capable' (TWM, 368). The characterisation of the `absolute' as non-human 
is a fundamental feature of Lewis's thought, from his rejection of total 
abstraction in art to his hostility to complete immediacy of experience. The 
`absolute' for Lewis is very much something that has to be kept at the 
correct and proper distance, and is seen as having lethal effects if the 
boundary between it and the human is broken down. Lewis maintains that 
there is, or, rather, that there was and still should be, a decisive distinction 
between the `supreme Reality' of the absolute or God, and the `personal 
reality' of the human individual. Indeed, he writes that `our sense of 
personal reality is so great that we are not able, at the same time, to 
entertain the sensation of the existence of a God' (TWM, 373); a statement 
which could be rewritten in the language of Zizek to mean that `reality' 
cannot be sustained in the face of direct contact with `the Real'. Lewis 
writes that he is `against a mystical "belief, " [... ] though not against the 
rational belief, and that he considers such `mystical' belief, in the manner 
of James, as `incompatible with "belief' in the more universal sense of 
experiencing and holding in ourself the sensation of reality' (TWM, 373). 
This incommensurability of belief in ourselves and belief in the absolute, 
means, for Lewis, that our relation to `the supreme Reality' must remain 
an oblique and indirect one. Indeed, he writes that: `It is as thieves only -a 
thief of the real - that we can exist, or as parasites upon God. The 
Absolute, we think, crushes, and is meant by its hierophants to crush, the 
personal life' (TYVM, 373)" 
Lewis's preference for `reality' over `the Real' is given its most 
programmatic expression in the following passage, in which he makes a 
case for a focus on the superficial and the avoidance of the more 
fundamental: 
If the contrast is between a conception of the world as an ultimate 
Unity on the one hand, or a Plurality on the other; if you have, 
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dogmatic and clear-cut, or rather if you could have, on the one side a 
picture of a multiplicity of wave-like surface changes only, while all 
the time the deep bed of Oneness reposes unbroken underneath: on 
the other side the idea of an absolute plurality, every midget 
existence, every speck and grain, unique (for what such "uniqueness" 
was worth) and equally real, irrespective of any hierarchy of truth at 
all: then can there be any question that the hypothesis of Oneness is 
the profounder hypothesis, and must, if we lay this barely between 
those two, be the real? But we are surface-creatures only, and by 
nature are meant to be that only, if there is any meaning in nature. 
No metaphysician goes the whole length of departure from the 
surface-condition of mind - that fact is generally not noticed. For 
such departures result in self-destruction, just as though we hurled 
ourselves into space - into "mental-space, " if you like, in this case. 
We are surface-creatures, and the "truths" from beneath the surface 
contradict our values. It is among the flowers and leaves that our lot 
is cast, and the roots, however "interesting, " are not so ultimate for 
us. For us the ultimate thing is the surface, the last-comer, and that is 
committed to a plurality of being. (TWM, 377) 
Lewis restricts knowledge to the surface not because he considers `the 
"truths" from beneath the surface' as categorically unknowable, but 
because they `contradict our values' and potentially result in `self- 
destruction'. His epistemology is framed in terms of survival rather than 
knowability; going `beneath the surface' is not rejected because it 
impossible, but because it is dangerous. A wilful ignorance of `the Real' is 
central to Lewis's version of `reality', a pattern that is repeated in his 
approach to God: 
If there is a God, we can say, we have, for this life, our backs turned to 
each other. This must be so for things to be bearable at all for us as 
creatures: for such unrelieved intimacy as would otherwise exist, 
such perpetual society - of such a pervasive, psychic, overwhelming 
kind - would not be socially possible. We at least must pretend not to 
notice each other's presence, [... ]. To confront or "encounter" God is 
for us physically impossible, we can conclude; we can only see God, if 
at all, from behind. (TWM, 372) 
The fundamental problem with Lewis's survival-oriented epistemology of 
the surface is that it assumes that it is within the power of individuals to 
ignore the absolute, whether in the form of God or `the Real', and does not 
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consider situations where this strategy would become impossible, and the 
`unrelieved intimacy' of `perpetual society' become unavoidable. It is in the 
light of this lack in his philosophy that the treatment of `reality' and `the 
Real' in his novels becomes significant, for they deal with situations in 
which individuals do not possess sufficient power to turn their backs to 
`the Real' of the situations in which they find themselves, and where the 
`reality' of the surface starts to crack and disintegrate. 
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The Childermass: 
`the whole appearance vanishes, the man is gone' 
The work of Lewis's in which a sense of reality is most dramatically lost is 
his 1928 novel The Childermass, described by Fredric Jameson as a work 
of `theological science fiction'. 12 The Childermass is so full of episodes 
where the real and the unreal mix uneasily that it would be impossible to 
document and analyse them all, and so I will concentrate, to begin with, on 
the figures of the `peons', the ghostly proletariat of Lewis's imagined after- 
world, whose tendency to disintegrate when looked at too hard 
demonstrates extremely well the bizarre nature of the reality of The 
Childermass, and indicates some of the more general cultural and political 
concerns of the novel. The peons first appear early on in the novel, when 
Pullman and Satterthwaite, the protagonists of the novel, encounter a 
`working-party of the peons despatched at daybreak from the celestial port 
for field-work and employment in the camp' (C, 21). The peons are 
described in terms which immediately give an impression of their status 
both as labourers and tenuously real indigents: 
Grey-faced, a cracked parchment with beards of a like material, 
ragged wisps and lamellations of the skin, bandage-like turbans of 
the same shade, or long-peaked caps, their eyes are blank, like 
discoloured stones. A number of figures are collected with picks and 
shovels, baulks, a wheelbarrow in the shape of a steep trough, a 
gleaming sickle, two long-handled sledges and one heavy beetle- 
hammer. Their spindle limbs are in worn braided dungaree suitings. 
(C, 21) 
The peons fascinate Salters, who is new to the after-world and unlike 
Pullman has not seen them before: 
Salters' eyes are attracted to these halted human shells as though to a 
suddenly perceived vacuum but with them it is not the abstract abyss. 
The bold spanking rhythm of Salters' forward roll degenerates into 
12 Fredric Jameson, Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist, 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979), p. 6. 
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sluggish pretence, stimulated by his trainer. His vertigo increases as 
they draw near to the peons. Pullman idles coolly forward, blandly 
receptive in his Zoo of men, but he says, "Don't look! " frequently, 
mistrusting of the mysterious inflammability of all more instinctive 
organisms. (C, 23) 
It is significant that it is specifically only Satters' eyes that are attracted to 
the peons, as this purely ocular fascination appears as more a physical 
than a mental process, guided by the automatism of one of the senses 
rather than the reflection and will of the mind or personality. The physical 
nature of Satters' fascination is also manifested in the `degeneration' of his 
walk from `bold spanking rhythm [... ] into sluggish pretence', as if the 
mere sighting of the peons instantly affects Satters' bodily posture which, 
until now, has been characterised as one of a thoroughly upper-class and 
public-school clumsiness, but which seems very quickly to begin to 
approximate that of the peons. When Pullman commands Satters not to 
look at the peons, it is unclear whether his mistrust of `the mysterious 
inflammability of all more instinctive organisms' is focused on Satters or 
on the peons, an ambiguity which also gives an indication of the sudden 
and involuntary similarity that is at work. 
Things get even more peculiar when we are given a Satters-eye view 
of the proceedings: 
Salters in the dirty mirror of the fog sees a hundred images, in the 
aggregate, sometimes as few as twenty, it depends if his gaze is 
steadfast. Here and there their surfaces collapse altogether as his eyes 
fall upon them, the whole appearance vanishes, the man is gone. But 
as the pressure withdraws of the full-blown human glance the 
shadow reassembles, in the same stark posture, every way as before, 
at the same spot - obliquely he is able to observe it coming back 
jerkily into position. (C, 23) 
The peons cannot be fixed in vision, and although they disappear to some 
extent they never do so completely, always remaining obliquely in the field 
of vision. If we take the peons to represent the urban working-class masses 
characteristic of modernity, something suggested by the fact that they 
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come equipped with `a gleaming sickle [... ] and one heavy beetle-hammer' 
(C, 21), then Lewis's presentation of them reveals not only an anxiety 
about the presence and potential power of these masses, but also a concern 
about the possibility of gaining knowledge of them and fixing them in 
perception. Rather like the absent crowd of the General Strike that is there 
but never quite appears in the last chapter of The Apes of God, which will 
be discussed in Chapter Five, the peons can never be confronted directly, 
as they do not stand still or even remain substantial for long enough for 
the middle-class observer to be able to come to terms with them and 
establish what they really are. In both novels the observer who confronts 
this problem is portrayed as being childlike and naive - Daniel Boleyn in 
The Apes of God is hardly more developed than the babyish Satters - 
which may suggest that Lewis is satirising a particular subset of the 
middle-classes; but, given the more general concern about stability and 
clarity of vision in his work, it seems extremely likely that this concern 
about the shifting and indefinable presence of a working-class mass is a 
fundamental one. The childishness of Satters and Boleyn can then be seen 
as functioning as a decoy or a screen, enabling Lewis to articulate his 
anxieties, without suffering the indignity of having to express them directly 
as his own personal fears. 
The peons, and indeed the whole of the world of The Childermass, 
can be seen as a fine example of a world in which `all that is sold melts into 
air', 13 and this melting certainly threatens Satters, undermining as it does 
his confidence in his power to understand the world around him: 
The effort to understand is thrown upon the large blue circular eyes 
entirely: but the blue disc is a simple register; it has been filled with a 
family of pain-photisms, a hundred odd, it is a nest of vipers 
absolutely - oh, they are unreal! what are these objects they have got 
in? signal the muscles of the helpless eye: it distends in alarm; it is 
13 The phrase is of course from The Communist Manifesto, but it also forms the basis and 
the title of Marshall Berman's influential account of modernity, All That is Solid Melts 
Into Air: The Experience of Modernity, (London & New York: Verso, 1983), which is 
illuminating on some of the issues at work here. 
33 
Chapter One: Reality 
nothing but a shocked astonished apparatus, asking itself if it has 
begun to work improperly. (C, 24) 
However, when the peons return to some sort of solidity, Satters is not 
relieved but becomes subject to a new sort of anxiety: 
The images take on for him abruptly a menacing distinctness; the 
monotonous breathing of the group turns into a heave that with a 
person would be a sigh; all this collection are inflated with a breath of 
unexpected sadness; a darker shade rushes into the pigments, as it 
were, of them, like wind springing up in their immaterial passionless 
trances, whistling upon their lips, at some order, denying them more 
repose - since they have a life after their fashion, however faded; and 
a thrill of dismay responds in Satters, the spell lifts, he presses 
against Pullman, forcing him off the track in panic. (C, 24-5) 
That this realisation of the strange reality of the peons results in Salters 
forcing Pullman (whose name itself suggests a railway carriage) off the 
track is significant, for it suggests that Salters' perception of the peons, 
which is far less mediated than Pullman's by the reassurances of the 
Bailiff, is in some way disruptive of the path which they are supposed to 
follow. Indeed, Pullman's reaction to Salters' behaviour is exactly that of 
the haughty but threatened member of the ruling classes: '"We must hold 
our ground [... ] Don't show you're afraid of them whatever you do. Where 
are your fighting glands? They're quite inoffensive"' (C, 25). Pullman's 
reaction is `to keep up appearances', which is, as we have already seen, 
Zizek's characterisation of an inadequate reaction to `the passion for the 
Real'; rather than admit and take into consideration the reality of what 
Satters sees, Pullman keeps on repeating the same old cliched formulas in 
order to sustain his less traumatic, but less real, sense of reality and order. 
Later on Salters and Pullman encounter some friends of Satters, who, 
like him, are dressed as school-boys, and with whom Satters converses. 
After they have gone Pullman admonishes Satters for talking to them, as 
he claims that they were in fact peons, a fact that Satters disputes, and 
which leads him to ask Pullman: 
34 
Chapter One: Reality 
"What is a peon then, really? " 
The response commences at once. 
"It is the multitude of personalities which God has created, ever 
since the beginning of time, and is unable now to destroy, " Pullman 
mumbles under protest, saying his lesson, over his basket, in which 
he stirs about with his finger. 
"How about Marcus then? " 
"Well how about him? " 
"Well, did I imagine Marcus - you know what I mean, or don't 
you? - I'm afraid! " 
"Did you create Marcus, do you mean? " Pullman's voice 
improves and grows distinct, but his head is sunk. He talks to his 
eggs as he turns them over. 
"Oh all right don't beastly well talk if you don't want to! No I 
don't mean that, that I- what did you say? " 
"Why not? In your dreams you create all sorts of people. Why 
not in the other thing? " 
"Why not in the what? " 
"Why, in the other dream. " (C, 41-2) 
Pullman's initial answer, which merely repeats a formula he has learnt 
from the Bailiff and which until now has been accepted by Salters, does not 
end the questioning here, and Pullman himself raises the possibility of 
subjectively creating people by the power of the imagination `in the other 
dream', i. e. in the `normal' waking world of The Childermass. This 
possibility, which in the world they are in cannot be summarily dismissed, 
seems to have a devastating physical effect on Pullman: 
Pullman looks up. Salters gazes into a sallow vacant mask, on which 
lines of sour malice are disappearing, till it is blank and elementary, 
in fact the face of a clay doll. 
"Why, you are a peon! " Salters cries pointedly, clapping his 
hands. 
Pullman recovers at his cry, and his face, with muscular 
initiative, shrinks as though in the grip of a colossal sneeze. The 
screwed-up cuticle is a pinched blister of a head-piece: it unclenches, 
and the normal Pullman-mask emerges, but still sallow, battered and 
stiff-lipped. (C, 42) 
This slippage on Pullman's part, who until now has very much functioned 
as Salters' only stable and reliable point of reference, prompts Salters to 
question him even more: 
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"Then I could create you as well, couldn't IF [Satters] drawls, 
and yawns. 
"I expect so. " 
Pullman squints at him with vixenish reserve and yawns. 
"Are peons- What was I going to say? Are the peons -" 
"Men? " 
"No not men; I mean are they always peons? " 
Pullman is in a huff; he moves the previous question. The 
dialogue prevents him from leaving. 
"They are not always peons. " 
"Always is a big order. Once a peon, always a peon: is that what 
you mean? Not necessarily. " 
"Yes I expect sometimes - They are human like us, aren't they, 
in a way, Pulley? " 
"Not like us. " 
"Not like us? What is the difference? Are we very different? I 
believe we only think we're different. " (C, 43) 
Satters seems to have hit on one of the truths of the world of The 
Childermass: the difference between the non-peons and the peons is not 
an absolute or an innate one, but one which has to be sustained through 
the reiteration of conventions and formulaic statements of belief. This 
`realisation' by Satters (although the reader is probably meant to be more 
aware of its truth than Satters, who remains the quintessential 
nincompoop) immediately has dramatic effects on the simulacrum of a 
souk in which this exchange has taken place: 
the lambent grain of the wall falls into violent movement, then it 
collapses, a white triturated dust puffs into the bazaar. Satters 
plunges into the dissolving surface after the small darting figure with 
the basket. He closes his eyes, there is a soft rush in his ears, there is 
an empty instant of time, and he is hurled from the sinking fabric. 
For a few seconds he is confused. He is still aware, as an image, 
of the scene from which he has been expelled. But the river is there in 
front of him: the city is reflected in it, as it is near. Pullman tramples 
beside him, bareheaded, in his slippers. The strangeness of the 
abrupt readjustment is overcome almost immediately. Then at once 
the present drives out everything except itself, so that inside a minute 
it for him is the real. (C, 43-4) 
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This sudden expulsion and the quickness with which the change of scene is 
internally recognised and accepted as reality dramatises the extent of the 
power of the Bailiff (who presumably is responsible for it, but who has not 
yet appeared in the narrative except through Pullman's routine allusions to 
him) over both the external environment and Pullman and Salters' 
perception of it. The speed at which the transformation becomes accepted 
is due to the shortness of their memory - an image of where they were 
before is retained, but only briefly, and `the present drives out everything 
except itself, that is to say the previous environment and their memory of 
it. 
Immediately after this unanticipated change of scene, as Pullman and 
Satters set off again, a `strange voice rises upon the atmosphere, in 
apostrophe', and, as Satters immediately realises, `The words are 
Pullman's but the voice and the manner are those of a stranger' (C, 44). 
This dissociation of Pullman's words and his voice signals the breakdown 
of the natural unity of the subject, manifested by the fact that Pullman is 
not entirely in control of himself, and indicates the presence of something 
other than Pullman and Satters, even though they are apparently alone - 
something other which can evidently speak through Pullman if it wishes to 
do so. Satters himself finds this `lapse' of Pullman's amusing, and `eyes 
with mischievous satisfaction the unconscious figure'; Pullman, on the 
other hand finds it an uncomfortable and embarrassing experience: 
Frowning, [Pullman] eructates slightly twice, then again, expelling 
the sensation - planting his slippered feet, as he advances, with 
additional firmness. He whistles a few bars of a chimes. As a person 
guilty of a spasm of wind in a select company, but who covers the 
breach with a stolid eye, so Pullman disregards his lapse from the 
rational. (C, 44) 
The simile of the `spasm of wind' and Pullman's eructation (belching) 
suggests a grotesquely physical dimension to his reaction to the 
dissociation which he has unconsciously undergone; his attempt to expel 
the sensation through such inside-out methods suggests that, in Pullman's 
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mind, the power or presence which was responsible for the lapse imposes 
itself inside him, rather than upon him. Pullman's defensive belching also 
recalls one of his instructions to Satters, after their earlier encounter with 
peons, to "`Spit out that filth! "', which was swiftly followed by the peons 
becoming `a part of the sodden unsteady phantasm of the past upon the 
spot' (C, 28). In both episodes the motion of physical expulsion of 
something interior (liquid or gas) functions as a means of the individual 
removing the influence of an external force that has somehow become 
internalised. Or, perhaps more accurately, it allows the individual to 
believe that they have accomplished such an expulsion. This image of the 
influence of others manifesting itself as a physical intrusion or as the 
digestion of an alien element, suggests that, for Pullman at least, the 
expulsion of this element will also result in the expulsion of the influence: 
he thinks that he can belch out the other voice which speaks through him. 
Such a belief presupposes that the physically intact individual is 
autonomous, and that individuality can be regulated and guaranteed 
through the maintenance of the proper order and appearance of the body. 
The relationship between belief and reality, so important in Time and 
Western Man, features in the explanation Pullman gives Salters for the 
latter's feelings of strangeness: Pullman relates an anecdote about a 
Professor Tyndall who, when receiving an electric shock in a public 
demonstration involving a battery of Leyden jars, has the following 
experience: 
" [... ] For a few moments Professor Tyndall was insensible. [... ] Well, 
when Professor Tyndall came to, he found himself in the presence of 
his audience. There was he, there was the audience, there were the 
Leyden jars. In a flash he realized perfectly what had happened: he 
knew he had received the battery discharge. The intellectual 
consciousness, as he called it, of his position returned more promptly 
than the optical consciousness. What is meant by that is as follows. 
He recovered himself, so to speak, very nearly at once. He was 
conscious on the spot of what had occurred. Professor Tyndall had 
great presence of mind. He was able to address the audience and 
reassure it immediately. But while he was reassuring the audience, 
his body appeared to him cut up into fragments. For instance, his 
arms were separated from his trunk, and seemed suspended in the 
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air. He was able to reason and also to speak as though nothing were 
the matter. But his optic nerve was quite irrational. It reported 
everything in a fantastic manner. Had he believed what it reported, 
he would not have been able to address his audience as he did, or in 
fact address them at all. Do you follow so far? Had it been the optic 
nerve speaking it would have said, `As you see, I am all in pieces! ' As 
it was, he said, `You see! I am uninjured and quite as usual. ' [... ] " (C, 
89-90) 
Pullman goes on to explain that when he first arrived in the world of The 
Childermass this story came to his mind: 
" [... ] Shall I tell you my reasoning? [... ] Tyndall when he was 
addressing the audience was really disembodied. He had no body at 
the moment, only bits. He spoke from memory of the normal 
situation. Do you see the train of thought or not? On the physical side 
we are, at present, memories of ourselves. Do you get that? We are in 
fragments, as it were, or anything you like. We are not normal, are 
we? No. Conscious - we are conscious, though. So there you have a 
sufficient parallel. We behave as we do from memory, that's the idea. 
We go one better than Tyndall: we put the thing together in its 
sensational completeness. We behave as though we were now what 
we used to be, in life. [... ] " (C, 90-1) 
These images of fragmentation and reintegration dramatise the idea that 
the body does not, at least in the world of The Childermass, exist for 
consciousness in a self-evident and unmediated way. However, there is a 
crucial difference between the experience of Satters and that of Professor 
Tyndall in Pullman's anecdote: for Tyndall, his body really is unified and 
whole, and the shock that he experiences exposes him briefly to the 
perception that his body exists as fragments, an illusory perception which, 
through the operation of his intellect, he quickly overcomes; with Satters, 
on the other hand, his body is not really unified in the first place -'We are 
not normal, are we? ' - and the mental operation of unification is one 
which has to be performed and cannot just be assumed. Pullman's 
statement that `We behave as though we were now what we used to be, in 
life', suggests that the unification of the perceived fragments of the body 
through the action of memory is no longer a temporary defence against a 
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momentary illusion of fragmentation, as it was with Professor Tyndall, but 
an ongoing constitutive process, an ongoing means by which people can 
behave `as though' they were normal. For Tyndall, the knowledge of his 
bodily unity is realistic, it is in accordance with the reality of the situation, 
as the fragmentation he perceives is just an effect of his electrocution, 
whereas for Salters and Pullman, the belief that their bodies are unified, 
based on their memories, is not realistic in the sense of simply reflecting a 
fixed objective reality out there, but is an active process of reality- 
production, of enabling them to behave `as though' they were still `normal'. 
The split between an `intellectual consciousness' and an `optical 
consciousness' that Pullman invokes in his explanation of Professor 
Tyndall's experience is a useful one for understanding the relationship 
between Pullman and Salters. Throughout the novel attention is drawn to 
the eyes of the two main characters: Pullman is presented as having 
glasses and poor vision, one of the key characteristics he shares with 
James Joyce; Salters is introduced as having `blue eyes engagingly dilated' 
(C, 7), and when he has to answer a question about the size of his eyes for a 
questionnaire of the Bailiffs Pullman prompts him to answer, `large. Very 
big. Lovely big ones! And blue' (C, 66). As we saw when Salters first 
encountered the Peons, his eyes sometimes seem to possess a will of their 
own, becoming drawn to things without the intervention of his mind; on 
the other hand, Pullman tends not to see what he does not already believe 
in, and in contrast to Salters, his optical perceptions are completely under 
the control of his intellect, something illustrated by his attitude towards 
their surroundings: 
[Salters: ] "What are those hills? " 
"Hills? Where? There are no hills. They're nothing! " Pullman 
crossly exclaims. 
"I didn't know. " 
"Nothing at all, not hills. " 
The distance to the city varies; Satters repeatedly looks over, 
lunging his head to catch it at its changes and at last says: 
"Doesn't that look smaller sometimes? " 
"What? " Pullman looks round indignantly. 
"Sometimes it looks smaller to me than others. " 
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"Certainly not! Whatever makes you think! " 
The whole city like a film-scene slides away perceptibly several 
inches to the rear, as their eyes are fixed upon it. 
"There! " exclaims Salters pointing. 
"Oh that! I know, it looks like it. But it isn't so. It's only the 
atmosphere. " (C, 32) 
Pullman's stubborn insistence that firstly there are no hills when hills can 
clearly be seen, and secondly that they are stationary when in fact they are 
clearly moving, indicates the extent to which his optical perception of his 
environment is conditioned by his belief that it is normal, and is not the 
bizarre and shifting oddity that it really is, and which he and Salters both 
see. The irony of Pullman's insistence that the hills are not really moving 
but only look as if they are is revealed later when the Bailiff declares `The 
mountains were an idea of mine! ' (C, 210), and explains that: 
I had [the mountains] fixed up as I told you. It was no easy matter to 
get 'em to make their appearance as you now can see them and settle 
down in the reliable way they have as pukka mountains, as they are. I 
went into the whole matter with our principal engineer as it happens 
a Scot -a Scot -a very able person: he was despatched to Iceland 
and he brought back the mountains with him or should I say their 
appearance. Once in a way they vanish even now, but they're a fairly 
dependable landmark on the whole as certain as most things. Don't 
look too hard at them, I didn't say they were to be taken too seriously. 
(C, 224) 
The fact that the mountains really are only `their appearance' makes a 
mockery of Pullman's earlier position, and shows that the `optical 
consciousness' of Salters actually registers the reality of their situation 
better than his `intellectual consciousness', reversing the hierarchy he 
invoked in the anecdote of Professor Tyndall. But although Salters can in 
many ways see, or allow himself to see, the reality of the world they are in, 
he is not equipped with the knowledge to survive in it unaided by Pullman, 
a fact emphasised by the constant references to his childishness and 
Pullman's nannyishness. Lewis's point here is not that the optical 
consciousness is superior to the intellectual consciousness, or vice versa, 
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but that the separation of these two consciousnesses has deleterious effects 
on the adequate perception of the world, a point that echoes his assertion 
in Time and Western Man that, `it is because of the subjective disunity due 
to the separation, or separate treatment, of the senses, principally of 
sight and of touch, that the external disunity has been achieved' (TWM, 
393)" 
The difference between Salters' dangerous optical fascination with 
the reality of what he sees, and Pullman's defensive intellectual integration 
of it into a pre-existing pattern is made clear in an earlier passage, where 
Pullman and Salters are characterised as rats: 
A veteran rat trotting in an aerial gutter, he catches a glimpse of 
glittering chasms but averts his eyes, his present business the 
periplus of the roof. He is guiding, dutiful senior, the young rat to 
their eyrie their coign of vantage. Once they get there he will rest, and 
have a dream perhaps, of gigantic apparitions inhabiting the 
dangerous hollows inside the world. Meanwhile action is everything; 
to keep moving is the idea, that is his law of existence - to rattle 
along these beaten tracks. Has he not the golden secret, who knows 
as he does the right road to the proper place in record time, barring 
accidents? But the glamour of this outcast plan, rigid and forbidden, 
whose lines are marked out through the solid walls of matter, 
contrary to the purposes of nature, is lost on the newcomer. He only 
has eyes for the abyss. Intoxicated with the spaces plunging all round 
them, in passionate distances expressed as bright dizzy drops, let in 
at spy-holes or thrown up as reflections, he walks upon air, truant in 
mind from the too-concrete circuit. (C, 16-7) 
The abyss which fascinates and intoxicates Salters is real but, in Pullman's 
eyes, dangerous, and so he averts his eyes from it, resisting the intoxication 
to which Satters is compelled. On the other hand, Pullman is throughout 
the book characterised as being `hypnotised' by the Bailiff; indeed the first 
time the Bailiff is mentioned he `withdraws into a hypnotic fixity of 
expression': `Pullman stands fast, shoulders high and squared, small calves 
in inflexible arcs, eyes still hypnotic' (C, 9-1o). 
It is Satters, the infantile idiot, and not Pullman, the educated 
intellectual, who directs his gaze beneath the surface, and while Lewis can 
hardly be said to endorse Satters as an exemplar, Pullman's strategy is 
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hardly presented as a perfect one, either. However, the alternatives 
presented here - either following the preordained path of convention or 
falling into the void - seem to map the only alternatives present in Lewis's 
thought. The idea of an active engagement with `the Real' beyond the 
`reality' sustained by belief is never seriously considered by Lewis, and the 
presence of any such reality is caricatured as traumatic and violent, 
invading the body and the mind of the individual, and destroying their 
sense of self. It is Lewis's inability to imagine a new way of being that 
escapes these two limiting alternatives that is his key failure, and marks 
him out as a peculiar modernist, advocating a reliance on established 
values and conventions of `common-sense' together with a suspension of 
curiosity about `the Real' on the philosophical level, while practising an 
extremely original and modern literary and visual style, which breaks 
decisively with the conventions of naturalistic realism that would seem to 
be the aesthetic counterpart of his epistemological position. 
The idea that memory plays a crucial role in our perception of the world 
was discussed in Time and Western Man, where Lewis asserts that: `It is 
memory that gives that depth and fullness to our present, and makes our 
abstract, ideal world of objects for us' (TWM, 383). Contrasted with the 
depth and fullness of a world mediated and enriched by memory is the 
flatness and depthlessness of the world as seen by Time-philosophy and 
modern science, which Lewis sees as: 
a world according to the crude or elementary optic sense, and 
therefore a picture. But it is a flat world: it is one of successive, flat, 
images or impressions. And further, these images or impressions are, 
as far as possible, naked and simple, direct, sensations, unassociated 
with any component of memory. (TWM, 384) 
This would also be a good description of the world of The Childermass, 
particularly in those moments when, as in the disintegration of the 
simulacral souk, it is at its most arbitrary and fluctuating. In light of this 
similarity it is significant that Lewis does not see this flat, optical world as 
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ultimately less real than the world of memory and common-sense, indeed, 
he actually sees it as more real: 
The intensity, nakedness, reality of the immediate sensation, even 
though it gives you no ideal whole, though it is dogmatically a 
creature of the moment, even though it gives you the "objects" of life 
only as strictly experienced in Time; evanescent, flashing and 
momentary; not even existing outside of their proper time, ideally 
having no prolongations in memory, confined to the "continuous 
present" of the temporal appearance: consumed (and immediately 
evacuated) as "events": one with action, incompatible with reflection, 
impossible of contemplation - the sensation (in spite of these 
peculiarities) is nevertheless, is it not? the real thing. (TWM, 389) 
This reinforces the idea that it is Satters who perceives far more acutely 
`the Real' of the world of The Childermass, whereas Pullman is stuck in the 
belief-mediated `reality' controlled by the Bailiff. However, Salters' 
helplessness, caused by the lack of an intellectual consciousness, suggests 
that, by itself, a perception of `the Real' is useless, and that its mediation 
into `reality' is necessary for an operative knowledge of it to be achieved. 
Lewis's satirical attitude towards Pullman's strategy is interesting, as it is 
not so different from Lewis's own epistemology of survival in Time and 
Western Man, where, as we have already seen, he asserted that `we are 
surface-creatures only, and by nature are meant to be that only, if there is 
any meaning in nature. [... ] For us the ultimate thing is the surface, the 
last-comer, and that is committed to a plurality of being' (TWM, 377). The 
problem confronted by Pullman is that the surfaces he perceives are not 
just simply there, they do not exist in a state of stable, common-sense, 
objective reality, but have been engineered by the Bailiff and can be 
manipulated for his political benefit. Superficial `reality' ungrounded in 
`the Real' becomes, in theory at least, merely a matter of belief, and as such 
is susceptible to ideological manipulation. The inescapability of `the Real', 
however, manifests itself through Satters' intransigent reliance on the 
evidence of his eyes, and even though it never appears as such, its effects 
disrupt Pullman's fantasy of a `reality' entirely out of touch with `the Real'. 
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The Revenge for Love: 
`a showdown, between a shadow and a man of flesh and blood' 
In The Revenge for Love we are presented with a struggle in which the 
contended factor is not ethical superiority or practical success, but reality: 
as Margot thinks to herself, `it was just as if they had engaged in a battle of 
wills, to decide who should possess most reality - just as men fought each 
other for money, or fought each other for food' (RL, 163). 14 The 
antagonistic parties invoked by Margot are, on the one hand, herself and 
Victor Stamp, her husband, and, on the other, people who could be 
described, extending the language of Tarr, as bourgeois-bohemian- 
bolsheviks -a set of well-to-do left-wing London intellectuals with whom 
Margot and Victor have a precarious association. When set out in this 
fashion the opposition at the heart of the novel seems to be between the 
authentic and non-political love of the financially insecure Victor and 
Margot, and the well-heeled, pretentious, and insubstantial politicking and 
philosophising of everyone else. If read in this way, the novel can be seen 
as a simple allegory of authentic human values (or reality) in a world gone 
mad with inhuman ideologies (unreality). 
The opposition between Victor and Margot as real and everyone else 
as unreal is given its most simple and powerful dramatisation in the fourth 
part of the novel, which largely takes place at a party held by Sean O'Hara, 
an important communist of suspect past and dubious commitment, at 
which all the main characters of the novel are present. The question of the 
reality or otherwise of the majority of the guests is raised by a drunken 
Victor, in belligerent response to Margot's attempts to make him quieter 
and less offensive: "`Not say what I think? Why? Do you suppose that these 
people are real? Do you think they exist? " he bellowed darkly in her ear' 
14 The idea of a struggle for reality was mentioned five years earlier in Snooty Baronet 
(1932), where Kell-Imrie, the protagonist, declares that: `I saw that I had to compete with 
these other creatures bursting up all over the imaginary landscape, and struggling against 
me to be real - like a passionate battle for necessary air, in a confined place. ' Wyndham 
Lewis, Snooty Baronet, first published 1932, ed. Bernard Lafourcade, (Santa Rosa: Black 
Sparrow Press, 1984), P. 138. 
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(RL, 162). The possibility of the unreality of the other guests initiates a 
long passage of reflection by Margot: 
Sending her eye out on a secret journey of inspection, she asked 
herself, shuddering at the question, were they real? If they were not, 
again, did that make it better or did it make it worse? Of course, if she 
really came to believe that they were not, she would feel afraid. Who 
would not? 
Was this after all a great complicated dream she had got into 
against her volition, where all these vivid likenesses of life only 
existed in her dreaming mind? Were all these tweed trousers and 
cotton shirts, buttons and fingernails a few feet away, imaginary, as 
she had been told so often by Victor that they were? Of all the 
conversations Victor was apt to hold with such young men as Pete, 
she perhaps disliked more than any others those that bore upon this 
topic, namely that of the appearance and the reality. 
Apart from anything else, this sort of talk caused her to regard 
everything, herself, as more shadowy and floating than before. But 
she had the strongest feeling, whenever she was listening to them, 
that their intentions were not charitable, as they argued upon those 
lines with Victor - for it was they who had made Victor believe that 
he was not "real, " of that she was positive. He had always thought he 
was real until he met Pete, to that she could swear. The malice would 
flash out of Pete's eye. It was their reality, that of Victor and herself, 
that was marked down to be discouraged and abolished, and it was 
they that the others were trying to turn into phantoms and so to 
suppress. It was a mad notion, but it was just as if they had engaged 
in a battle of wills, to decide who should possess most reality - just 
as men fought each other for money, or fought each other for food. 
(RL, 162-3) 
This passage dramatises the problems caused by Lewis's belief, expressed 
in Time and Western Man, that, `the everyday life is too much affected by 
the speculative activities that are renewing and transvaluing our world' 
(TWM, xi), or, in Margot's language, how `this sort of talk' affects the way 
she `regards everything'. The fact that it is `they', i. e. members of the 
bourgeois-bohemian-bolshevik clique, who are responsible for Victor's 
sense of unreality demonstrates how, for Lewis, the problem of the 
ontological stability of reality is not a self-sufficient existential problem of 
the isolated individual, but something which happens in response to the 
presence and discourse of other people. The political aspects of this 
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diminishment of common-sense stable reality are also emphasised in this 
passage, by Margot's belief that the notion of unreality propagated by Pete 
and his friends is intended to discourage, abolish, and suppress the reality 
of Victor and herself , which she sees as representing the non-political 
values of art and of love. The philosophy of Pete and his friends, which 
seems basically to be the `Time-philosophy' vilified in Time and Western 
Man, is presented as being motivated more by strategic than philosophical 
concerns. Although Margot dislikes the ideas of Pete and his friends, she is 
unable to dismiss them, and feels compelled to seek physical proof of 
Victor's reality by making contact with his body: 
the mere notion of Victor as a shadow-person distressed her so much 
that she grappled him to herself, so that he, at least, should not be 
outside herself among the unreals, resolved to fortify herself against 
the scepticism in this capital matter, and as a munition against 
Peteishness to use violence if necessary. Slipping her hand in beneath 
Victor's arm, she hugged it to her body. As his muscles played about 
like fishes under his skin, she tried to catch them with her ever-timid 
fingers, like little apologetic pincers - as if to arrest life, and its 
reality as well, if she could only catch one and hold it still in her 
hand, extracting it from its bloody element. (RL, 163) 
The violence present in Margot's mind complicates the idea that she is 
merely a victim of the ideology of unreality, as her willingness to use 
violence as a `munition' suggests that she too is motivated by strategic 
rather than innocent concerns. The image of Margot grappling herself to 
Victor and trying to catch one of his fishlike muscles and extract it `from its 
bloody element' makes quite clear this underlying violence, and the 
generally combative nature of her attitude suggests that she views the 
`battle of wills' in which she feels herself to be engaged as one which has to 
be fought with force. 
The beginning of the end of Margot's common-sense view of reality is 
indicated here by the fact that, although she manages to retain her sense of 
her and Victor's reality, she herself comes to believe in the unreality of 
everyone else: 
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As she clung to Victor she felt that what he had said was true, and 
that they were not in fact so very real at all, the people with which 
this room was packed. They were a dangerous crowd of shadows, of 
course, that hovered over them. But if you stood up to them, if you 
called their noisy shadow-bluff, as Victor would be able to do if he so 
desired - if it came down to a showdown, between a shadow and a 
man of flesh and blood - they would give way. She could see that they 
would move off, chattering, but admitting their ineffectiveness. They 
could not really bear you down. They could only browbeat you like a 
gramophone, or impose on you like the projections on the screen of 
the cinema. Spring up and face them, and they would give way before 
you. For they had no will. Their will to life was extinct, even if they 
were technically real. (RL, 163-4) 
Paradoxically, it is precisely when, in order to re-establish a sense of 
reality, Margot clings to Victor's body that she begins in some way to 
accept or realise the truth of what Pete says, and begins to think of the 
people around her as `not in fact so very real at all'. Margot's sense of her 
own reality, grounded, at least for the moment, in the physical reality of 
Victor, is in fact a reaction to the insistence of Pete and his friends that 
everything is unreal; given that her sense of her own and Victor's reality is 
invoked as a defence against her growing sense of the unreality of everyone 
else, her need to find a physical ground for it implicitly admits the power 
of the contrary arguments. Margot's re-designation of everyone else as 
unreal is a partial admission that Pete's ideas were right all along, but she 
takes refuge in believing that he is only right up to a point and that the 
spreading sense of unreality does not yet extend all the way to her and 
Victor. 
Margot's hopeful belief that `if you stood up to them, if you called 
their noisy shadow-bluff [... ] - if it came down to a showdown, between a 
shadow and a man of flesh and blood - they would give way' and that 
`Victor would be able to do if he so desired' is given an initial yet partial 
vindication in the confrontation between Victor and the group of shady 
businessmen for whom he comes to forge pictures as a living, in `The 
Fakers' section of the novel. The most grotesque of these businessmen is 
Freddie Salmon, an anti-Semitic caricature, whose features are described 
entirely in terms of their falsity: 
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Freddie Salmon had a really enormous false bottom to his face. The 
face proper obviously terminated a short distance below the line of 
the lower lip: and what was palpably a bogus jaw had been 
superadded, for some not very evident purpose, by inscrutable 
nature; unless, of course, he had grown it himself, in the progress of 
his mortal career, for ends which, again, were none too clear. It 
caused him to have a somewhat stupid look, however, at times. And 
he may of course have desired to look stupid. And it perhaps 
imparted, observed from immediately in front, a somewhat soft 
appearance to the face. It was not impossible that he may have 
desired to appear "soft. " But it was so patently postiche that it could 
only have deceived a very inattentive man. (RL, 231-2) 
Victor is presented as the absolute opposite of this `postiche' stereotype, in 
terms which stress his natural powerfulness: 
an animal amongst men, this young giant crouched, doubled up 
where he sat, his back eloquently presented to Freddie Salmon 
should he turn about to address him. A striking picture of the Odd 
Man Out. For better or for worse these broad and hostile shoulders 
belonged to Nature, with her big impulsive responses, with her 
violent freedom, with her animal directness: unconservative, illogical, 
and true to her elemental self. He subscribed therefore to the larger 
scheme: the smaller, the watertight, the theoretic, the planning of 
man's logic, he repudiated. Like the camel, he must remain a creature 
of the wild, and never, like the horse, wholly submit to discipline. 
(RL, 236) 
Although apparently more authentic than Freddie Salmon, the figure of 
Victor presented here is just as much a stereotype, conforming exactly to 
the requirements of an awkwardly intransigent force of nature. The 
opposition between Victor's naturalness and Freddie Salmon's falseness is 
given a political twist when he is compared to Nazi Germany: Freddie 
Salmon takes this as a sign of Victor's physical brutishness, declaring that 
`the Germans are brutes' (RL, 244). Victor himself airs anti-Semitic 
attitudes which focus on the supposedly false nature of the Jews: 
"[... ] They are sent by their Mitropan pappas, with their names 
changed, to Oxford or Cambridge to be polished up - to learn how to 
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cheat people better! To get themselves a nasty little sham polish on 
their lowbred hides, to trick with, in a shady trade! And that they get 
away with it shows the world's an outsize sucker, that deserves all it 
gets and more! " (RL, 240) 
The opposition between the authentic and natural Victor and the false and 
constructed Freddie Salmon seems to be exactly the same as the one 
between `a shadow and a man of flesh and blood' that Margot imagined at 
O'Hara's party, and in `The Fakers' Victor is allowed his little victory, 
storming out of the room and, he thinks, the whole world of forgery, after 
putting his foot decisively through the painting -a fake Van Gogh self- 
portrait - that he has been working on (RL, 239-40). This violent gesture 
of Victor's emphasises his status as a figure of uncontrollable nature, 
whose physicality disturbs the false and unnatural world of `The Fakers'; 
when he moves we are told that, `The workshop was shocked with the 
impatient revolutions of a heavy body' (RL, 237). This violent, physical 
triumph of Victor's physicality over the false world of `The Fakers' is, 
however, dramatically turned around in the last section of The Revenge for 
Love, `Honey-Angel', where it becomes obvious that it is not so easy at all 
for `a man of flesh and blood' to beat shadows. 
The `Honey-Angel' section begins with Victor and Margot crossing 
the frontier from France to Spain for what is in Victor's eyes at least 
nothing more than an innocent tourist excursion, but which is highly 
suspicious in the eyes of the Spanish police, who have been fooled into 
thinking that Victor is the leader of a gun-running gang. Margot is uneasy 
at crossing into Spain, for although `France was quite unfamiliar enough 
[... ] at least they had not been arming its malcontents with 
Czechoslovakian machine-guns! ' (RL, 261). This unease is registered in her 
bones: `all the globetrotting vibrations in her spine were decidedly extinct. 
Instead, there was established there a numb and convulsive alarm' (RL, 
261). Spain becomes for Margot an unreal place which embodies in its 
geography the `false-bottoms' that pervade the novel: 
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with growing apprehension she trod this sullen soil. Here was 
nothing fast but a false and deceptive surface. Even its touristic 
blandishments savoured of deceit. She felt that she had engaged upon 
the crust of something that concealed a bottomless pit, which bristled 
with uniformed demons, engaged in the rehearsal of a gala Third 
Degree, to be followed by a slap-up autodafe, for the relaxation of 
Lucifer. (RL, 262) 
This sense of unreality and unease prompts Margot to suggest that they 
turn back and not go `farther and farther into this threatening geographical 
abstraction', in which they will, she feels, be `at every moment beset with 
uncertainty', and where `a man might be hiding behind that wall, noting 
their unconcerned advance with satisfaction' (RL, 262). What is important 
to note is that Margot's almost paranoiac sense of unreality is actually far 
closer to the truth than Victor's apparently far more common-sense and 
`realistic' view of events, for as we soon find out, they are actually being 
followed by the Spanish police who even do their comic best to hide behind 
walls (RL, 273). It is significant that Margot reads Victor's unworried 
behaviour as just like a handsome man! There was your handsome man all 
over! ' (RL, 263). Victor's attitude is seen by Margot as determined by a 
conformity to a stereotype, that of the Clark Gable-type `handsome man', 
rather than a recognition of the reality of the situation, a reality which 
cannot be understood without an understanding of the real effects of 
unreal abstractions, in this case that of the borders between countries. 
Margot's attitude here is very different to her attitude at O'Hara's party, 
where it was the real, physical presence of Victor that provided a defence 
against the unreality of the other guests; on the border between France 
and Spain this solid, physical reality of Victor's, and his perception of it, is 
actually a barrier to an understanding of a reality that is both more 
fundamentally real and yet saturated with and defined by ideological 
abstractions. 
In the `Honey-Angel' section we witness Margot's growing realisation 
that what she saw as realities on which see could ground her perception of 
the world, e. g. Victor's body, are not as unproblematically real as she 
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thought, and that what she previously thought of as unrealities can actually 
have very real effects. 
This realisation of the unreality of what she previously saw as real is 
given a perhaps too programmatic exposition in the second chapter of 
`Honey-Angel', which focuses on Margot's thoughts on nature, as she lies 
`upon the bank of a mountain stream' reading Ruskin (RL, 275-9). The 
chapter satirically exposes the gulf between Margot's understanding of 
nature as informed by an English pastoral tradition, represented here by 
Ruskin and Wordsworth, and her perception of `nature in the flesh, as it 
were' (RL, 275). There are two ways to read this chapter: on the one hand, 
it can be read simply as merely poking fun at the delusions of an 
aspirational and pseudo-cultivated lower-class English woman, who is 
stupid enough to believe what she reads; on the other hand, it can be read 
as a reflection or dramatisation of Lewis's ideological concerns about the 
loss of the personality due to the erosion of conventional beliefs and the 
sense of `reality' they provide by the twentieth-century's `passion for the 
Real'. These two different readings cannot be perfectly and harmoniously 
reconciled: in particular, the satirical and mocking tone of the first 
approach would seem to trivialise and make the second reading seem a 
little over-egged. However, this disparity can be seen as a means by which 
Lewis could insert his more apocalyptic concerns into the novel, safely 
concealed under the cover of an easy and unsurprising satirical interlude. 
For example, when Margot asks herself `Did her quarrel with nature 
involve everything upon which her personality had been grounded? ', and 
concludes that `It looked as if it might' (RL, 276), the question of the 
grounding and destruction of the personality that is raised in passing and 
with a light conversational tone is actually one of Lewis's perennial 
philosophical and ideological concerns, although its articulation by Margot 
at this point in the novel disguises this, allowing for the more dramatic 
events that follow to illustrate this proposition without appearing to be 
there solely for this theoretical purpose. 
The `quarrel with nature' that Margot refers to above is a result of her 
`uneasy surprise' with `nature in the flesh': 
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So this is nature: this small bird-woman appeared to be remarking to 
herself. And she had not been prepared for this, it was pretty plain: 
without feeling a fish out of water, she nevertheless would not have 
wished to remain a trout in this particular watercourse. She reserved 
the right to remain outside of nature, now it came to the point; not to 
participate in its sunny dream. It was too sunny altogether! It was too 
artless; it was too empty; it was too much a senseless agitation of 
unfeeling things. (RL, 275) 
This unease with nature is presented as being the result of the situation in 
which she finds herself: 
Under different circumstances, however, the behaviour of these jolly 
liquids, the phlegmatic grandeur of these chaotic stones, would have 
called forth other responses; all would have passed off quite 
differently had her mind not been obsessed with the actors, for whom 
these pastoral sets were the incongruous backgrounds, and if she had 
not been part of this agony of men. It was Victor who was her nature 
now; and "wild nature" too, at that. (RL, 275-6) 
There is an element of nostalgia here, perhaps, for a less troubled time in 
which the idealised view of nature Margot has subscribed to would have 
been able to sustain itself, and not been shown as inadequate to `this agony 
of men'. However, there is also a strong feeling that such nostalgia is 
insufficient, as Margot is part of `this agony of men' and cannot escape it, 
as shown by the description of the book of Ruskin's that she is reading as `a 
more subjective and obedient medium' than the `senseless agitation of 
unfeeling things' which represents the objective situation in which she is 
inescapably caught. The fact that what are now exposed as Ruskin's 
fictions, rather than realities, are inadequate to `the Real' in which Margot 
and Victor are caught is made quite explicitly: 
She had to confess that at present fate seemed to have the whip-hand 
of Victor; and that had he been a hero in a book, he would have 
answered to the requirements of Ruskin's generalization. But Victor 
was not a hero in a book - she only wished he were! They were 
hemmed in by a chaotic reality, against which "heroism" (book- 
heroism) would be of little avail. (RL, 278) 
53 
Chapter One: Reality 
Margot asks herself `Was this treatise going to follow "nature, " into that 
limbo into which all her life was falling? ' (RL, 276). The answer is, of 
course, yes, and the chapter ends thus: 
She rose to her feet, as if she had suddenly called to mind a pressing 
engagement. In her haste she left the book lying on the grass. 
Without looking left or right she started back, at a rapid walk, in the 
direction of the village. (RL, 279) 
This newfound determination and what can perhaps be best described as 
an involuntary decisiveness, together with the abandonment of the 
Victorian myths on which she had previously relied for her sense of 
personality, does not represent anything like a triumphant renunciation of 
an antiquated sense of self and the birth of something like a new and real 
woman, but the beginning of what Zizek would call the disintegration of 
the `phantasmic frame' which enables her sense of reality to function. As 
the novel moves towards its end Margot certainly does begin `to perceive 
reality as an "irreal" nightmarish universe with no firm ontological 
foundation', and it becomes clear that `this nightmarish universe is not 
"pure fantasy" but, on the contrary, that which remains of reality after 
reality is deprived of its support in fantasy. ' 15 Or, to put it in the terms of 
Time and Western Man, Margot begins to perceive reality without the 
support of coherent belief, and as such what she perceives lacks a sense of 
reality and has a `dream quality', even though its violence remains very 
`real' indeed (TWM, 549). 
The first indication that Margot has in some way fundamentally 
changed is given by the manner in which she walks back to the village 
where she and the others are based: she walks with `unprecedented speed 
[... ]. She marched almost, she well-nigh goose-stepped, up the village 
street, with a quasi-obstreperous eye' (RL, 281-2). This new speed and 
determination, indicated by her almost Nazi-style marching, is matched by 
15 Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies, p. 66 
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her awareness that: `She had become an amazon, beside her mountain 
stream! [... ] Ruskin had armed [her eye] with Victorian pugnacity and will- 
to-live, even in the moment when she had cast him out forever as a queen- 
maker' (RL, 282). Margot returns to the company of Victor and Percy 
Hardcaster just as it becomes clear that O'Hara has forged Victor's 
signature in order to make it appear that Victor is the leader of the gang of 
gun-runners for which he is working, thereby making Victor into a target 
for the Spanish police. Margot's unease with this situation, which is far 
more perceptive than Victor's bluff dismissal of it as a `joke', is made 
manifest in her physiognomy: 'Margot's eyes were staring more than was 
natural for a person in a brown study, and her lips had got a smile on them 
that no joke, however much of a scream, would entirely account for' (RL, 
285). 
This change in Margot, which manifests itself both in the insistence 
of her protests about the forged signature and in her physical appearance, 
disturbs Victor, who sees in it aspects of phenomena usually associated by 
Lewis with his less preferred features of modernity: 
this was quite a new departure. [... ] She had brought out into the light 
of common day her secret smile, as before - her overstrained voice; but she had brought out her private imagery as well, [... ] that was the 
trouble: as if the objects of her fancy belonged outside and not inside 
at all. 
She sought to impose them upon the objective reality. To this, 
as an artist, he somewhat objected. Here was the sur-real - he had 
nourished it unawares in his own bosom! And as a man he had to 
confess that he was at a loss to know how to cope with it. He was not 
even quite sure, to be frank, that he would take on the job! He was 
not quixotic enough, perhaps, to take on the delusions of a Quixote. 
His honey-bird in the full regalia of her private mind sitting down at 
a cafe table with old Percy and him and insisting upon wearing her 
nightdress in public - there was about that something he did not like. 
Everything had become involved in this brutal invasion of the 
external plane by the internal plane. (RL, 288) 
At the heart of Margot's transformation, as seen by Victor, is a breakdown 
of manageable duality resulting in a mixing up of the public and the 
private, and the external and the internal, exactly the sort of merging that 
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Lewis set himself against in Time and Western Man. Victor, the hyper- 
masculine artist, cannot deal with this merging because, in a telling 
phrase, he is `no quixotic enough'. The idea that the way one might be able 
to cope with the merging of private and public that Lewis sees as endemic 
in modernity and which is embodied here in Margot by being `quixotic' 
suggests that Lewis sees delusion as playing a defensive role against `the 
Real', in much the same way that he saw belief allowing a coherent sense of 
reality in Time and Western Man. If looked at in this way, The Revenge for 
Love admits in the form of fiction the problem inherent in the philosophy 
proposed in Time and Western Man; namely, that the beliefs Lewis looks 
nostalgically back to cannot deal adequately with the violence of 
modernity, that being `quixotic enough' for modernity is not so easy. 
Lewis's idea of a sense of reality sustained by belief is adequate to a world 
in which aeroplanes do not fall from the sky, but as in the modern world 
such things do happen these beliefs will inevitably come under pressures 
which, he seems to suggest in The Revenge for Love, they cannot resist. 
When faced with Margot in her transformed and driven state, Victor 
recognises that being `quixotic' is no longer a viable response, just as 
Margot became aware of the inadequacy of the ideals of Ruskin to the 
world of `nature in the flesh'. Whereas Time and Western Man merely 
expressed the undesirability, in Lewis's eyes, of `the Real' of modern world, 
The Revenge for Love dramatises its unavoidability and the inadequacy of 
existing ideological fantasies - those of quixotic chivalry and natural 
beauty - to that reality. 
This unavoidability of `the Real' of modernity is given perhaps its 
most blatant symbolisation in the form of the motorcar which is to be used 
for Victor's gun-running, and in which Victor and Margot attempt to 
escape from arrest, and ultimately end up dying in. Fredric Jameson has 
written that the motorcar `seems to have absorbed all the vitality of the 
human beings henceforth dependent on it', and that it: 
stands as the virtual personification of what Sartre called the 
practico-inert, that malignant desire or anti-freedom which human 
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beings create over against themselves by the investment and 
alienation of their labor in objects which return upon them 
unrecognizably, in the hostile form of a mechanical Necessity. The 
motorcar is indeed the very locus of metonymic fission, which, 
transmitted to ever wider circles of objects, ends by drawing life itself 
[... ] into its baleful dominion. 16 
The point not to be missed here is that the motorcar does not stand for 
modernity solely by its status as a technological object, but also because of 
the process of merging, or what Jameson calls `metonymic fission' to 
which it subjects Victor and Margot. Jameson points out: `For Margot, 
indeed, the machine is an uncontrollable destiny which nonetheless, 
perversely and unaccountably, requires our own collusion and accuses our 
complicity'. 17 In Jameson's opinion this `collusion' and `complicity' 
signifies that `the monadic isolation of the subject has been overcome: but 
as though through some grisly misunderstanding, through some blind 
alienation from without, which cannot be observed but merely felt'. 18 
Jameson does not, unfortunately, expand on this point, but it is clear that 
this overcoming or breakdown of the subject is accomplished by the 
penetration of the forces of modernity into the minds and even the bodies 
of Victor and Margot, a process exemplified by Margot's feeling that, 
although `she detested this charging beast, that muscular machine', she 
must, nevertheless, `cooperate' with it, and `use must be made of her 
organs, so it seemed, as well as [the motorcar's] own' (RL, 314). This 
penetration of Margot's subjectivity by `the Real' of modernity is also 
shown in the description of her mind as `the picture-house of the senses' 
(RL, 314), an image which shows how the cinematic, which was used 
earlier to signify the falseness of the other guests at O'Hara's party (RL, 
164), has become thoroughly internalised by Margot. 19 Another indication 
16 Jameson, Fables ofAggression, p. 82. 
17 Jameson, Fables ofAggression, pp. 82-3. 
18 Jameson, Fables ofAggression, p. 83. 
19 This penetration of Margot's subjectivity by the cinematic was in fact made perfectly 
clear at the beginning of the novel, where we learnt that `she had been born poor, she had 
taught herself English, and so had evolved a composite speech of her own. It was 
flavoured with American talkie echoes' (RL, 71). The trajectory of the cinematic in the 
novel - from internalisation as an aspect of self-fashioning, to representing an external 
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of Margot's internalisation of technology is given by Lewis's description of 
her perception of the Civil Guards who fatally attempt to stop the 
motorcar: `She saw the two guards get bigger and get bigger. It was as if in 
a series of blinks, or similar to the jumps of a large public clock, where the 
hands were the size of scythes' (RL, 321). Margot's perception of time here 
is figured in a very different way to the internal, private, and non- 
mechanical time of Bergson or Proust, to whom the idea of personal time 
functioning as `similar to the jumps of a large public clock' would have 
been anathema. What makes Lewis's `large public clock' simile even more 
interesting is that this mechanical and public time only becomes part of 
Margot's consciousness at a moment of extreme personal strain, indicating 
that, for Lewis, this time is what is revealed when the `reality' of the 
personality is broken down. Far from being an artificial abstraction 
imposed on the more organic and fluid deep reality of time, mechanical 
clock time here comes to represent time in `the Real', as it were; that is, 
time perceived without the framing illusions of Nature and personality. An 
analogy can be made with Lewis's comment in Time and Western Man 
that `A "stream of consciousness" is passing through us - in and out again. 
But it is a public stream. This some of us do not properly understand. We 
treat it as though it were a private stream' (TM, 338). Lewis's point here, 
in The Revenge for Love, and more generally, is that the deeper reality 
sought after by modernism and its `passion for the Real' is not a more 
private and individual reality, free from the weight and constraint of social 
and historical conventions, but is in fact a deindividualising and 
objectifying experience in which everything and everyone is reduced to 
mere interchangeable and meaningless things, and that it is only through 
beliefs and conventions that any idea of reality or individuality can be 
sustained at all. 
The fact that `the Real' in The Revenge for Love is figured by a `large 
public clock' and the increasingly cinematic nature of Margot's perception 
threat to the self from unreal others, to internalisation in the form of a malignant 
colonisation and destruction of the self by modernity - is an interesting one, and worthy 
of further consideration. 
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of events demonstrates how, for Lewis, `the Real' that he wanted to keep at 
a proper distance through the mediation of belief is figured in terms of the 
technological and mass-cultural world of modernity. This is significant in 
two regards: firstly, because it forms the essential link between Lewis's 
ideological dislike of the world in which he found himself, and his 
epistemology, indeed all his philosophical and theological thinking; and 
secondly, because it moves `the Real' from the category of the ontological 
and metaphysical back into the unavoidable realm of history. Lewis's 
thinking is reactionary in its anti-modern tendencies and its wish to retain 
the old beliefs and, more importantly the barriers that they sustain, but 
surprisingly, and perhaps unwittingly, radical in its identification of `the 
supreme Reality' not with God or any such transcendent abstractions but 
the very real phenomena of clocks, cinemas, and motorcars. Jameson 
writes that, in Margot's perception of the motorcar, `the approach of the 
Real is unmistakable''20 and we can see, just as we could with Margot's 
thoughts on nature, the inevitable counterpart of this approach, namely 
the retreat of the sense of reality as mediated by belief. 
One of the most remarkable passages in The Revenge for Love 
describes Margot's perception of the civil guard who is run over by their 
motorcar: 
she discovered herself at last watching against her will the floodlit 
stretch of rust-red road. Plumes of dust were spurting up; but their 
car (it had left her behind) was rapidly disappearing and had already 
grown quite small, in diminishing perspective; while in the 
foreground she was staring down at a disagreeably flattened object. 
Sprawling in the centre of the road, it was incredibly two- 
dimensional and, in short, unreal. It might have just been painted on 
the earth. But it looked more like a big untidy pattern, cut out of 
black paper, except for what was the face. That was flat, as well - as 
flat as a pancake, but as pale as a sheet, with a blue smear where the 
chin was. It was the chin of Prussian-blue. The flat black headgear of 
a Civil Guard, likewise no thicker than cardboard, lay a foot away 
from the head. (RL, 325) 
=O Jameson, Fables ofAggression, p. 83. 
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Jameson interprets this passage as being one in which `the impossible, 
unimaginable picture [is] nonetheless imagined in all its impossibility! ', 
adding that it `is of course not meant to represent Margot's perception of 
the corpse [... ] but reproduces her attempt to visualize it in its absence' . 21 1 
would argue that this aerial and disembodied view of the corpse in some 
way represents an abstraction of the scene, which in its artificiality and 
unreality and its reduction of the human to a collection of non-human 
objects (paper, paint, cardboard - all the ingredients of a modernist 
collage) suggests that Margot's viewpoint has become one of `larger eyes' 
which can see `god-like lines', exactly mirroring Lewis's derogatory 
description of the process of abstraction practiced by the Cubists. 22 The 
connection between Cubist abstraction and an aerial viewpoint is also 
made by the philosopher Theodor W. Adorno, but in his interpretation this 
viewpoint is not an impossible one, but one related, somewhat 
anachronistically, to `the Real' of historical trauma: `Historically, cubism 
anticipated something real, the aerial photographs of bombed-out cities 
during World War II. '23 The connection between `the Real', artistic 
abstraction, and aerial bombardment perhaps becomes less tenuous if we 
remember that, in an unpublished chapter of Time and Western Man, 
Lewis's example of a `Real' event that could not be experienced as `reality' 
was `a "crashing" aeroplane dropped on top of you' (TWM, 549). If this line 
of argument is continued, the fictional and subjective experience of Margot 
can be seen to `anticipate' the historical and objective phenomena of the 
aerial bombing of the Spanish Civil War. 
21 Jameson, Fables ofAggression, p. 85. 
22 Wyndham Lewis, `A Review of Contemporary Art', first published in 1915, in Wyndham 
Lewis on Art: Collected Writings 1913-1956, eds. Walter Michel & C. J. Fox, (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1969), p. 62. 
23 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, eds. Gretel Adorno & Rolf Tiedeman, trans. & 
ed. Robert Hullot-Kentor, (London: The Athlone Press, 1997), p. 301. Interestingly, 
Adorno's proposed anachronistic relationship between art and historical events is itself 
`anticipated' by Lewis's comment in Blasting and Bombardiering that: `It is somewhat 
depressing to consider how as an artist one is always holding the mirror up to politics 
without knowing it. My picture called "The Plan of War" painted six months before the 
Great War "broke out", as we say, depresses me. A prophet is a most unoriginal person: 
all he is doing is imitating something that is not there, but soon will be. With me art and 
war have been mixed up from the start. ' (BB, 4) 
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The extent of Margot's transformation and the collapse of her 
`phantasmic frame' in the face of `the Real' of the `senseless agitation of 
unfeeling things' and the `agony of men' is indicated by the change in her 
conception of her love for Victor: whereas at O'Hara's party Victor's body 
could provide a material ground for her sense of reality, during the final 
drive she realises that in fact she loves Victor as a symbol: 
She had long ago made up her mind that Victor was - well, a symbol. 
Some men are symbols. She knew that. They were the very words of 
an argument, in which she had timidly joined (but she had argued 
against the symbolic man); and they certainly abashed her a great 
deal of the time with all their chatter of symbols. The word "symbol" 
was then new to her. And was not her Victor the symbolic man, as 
you might call it, to a fault? She grasped quite well the fact that he 
stood for something. Not for nothing, anything but that. So he could 
not be a nobody. That was clear enough. She could not in any case 
have loved a nobody. But she could love a symbol. And that, as she 
put it a little hardily, was one up to her. There were some girls who 
would have shied at a symbol - when they found out it was that. (RL, 
318) 
The split in Margot here between her argument against `symbolic man' and 
her knowledge that this is exactly what she loves in Victor seems to reflect 
the split in Lewis's attitude toward modernity whereby he argues against it 
but knows that he cannot escape it. It is indicative of Margot's forced 
acceptance of `the Real' of the modern that she is forced to admit that she 
loves Victor because he is a symbol, something she `had argued against', as 
this signals, as much as her rejection of Ruskin, her capitulation to what 
she had tried to hold at bay. The similarity between her realisation of the 
symbolic value of Victor and her rejection of Ruskin can be seen in her 
identification of Victor as `Kipling Man' -a title given to him by one of his 
communist friends - and her recognition that such an idea of masculinity 
6 was semi-extinct, or [... ] was becoming so', and that: 
Already Kipling Man was flying in the face of fact - they all had 
agreed when they were talking about it. It had made her very angry at 
the time. This sort of Man was in fact an outlaw, at best in a Big 
Game Park. That was how Tristy had summed the matter up. "With 
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he of Cromagnon, and he of Neanderthal, the Kipling Man will soon 
be a skull, and a doubtful femur, and a thing that might have been a 
rib. Reconstructed, he would figure in an anthropologist's tract. " - "He may be magnificent, but he is not Marxian Peace! " Victor had 
shouted, with a big hearty scoff back that had silenced them. That 
had brought the debate to an end, and everyone had been ruffled. 
Victor would mention Marx, just to tease them! 
How much of this the tendrils of those tender nerves in the 
small parasite at Victor's side had registered was proved by the 
intelligent solicitude she had shown him and her cunning reading of 
the forged writing on the wall. How much she loved this aimless 
thing! But she was Nature mourning for the mate of her youth. She 
was the wind sighing in the wart-leaves for its existence among the 
glacial peaks, after a levelling of all the splendid mountains. She was 
the sigh of the last rose, and the whisper of the last lily, when the 
Flower-haters have decreed the extinction of all "luxury-weeds. " So, 
and in that symbolic manner, she could respond to the song of 
magdalen, brought to her notice by the latter-day wolves, who had 
suckled her starved intelligence and fed it with Victorian lollypops. 
(RL, 318-9) 
Margot's attitude is ambiguous here, for although she seems to accept this 
version of Victor and what he symbolises, she clearly does not want to. 
Lewis's reference to Margot's `starved intelligence' and those `latter-day 
wolves' who `fed it with Victorian lollypops' makes clear once again the 
inadequacy of her cultural beliefs - or, if you prefer, her `phantasmic 
frame' - to the `agony of men' in which she, and Victor, are unavoidably 
entangled. But Lewis is not just criticising Margot for a personal 
foolishness, but a whole culture - that of interwar Britain - for being 
unable to withstand the violence of modernity, and, at the same time and 
not without a certain amount of wistful nostalgia, demonstrating the 
inadequacy of trying to maintain such beliefs in the face of modernity. 24 
This disparity between the abstractions of nineteenth-century thought and 
the realities of the twentieth century is commented on in Left Wings Over 
Europe: Or, How to Make a War About Nothing (1936), one of Lewis's 
political books. In Left Wings Over Europe Lewis writes of how what he 
24 Compare Lewis's statement in Doom of Youth that: `Even more than the Age of 
Machines this is the age of the machine-guns. Against these we are in the position of the 
"Pore benighted 'eathen of Kipling's day - absurdly brave, but all in vain. ' Wyndham 
Lewis, Doom of Youth, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1932), P. 48. 
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sees as a political injustice, the treatment of Nazi Germany by the 
international community, is the result of such a disparity between 
historical reality and the abstractions used to understand it: 
The abstract conceptions of nineteenth-century liberalist ideology 
have led directly to this situation. It is a situation in which, busy with 
theory, we have lost touch with the concrete and the real. We have 
freed with one hand and enslaved with the other. We have one- 
sidedly, and superficially, applied our principle: to-day our 
principles, since we do not "move with the times", cause us to be 
terribly unjust. 
We are still busy being `just" in a manner appropriate to a 
nineteenth-century background. But the scene has changed, without 
our remarking the fact, with astonishing rapidity. And in this 
twentieth-century decor we appear sometimes as monsters of 
injustice. 
This is not because we are lacking in a sense of justice. It is only 
because we are slow-moving. It is because we think we have one set 
of people before us, whereas in fact we have quite a different set. 25 
Lewis goes on to write that `Liberalism substituted itself for christianity: 
and, dying, it designates communism as its heir', 26 and this sense of the 
inevitable triumph of communism, of which Lewis did not entirely 
approve, is perhaps also detectable in the figure of Percy Hardcaster, the 
one `genuine', although perhaps not sincere, communist in The Revenge 
for Love. Hardcaster's coldness and detachment are presented as 
profoundly different to Margot's more emotional outlook, and, when at the 
end of the novel he finds himself in a Spanish prison, we learn that: 
No illusions with regard to abstract justice troubled the upright 
cynicism of his outlook. He "played the game. " As ever, with an 
incorruptible mind, he remained a true "sportsman. " To himself, at 
least, he never pretended that he was hardly used. He accepted, for 
his political opinions, the status of a game -a game, of course, of life 
and death. (RL, 332) 
25 Wyndham Lewis, Left Wings Over Europe: Or, How to Make a War About Nothing, 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), p. 316. 
26 Lewis, Left Wings Over Europe, p. 322. 
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Hardcaster's disillusioned outlook, free from abstractions, extends even to 
himself: 
when he allowed himself to reflect upon the manner of his arrest, and 
what had led up to it, he sat frowning stolidly at the wall, as downcast 
as he had ever been in his life. For this man of truth was not in the 
habit of sparing himself. Indeed, he somewhat enjoyed exercising his 
incorruptible intellect upon the dissection of Percy Hardcaster. He 
was like a painter fond of self-portraiture: and his self-portraits were 
not chocolate boxes! He hit hard when he hit Percy! (RL, 334) 
This self-scrutiny is of the same sort that Lewis warned against ten years 
earlier in his essay `The Meaning of the Wild Body', where Lewis claimed 
that `it is comparatively easy to see that another man [... ] is absurd; but it 
is far more difficult to observe oneself in that hard and exquisite light', 
adding that `no man has ever continued to live who has observed himself 
in that manner for longer than flash' ('Meaning', p. 158). Hardcaster's 
detached self-scrutiny, even if it does not kill him, does affect his 
physiognomy: `What his eye took in only deepened his detachment - it 
seemed even to freeze his face' (RL, 335). This physical change in 
Hardcaster is not the first in the novel; he already has a wooden leg as a 
result of being shot attempting to escape from prison. This earlier shooting 
was accompanied by a change in his attitude toward nature which 
contrasts significantly with Margot's experience of `nature in the flesh, as it 
were' (RL, 275). Before he is shot Hardcaster tries to display the disdain of 
a hardened political activist toward nature: 
There was not only the fact that Nature was blind to the intellectual 
beauties of the Social Revolution, and deaf to the voice of Conscience; 
there was also the fact that Nature, especially in these sumptuous 
climates, required a spartan watchfulness on the part of the 
revolutionary, tending to clip the wings of Percy's more civilised 
muse, and non-party mind. (RL, 46) 
Unlike Margot, Hardcaster's initial attitude toward nature is a negative 
one; however, after he has been shot his attitude becomes far more 
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positive, indeed approximating that of Margot's initial, idealised vision of 
nature: 
He was in quite unexpected harmony, all of a sudden, with Nature - 
with the shimmering sardine oil of the waters of the river, and that 
sunburst of diamonds that spattered the velvet sky. (RL, 49) 
This sense of harmony with nature is matched by an increased sense of 
objectivity (Margot's problem is that she cannot match her idea of nature 
with her sense of objectivity) which results in Hardcaster perceiving Don 
Alvaro - the prison guard by whom he has been shot - as false and 
constructed: 
Objectively Don Percy considered this apparition, as he lay, right eye 
uppermost, and he was able to examine him with so inordinate a 
detachment that he saw what he had never seen before. He saw that 
this man was false. His moustache was stuck on - it did not grow 
there! (RL, 50) 
Hardcaster's objective consideration of Don Alvaro at the beginning of the 
novel is matched by his objective consideration of himself at the novel's 
end, when he is described as being `like a painter fond of self-portraiture'. 
This self-objectifying gaze results in his frozen face being replaced by a 
mask, with he which he artfully performs in such a way to do well in the 
`game' of being in prison and gain privileges: 
Percy proceeded to give a sculpturesque impersonation of THE 
INJURED PARTY. His cellmates watched him surreptitiously, with an 
admiration it was out of their powers to withhold. Heavily clamped 
upon his brickred countenance, held in position by every muscle that 
responded to Righteous Wrath, was a mask which entirely succeeded 
the workaday face. It was the mask of THE INJURED PARTY (model for 
militant agents in distress). Obedient to the best technique of party- 
training, he sustained it for a considerable time. (RL, 336) 
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However, Lewis himself was not possessed of such obedience, and the 
narrative deviates from its trajectory, allowing Hardcaster's mask to crack 
and the emotionality of Margot to have the last word: 
But meanwhile a strained and hollow voice, part of a sham-culture 
outfit, but tender and halting, as if dismayed by the sound of its own 
bitter words, was talking in his ears, in a reproachful singsong. It was 
denouncing him out of the past, where alone now it was able to 
articulate; it was singling him out as a man who led people into 
mortal danger, people who were dear beyond expression to the 
possessor of the passionate, the artificial, the unreal, yet penetrating, 
voice, and crying to him now to give back, she implored him, the 
young man, Absalom, whose life he had had in his keeping, and who 
had somehow, unaccountably, been lost out of the world and out of 
Time! He saw a precipice. And the eyes in the mask of THE INJURED 
PARTY dilated in a spasm of astonished self-pity. And down the front 
of the mask rolled a sudden tear, which fell upon the dirty floor of the 
prison. (RL, 336) 
This tear, which comes from within Hardcaster's rigid `mask', has been 
described by Fredric Jameson as `the realest tear in all literature', and he 
sees in it what he calls the `burning political message of The Revenge for 
Love', its dramatisation of the very real effects of the symbolic: `What does 
not exist reaches out its shadow arm to strike down real flesh and blood, 
and, itself insubstantial, to leave real corpses behind it'. 26 This account of 
the novel, in which Margot's defiant assertion that `if it came down to a 
showdown, between a shadow and a man of flesh and blood - they would 
give way' is exposed as empty and unreal, is a compelling one, but does not 
take into account that Margot and Victor do not simply represent a non- 
ideological human reality opposed to the inhuman abstractions of the 
communist conspirators and intellectuals, but allegorise the failure of the 
abstractions, and hence the `reality', of liberalism in the face of `the Real' of 
26 Jameson, Fables ofAggression, pp. 177,176. Jameson sees this `burning political 
message' as having relevance to America's foreign policy and the intellectuals who justify 
it, comparing `the fascist theoreticians and twenties and thirties, many of them genuinely 
shocked to discover the things for which the words really stood' to `the postwar generation 
of American liberal theoreticians, elaborating enthusiastic apologias for the "free world" 
and exulting in the ingenuity of their own paper strategy and contingency planning, which 
were at length to realize themselves in the bloody genocide of South-East Asia. ' Fables of 
Aggression, p. 177. 
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the modern world. Their physical demise is accompanied by a 
disintegration of the fictions by which they have maintained their sense of 
`reality', their belief that they are real and everyone else is fake. In this 
sense, Margot and Victor are doomed not because they are too real to 
survive in an increasingly abstract world, but because they are too 
detached from `the Real', what Margot refers to as `too much a senseless 
agitation of unfeeling things': like the liberalism Lewis Presents in Left 
Wings Over Europe they `think [they] have one have one set of people 
before us, whereas in fact [they] have quite a different set'; they `have lost 
touch with the concrete and the real'. 
The analogy between Victor and Margot and the liberalism presented 
in Left Wings Over Europe does not entirely do the novel justice, however, 
largely because its view of reality is too simplistic - you are either in touch 
with the real or you are not. In the more complex and considered 
epistemology outlined in Time and Western Man being in touch with `the 
Real' is a lethal option: `The Absolute [... ] crushes [... ] the personal life' 
( M, 373). If the ending of The Revenge for Love is analysed from this 
perspective Victor and Margot's demise is due to being too much in touch 
with `the Real', rather than out of touch with it. The contradiction between 
these two readings can be resolved through recourse to the idea of the 
difference between `reality' and `the Real' outlined above: the `reality' of 
Victor and Margot has become so inadequate to `the Real' in which they 
find themselves that it collapses, and they are plunged into `the Real' 
without the protective shield of belief to keep it at a proper distance, a 
movement symbolised by their plunge over the cliff. Fantasy-sustained 
`reality' cannot be just a matter of subjective `belief, as it was in Time and 
Western Man, but must operate in a dynamic relationship with `the Real': 
as Lacan puts it in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
(1973), `The real supports the phantasy, the phantasy protects the real'. 27 
27 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XI: The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, first published in French 1973, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, 
trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York & London: Norton, 1981), p. 41. 
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To rephrase Jameson, the message of the novel is that `real flesh and 
blood' requires a measure of `what does not exist' in order not be 
destroyed; or, in Zizek's words, that `fantasy is on the side of reality'. The 
opposition at the heart of The Revenge for Love is not between the real 
and the abstract, but between two competing sets of abstractions, one 
which proves stronger than the other, and the `realities' that they structure 
and sustain: Margot's `mad notion' that `they were engaged in a battle of 
wills, to decide who should possess most reality' turns out not to be so 
mad at all, so long as we understand `reality' as distinct from `the Real', as 
outlined above. 
The need for abstractions, of beliefs and fictions, for the maintenance 
of a sense of `reality'; an awareness of the weakness of the abstractions 
inherited from the 19th century and the subsequent weakness of the sense 
of `reality that these provide; a distaste for `the passion for the Real': these 
are all key elements of The Revenge for Love and of Lewis's thinking in 
general. 
Zizek has characterised the relationship between `reality' and `the 
Real' in corporeal terms: 
Let us recall the uncanniness, even disgust, we experience when we 
endeavour to imagine what goes on just under the surface of a 
beautiful naked body - muscles, organs, veins.... In short, relating 
to the body implies suspending what goes on beneath the surface. 
This suspension is an effect of the symbolic order; it can occur only so 
far as our bodily reality is structured by language. In the symbolic 
order, even when we are undressed we are not really naked, since 
skin itself functions as the "dress of the flesh". This suspension 
excludes the Real of the life-substance, its palpitation: one of the 
definitions of the Lacanian Real is that of the flayed body, the 
palpitation of the raw, skinless red flesh. 28 
With this in mind, we can see that Margot's `reality' is doomed from the 
minute when, at O'Hara's party, she tries to ground it in Victor's body, in 
`his muscles' which she tries to catch and extract from their `bloody 
28 Slavoj Zizek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality, 
(London & New York: Verso, 1994), P" 116. 
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element'. This going beneath the surface in order to maintain her sense of 
`reality' represents the point at which that `reality', that `fragile, symbolic 
cobweb, is ruptured, and `torn aside by an intrusion of the real'. 29 It also 
represents one of the key paradoxes of Lewis's work: how to maintain the 
`reality' of the body, the coherence of its exterior surface, while 
simultaneously suspending any knowledge of `what goes on beneath the 
surface' - which is, of course, precisely that upon which the surface rests. 
This paradox will manifest itself in the chapters to follow: in Lewis's 
attempt to maintain the appearance of a separation between mind and 
body, despite his belief that `persons' are really only `things'; in his 
frequent citation of an almost metaphysical separation between the 
masculine and the feminine, and his simultaneous questioning of natural 
biological gender difference; in his use of racial rhetoric despite his denials 
of racial factors in the determination of consciousness; and in his 
attempted separation of the eye of the artist from the body of the crowd, a 
separation which is central to his thinking, but which is never represented 
as completely successful. 
29 Zizek, Looking Awry, p. 17. 
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Lewis's critics have tended to portray some form of dualism as an 
unproblematic and central feature of his work: Hugh Kenner writes that he 
was a `man to whose mind the Cartesian split' was `lifeblood'; Toby Avard 
Foshay contends that `Dualism, the tension of opposites, was an instinctive 
and visceral response of Lewis's in every sphere of life, a response which he 
deliberately cultivated and theoretically and polemically promulgated'; and 
Paul Edwards simply states that `Lewis seems to have been an instinctive 
dualist'. ' In this chapter I will tackle the issue of Lewis's dualism by 
examining three important texts: the Vorticist `play' Enemy of the Stars 
(1914; revised version 1932); the theoretical essays published in the 
collection of short stories The Wild Body (1927); and Men Without Art 
(1934). I will argue that although dualism is a key feature of all these texts 
they are not, when closely examined, as dualistic as they may at first seem, 
and that dualism is best thought of not as the product of an `instinct' but as 
a `fantasy' or `belief used to construct a `reality' which, like all such 
`realities', functions by repressing `the Real'. 
Hugh Kenner, Wyndham Lewis, (London: Methuen, 1954), P. 139; Toby Avard Foshay, 
Wyndham Lewis and the Avant-Garde: The Politics of the Intellect, (Montreal & 
Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp. 18-9; Paul 
Edwards, Wyndham Lewis: Painter and Writer, (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2000), p. 86. 
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Enemy of the Stars: 
`All our flesh is the same' 
Lewis's Vorticist `play' Enemy of the Stars (I will refer to the original 1914 
version) stages a conflict between two characters, Arghol and Hanp, which 
has been seen by many critics as a dramatisation of Lewis's ideas of 
dualism, sometimes understood in terms of mind and body: Toby Avard 
Foshay, for example, writes that `Hanp is the man of the body, Arghol the 
man of the mind'. 2 
In one of the most sophisticated interpretations of Enemy of the 
Stars as a dualistic work, Paul Edwards places the `play' within a strand of 
modernism that includes German Expressionist drama as well as what he 
calls `Futurism's "esoteric" dimension'. Drawing on Massimo Carrä's claim 
that `Futurism's own ringing challenge to the stars [... ] needs to be 
understood as a recrudescence of Gnosticism' Edwards argues that `Enemy 
of the Stars must take its place among such Modernist explorations of 
Gnostic myth as Marinetti's own Conquete des etoiles and Aleksei 
Kruchenykh's Victory over the Sun'. Edwards writes that `Gnostic dualism 
[... ] is the definitive myth that all versions of alienation tend towards, and 
is therefore closer to the primal metaphysical issues that concern 
Expressionism than the particular sexual and familial narrative formations 
upon which it tends to base its narratives'. Edwards points out Lewis was 
interested in Gnosticism and in similar metaphysical concerns to those of 
Expressionism, and argues that Enemy of the Stars `is, however, as one 
would expect from an artist like Lewis who was sceptical about fantasies of 
the transcendence of dualism, a critique of such fantasies as well as an 
expression of them'. Edwards connects this interest in Gnostic dualism to 
Romantic concerns about the `duality of authentic and inauthentic', 
particularly in terms of the self: `Enemy of the Stars is about precisely such 
a [Romantic] quest to "speak and act" the original self. Edwards argues 
that `The character Arghol is a religious ascetic attempting to escape 
2 Foshay, Wyndham Lewis and the Avant-Garde, p. 29. 
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cosmic necessity. Hanp is his other, more worldly self .3 While there is 
little doubt that a discourse of this sort is present in Enemy of the Stars, 
and that Arghol himself perceives his situation in terms similar to these, I 
will argue that within the world of the `play' this dualism is best thought of 
as a strategy of `belief or `fantasy' rather than simply an aspect of the 
`play's' universe. Indeed, I will argue that dualism is a way of 
(mis)perceiving `the Real' rather than a fundamental ontological feature of 
it: dualism is a way of seeing and understanding the world, rather than the 
way in which the world is structured. Edwards's interpretation of the `play' 
is an extremely sophisticated and illuminating one but is limited by its 
assumption that Enemy of the Stars is a philosophical `play', as this 
assumption precludes investigation of the way in which this is a `play' 
about philosophy, a `play' which dramatises the role played by the 
intellectual in a concrete social situation. 
The action of the `play' begins with Arghol being given a vicious 
beating by his uncle, the master of the wheelwright's yard in which both 
Arghol and Hanp work. The beating is presented as preordained: `The first 
stars appear and Arghol comes out of the hut. This is his cue' (ES, 97). 
Arghol is called, replies, and waits for what happens next: 
The figure rushed without running. Arghol heeled over to the left. A 
boot battered his right hand ribs. These were the least damaged: it 
was their turn. 
Upper lip shot down, half covering chin, his body reached 
methodically. At each blow, in muscular spasm, he made the pain 
pass out. Rolled and jumped, crouched and flung his grovelling 
Enceladus weight against it, like swimmer with wave. (ES, 99) 
The fact that it is the `turn' of `his right hand ribs' indicates that the beating 
of Arghol by his uncle is a regular event, and the `methodical' way in which 
he reacts to it suggests a passive compliance, rather than any attempt of 
resistance or defence. Arghol's submissiveness is key to philosophical 
3 Edwards, Wyndham Lewis, pp. 144-45. 
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interpretations of the play, as his philosophising first appears in answer to 
Hanp's inquiry as to why he puts up with this regular violence: 
"Can't you kill him, in the name of God? A man has his hands, little 
else. Mote and speck, the universe illimitable! " Hanp gibed. "It is true 
he is a speck, but all men are. To you he is immense. " (ES, poi) 
It is significant that Hanp specifically asks Arghol why he does not use `his 
hands', as it suggests that Arghol's status as `the man of the mind' is not 
forced upon him but chosen: he could use his hands, but for some reason 
he does not. Arghol's answer to Hanp's gibe invokes an abstract notion of 
his place in the world to justify his inaction: `Here I get routine, the will of 
the universe manifested with directness and persistence' (ES, loi). 
Arghol's philosophy initially serves to frame his particular situation and 
explain his behaviour in universal abstract terms; he claims his submission 
to his uncle's beating is not a matter of personal choice, but one of 
unavoidable ontological destiny. This reading of Arghol's situation seems 
to be endorsed by the narrative voice. In the introductory, scene-setting 
passages Arghol is presented as a `gladiator who has come to fight a ghost, 
Humanity' and his `fight' as futile: he is a 'CONDEMNED PROTAGONIST' 
and the audience, consisting of `the cream of Posterity', `BREATH IN 
CLOSE ATMOSPHERE OF TERROR AND NECESSITY TILL THE 
EXECUTION IS OVER, THE RED WALLS RECEDE, THE UNIVERSE 
SATISFIED' (ES, 98). However, this doom-laden atmosphere of universal 
necessity is tempered by a less serious strand within the introductory 
passages. The `actors' wear `MASKS FITTED WITH TRUMPETS OF 
ANTIQUE THEATRE, WITH EFFECT OF TWO CHILDREN BLOWING 
AT EACH OTHER WITH TIN TRUMPETS' (ES, 97). There is a move here 
from images of Greek tragedy to images of childish games, and this 
mismatch of genre and register, this uneasy cohabitation of the tragic and 
the comic, persists through the play. It is important to be aware of the way 
in which Arghol's philosophising, which is on the side of the tragic, is 
challenged by the objections of Hanp. For example, Arghol articulates in a 
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highly serious and philosophical manner a theory of the `degradation' of 
the soul by social contact with others: 
The process and condition of life, without any exception, is a 
grotesque degradation, and `souillure' of the original solitude of the 
soul. There is no help for it, since each gesture and word partakes of 
it, and the child has already covered himself with mire. 
Anything but yourself is dirt. Anybody that is. I do not feel clean 
enough to die, or to make it worth while killing myself. (ES, io6) 
Hanp responds to this with a `laugh, packed with hatred' and tells Arghol 
that his philosophy is `Sour grapes! ' (ES, 1o6). Arghol's philosophising 
constantly moves away from the particular situation in which he is 
embedded and where he is subjected to, and indeed submits to, regular 
violence to a more abstract and grandiloquent level, which gives his 
situation some sort of ontological justification and aesthetic resonance and 
allows him to indulge in misanthropic fantasies of authenticity. Hanp's 
hate-packed laughter interrupts this abstract discourse, and brings the 
concrete situation back into view, telling Arghol that `you let yourself be 
kicked to death here out of spite' (ES, io6). Arghol's reaction to Hanp's 
gibe is interesting: 
Disrespect or mocking is followed, in spiritualist seances, with 
offended silence on part of the spooks. Such silence, not discernedly 
offended, now followed. 
The pseudo-rustic Master, cavernously, hemicyclically real, but 
anomalous shamness on him in these circumstances, poudre de riz 
on face of knight's sleeping effigy, lay back indifferent, his feet lying, 
two heavy closed books, before the disciple. 
Arghol was a large open book, full of truths and insults. 
He opened his jaws once more in egotistic self castigation. (ES, 
io6-7) 
This passage undermines Arghol's assumed position as philosophical guru, 
calling him a `pseudo-rustic Master', implicitly referring to him as a 
`spook', commenting on his `anomalous shamness', and showing his 
silence to be an automatic and conventional response to Hanp's gibe. This 
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is the first time in the `play' that Hanp is referred to as Arghol's `disciple', 
which is significant as it suggests that Hanp's role may be as `sham' as 
Arghol's, and likewise generated by the conventions of `spiritualist seances' 
rather than simply reflecting the reality of the situation. Arghol's `egotistic 
self castigation' takes the form of a speech in which he expounds on the ill 
effects of other people on the individual: 
The doctoring is often fouler than the disease. 
Men have a loathsome deformity called Self; affliction got 
through indiscriminate rubbing against their fellows: social 
excrescence. 
Their being is regulated by exigencies of this affliction. Only one 
operation can cure it: the suicide's knife. 
Or an immense snuffling or taciturn parasite, become necessary 
to victim, like abortive poodle, all nerves, vice and dissatisfaction. 
I have smashed it against me, but it still writhes, turbulent 
mess. 
I have shrunk it in frosty climates, but it has filtered filth inward 
through me, dispersed till my deepest solitude is impure. 
Mire stirred up desperately, without success in subsequent 
hygiene. (ES, 107) 
An idealised dualism between the `I' and its `fellows' is clear here, as is 
Arghol's anxiety that there is no clear boundary between the two and that 
his `being is regulated by exigencies of this affliction'. Arghol's theory of 
the relationship between the individual self, the `I', and the more social 
`loathsome deformity called Self to which it is opposed is interesting, and 
many critics have written extensively about the intricacies of Arghol's 
philosophy and its significance, but Hanp's reaction to it is also significant, 
and at least as interesting: 
This focussed disciple's physical repulsion: nausea of humility added. 
Perfect tyrannic contempt: but choking respect, curiosity; 
consciousness of defeat. These two extremes clashed furiously. The 
contempt claimed its security and triumph: the other sentiment 
baffled it. His hatred of Arghol for perpetually producing this second 
sentiment grew. This would have been faint without physical 
repulsion to fascinate him, make him murderous and sick. 
He was strong and insolent with consciousness stuffed in him in 
anonymous form of vastness of Humanity: full of rage at gigantic 
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insolence and superiority, combined with utter uncleanness and 
despicableness - all back to physical parallel - of his Master. The more Arghol made him realize his congenital fatuity and 
cheapness, the more a contemptible matter appeared accumulated in 
the image of his Master, sunken mirror. The price of this sharp vision 
of mastery was contamination. (ES, 107) 
The philosophic scheme by which Arghol attempts to define his place in 
the world and give his situation a sense of cosmic inevitability does not do 
the same for Hanp, whose reaction to it is suitably dualistic but within 
whom the `two extremes clashed furiously'. Arghol's criticisms of Hanp 
strike home - Hanp `realize[s] his congenital fatuity and cheapness' - but 
in doing so they rebound on Arghol as well, who becomes a 'sunken mirror' 
of Hanp. From Hanp's point of view Arghol's criticisms are correct but 
they apply to Arghol as well: the opposition between the two which 
Arghol's philosophy attempts to create breaks down - he is not seen to 
occupy the positive position but shares the negative one with Hanp. `The 
price' of Arghol's `sharp vision of mastery' is indeed `contamination': 
`contamination' by that which he attempts to define himself against. As we 
will see in Chapter Three the pattern of a protagonist articulating an ideal 
position which he is unable to occupy is a recurrent one in Lewis's work. 
Arghol attempts to escape what he sees as his inevitable ontological 
condition through a course of inaction and passivity rather than by using 
his hands, characterising his strategy thus: 
Accumulate in myself, day after day, dense concentration of pig life. 
Nothing spent, stored rather in strong stagnation, till rid at last of 
evaporation and lightness characteristic of men. So burst Death's 
membrane through, slog beyond, not float in appalling distances. 
Energy has been fixed on me from nowhere - heavy and 
astonished: resigned. Or is it for remote sin! I will use it, anyway, as 
prisoner his bowl or sheet for escape: not as means of idle 
humiliation. (ES, 104) 
This strategy of resigned accumulation of the unavoidable in hope of some 
eventual transcendence - `burst Death's membrane through' - is, as 
Edwards helpfully points out, an ascetic strategy that Lewis seems to have 
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derived from the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Edwards contends 
that: `The heavily material imagery of this passage is surprising in this 
context, but the intention behind it is clear enough. Arghol wishes for a 
complete escape from the system'. 4 While Edwards is right about Arghol's 
intention it is surprising that he is surprised by the use of `heavily material 
imagery', as this imagery signals the futility, already announced in the 
introductory passages, of Arghol's wish. As we have already seen, Edwards 
argues that `one would expect from an artist like Lewis who was sceptical 
about fantasies of the transcendence of dualism, a critique of such 
fantasies', and such a critique is implicit in this material imagery. Indeed, 
such imagery suggests a continuum rather than a separation between the 
physical and the mental, and as we will see, this possibility haunts the 
`play'. Edwards is aware of these `continuities' but dismisses their 
importance, writing that although they `suggest an ultimate identity of 
Arghol with the principle he opposes [... ] the text and narrative are more 
concerned with his duality than with any ultimate physical or metaphysical 
unity with an Absolute -a question that arises only as a distraction in this 
text but came to haunt all Lewis's future work'. 5 I would argue that another 
`unity' haunts this text: the spectre of the absence of any ontological 
distinction between Arghol and Hanp - the spectre, that is, of their 
fundamental equality as slaves of the same master. 
Edwards interprets Arghol's submission to his uncle's beatings as 
rooted in his attitude of Schopenhauerian asceticism, writing that he 
`submits to, even invites, these attacks [by his uncle] in order to help him 
realise more perfectly "the will of the universe"'. 6 While this interpretation 
makes sense from Arghol's point-of-view, and possibly even the narrator's, 
Hanp's interpretation of Arghol's philosophy as `Sour grapes' forms an 
important counter-discourse, which deflates Arghol's abstract tendencies 
and offers an alternative, critical interpretation. 
4 Edwards, Wyndham Lewis, p. 150. 
5 Edwards, Wyndham Lewis, p. 150. 
6 Edwards, Wyndham Lewis, p. 149. 
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Hanp's suspicion that Arghol is unwilling, rather than ontologically 
unable, to act is given credence by the violent fight between the two, 
initiated by Hanp and won by Arghol. Arghol is aware that by using `his 
hands' and fighting Hanp he is contravening his earlier philosophy of 
passive submission, thinking to himself `To break vows and spoil 
continuity of instinctive behaviour, lose a prize that would only be a trophy 
tankard never drunk from, is always fine' (ES, no). Again, Arghol's 
thoughts seem to lag behind the situation and justify it after the fact. 
The fight is also interesting as it seems to demonstrate some sort of 
equality between Arghol and Hanp, together with a breakdown of the 
barrier between mind and body. This impression of equality is signalled 
partly by the use of impersonal pronouns, as in the following passage, in 
which it becomes increasingly unclear exactly who is doing what to whom 
and for what reason: 
Strike his disciple as he had abused him. Suddenly give way. 
Incurable self taught you a heroism. 
The young man brought his own disgust back to him. Full of 
disgust: therefore disgusting. He felt himself on him. (ES, 110) 
It is unclear exactly who the `young man' is, and each of the three 
pronouns in the last sentence could apply equally logically to either Arghol 
or Hanp, grammatically enacting the confusion of the tussle, and the lack 
of distinction which accompanies it. This lack of distinction or equality is 
also narrated more clearly: `they hit each other, both with blows about 
equal in force' (ES, no). The physicality of the fight is stressed by 
reference to the physicality of the soul in the form of the brain: 
Soul perched like aviator in basin of skull, more alert and smaller 
than on any other occasion. Mask stoic with energy: thought cleaned 
off slick - pure and clean with action. Bodies grown brain, black 
octopi. (ES, llo-1) 
As we will see, this idea of `Bodies grown brain' recurs in Lewis's essay 
`Inferior Religions', where he writes that `Laughter is the brain-body's 
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snort of exultation' ('Religions', p. 152). In both cases, some instinctive 
physical reaction - laughter or violence - is seen to result in the erasure of 
the distinction between mind and body. Viewed philosophically it is 
interesting that the supposed physiological location of the soul is `in basin 
of skull' as in The Passions of the Soul (1649) Rene Descartes claims that: 
although the soul is joined to the whole body, there is yet a certain 
part of it in which it exercises its functions more particularly than in 
all the others [... ] I have clearly ascertained that the part of the body 
in which the soul exercises its functions immediately is in nowise the 
heart, nor the whole of the brain, but merely in the most inward part 
of it, to wit, a certain very small gland which is situated in the middle 
of its substance[. ]? 
This `very small gland' serves to bridge the gap between mind and body 
inherent in Descartes' dualism, but, by providing a particular physiological 
location for the soul, it also risks collapsing mind-body dualism altogether, 
a risk also present in Arghol's fight with Hanp. 
It is perhaps ironic that the purity and cleanliness which Arghol 
wished to reach by ascetic means is achieved by violent physical action and 
its slick cleaning off of thought, and the physicality of Arghol's victory over 
Hanp is also ironic: in the terms of a dualistic mind-body interpretation of 
Enemy of the Stars, mind has just given body a sound thrashing, although 
in doing so it has possibly become something else. This thrashing was 
achieved by Arghol's complete abandonment of his self to what we could 
call, following Edwards's Schopenhauerian interpretation, `the will of the 
universe': 
Arghol did not hit hard. Like something inanimate, only striking as 
rebound and as attacked. 
He became soft, blunt paw of Nature, taken back to her bosom, 
mechanically; slowly and idly winning. 
He became part of responsive landscape: his friend's active 
punch key of the commotion. (ES, ili) 
7 Rene Descartes, The Passions of the Soul (1649), in The Philosophical Works of 
Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross, Vol. II, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1931). P" 345. 
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Rather than remaining in what Lewis called in `Physics of the Not-Self 
(1932), his `metaphysical commentary' on Enemy of the Stars, `the 
traditional role' of the human mind as `an oddity outside the machine', 
Arghol here becomes the machine, abandoning the role of mind 
altogether. 8 
The fight disturbs the whole dualistic scheme of mind and body, as 
after it opposed qualities merge into each other, and Arghol begins to 
perceive thoughts in a physical and violent way: 
A strong flood of thought passed up to his fatigued head, and at once 
dazed him. Not his body only, but being was out of training for 
action: puffed and exhilarated. Thoughts fell on it like punches. (ES, 
iii) 
Just as `bodies' became `brain' during the fight, in its aftermath `thoughts' 
become `punches'. Although these images retain terms which could be 
schematised in terms of `mind' and `body' they do not retain an 
oppositional dualism between them, rather combining and confusing the 
two poles. Tired by the fight, Arghol falls asleep and dreams. 
Arghol's dream takes him back to his time as a university student in 
an unidentified capital city. Arghol finds a copy of Max Stirner's Einzige 
und Sein Eigentum (translated into English as The Ego and Its Own) 
which he throws out of the window. The volume is, however, returned to 
him by a figure who first appears as `a young man he had known in the 
town' but who changes into `his present disciple', although Arghol 
considers that `Obliquely, [... ] he appeared now to be addressing Stirner' 
(ES, 112). The figure changes again, into `A middle aged man, red cropped 
head and dark eyes, self-possessed, loose, free, student-sailor, fingering 
the book: coming to a decision. Stirner as he had imagined him' (ES, 112). 
The figure will not leave with the book, and `A scrap ensued, physical 
experiences of recent fight recurring, ending in eviction of this visitor and 
8 Wyndham Lewis, `Physics of the Not-Self, first published 1932, in Collected Poems and 
Plays, ed. Alan Munton, (Manchester: Carcanet, 1979), P. 195" 
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slamming of door' (ES, 112). Deciding that `These books are all parasites. 
Poodles of the mind' Arghol tears them up and leaves his room to find his 
friends in a cafe: `But he never reached the Cafe' (ES, 113). After this failed 
meeting `His dream changed; he was now walking down the street in his 
native town, where he now was, and where he knew no one but his school- 
mates, workmen, clerks in export of hemp, grain and wood' (ES, 113). He 
meets `one of the friends of his years of study in Capital' and declares to 
him `Sir, I wish to know you! ' (ES, 113). A strange exchange takes place in 
which his friend reminds Arghol that he knows him already, and Arghol 
`saw a man directly beneath his friend, imprisoned, with intolerable need 
of recognition' (ES, 113). This leads Arghol to speculate on the relationship 
of self and others: 
Arghol, that the baffling requirements of society had made, impudent 
parasite of his solitude, had foregathered too long with men, and 
borne his name too variously, to be superseded. 
He was not sure, if they had been separated surgically, in which 
self life would have gone out and in which remained. 
"This man has been masquerading as me. " 
He repudiated Arghol, nevertheless. 
If eyes of his friends-up-till-then could not be opened, he would 
sweep them, along with Arghol, into rubbish heap. 
Arghol was under a dishonouring pact with all of them. 
He repudiated it and him. 
"So I am Arghol. " 
"Of course. But if you don't want -. 
"That is a lie. Your foolish grin proves you are lying. Good day. " 
Walking on he knew his friend was himself. He had divested 
himself of something. (ES, 114) 
The dream ends in `a Cafe; he, alone, writing at table'. However, Arghol is 
not completely alone: 
He became slowly aware of his friends seated at the other end of 
room, watching him, as it had actually happened before his return to 
his uncle's house. There he was behaving as a complete stranger with 
a set of men he had been on good terms with two days before. 
"He's gone mad. Leave him alone, " they advised each other. 
As an idiot, too, he had come home; dropped, idle and sullen, on 
his relative's shoulders. (ES, 114) 
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The contrast between the city, associated with intellectual study and 
friends, and the town, associated with work and family, is an important 
feature of this dream, and suggests another dualism, sociological rather 
than metaphysical, may be at work. Fredric Jameson argues that `what we 
call artistic or aesthetic "modernism" essentially corresponds to a situation 
of incomplete modernization', that it emerges in `a world that is still 
organized around two distinct temporalities: that of the new industrial big 
city and that of the peasant countryside'. 9 This situation, Jameson argues, 
results in a split consciousness: 
In this transitional era, people - but it would be better to say, 
intellectuals, and the writers and the ideologists who are part of that 
category - still live in two distinct worlds simultaneously. This 
simultaneity can no doubt for a moment be cast in terms of some 
distinction between the metropolis and the provinces; but it might 
better be imagined in terms of a situation in which individuals 
originate in a "pays", a local village or region to which they 
periodically return, while pursuing their life work in the very 
different world of the big city. lo 
The `situation' that Jameson outlines can be seen in Arghol's dream, but 
unlike Jameson's model intellectual Arghol does not move between two 
worlds but has moved from one to the other and back again, where he is 
stuck and is violently forced to do manual work. This move from an urban 
world of intellectual speculation and chosen friends back to one of physical 
labour and the unavoidable biological link with family is an important 
factor in Arghol's philosophy, or, as Hanp calls it, his `Sour grapes'. 
Arghol's dream is significant not only for his violent repudiation of Stirner 
but also because it displays the split social situation that, I will argue, lies 
behind his metaphysical dualism. 
After his dream and a `confused struggles and vague successions of 
scenes' Arghol finds that `A riddle had been solved': 
9 Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present, 
(London & New York: Verso, 2002), pp. 141-2. 
10 Jameson, A Singular Modernity, p. 142. 
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He was Arghol once more. 
Was that a key to something? He was simply Arghol. 
"I am Arghol. " 
He repeated his name - like sinister word invented to launch a 
new Soap, in gigantic advertisement - toilet-necessity, he, to scrub 
the soul. 
He had ventured in his solitude and failed. Arghol he had 
imagined left in the city. - Suddenly he had discovered Arghol who had followed him, in Hanp. Always a deux! (ES, 114-5) 
This realisation of the failure of his solitude and the realisation that he is 
fundamentally dual himself - `Always a deux! ' - may suggest that Arghol 
has finally come to terms with his situation and dropped what Hanp saw as 
his `gigantic insolence and superiority'. Although this may imply a coming 
to terms with his antagonism with Hanp it does not mean that he has come 
to terms with the totality of his situation: in particular his acceptance of 
duality does not seem to include the figure of the uncle, his violent 
employer; Arghol may be reconciled to some degree with the one he has 
designated as his other and his `disciple', but he has not come to terms 
with his `master', whom he and the narrative of the `play' seem to have 
forgotten. 
The `play' ends with Hanp murdering Arghol and committing suicide, 
a double death which leaves the uncle unscathed. Hanp is provoked to kill 
Arghol by his disgust at Arghol's snoring. That snoring is the reason for 
Arghol's death is interesting for two reasons: firstly, in terms of mind-body 
dualism, body kills mind because it is disgusted by mind's physicality; 
secondly, snores themselves have a sort of liminal physicality. Snores are 
physical in that they issue from the body but they have no tangible physical 
presence, being a vibration rather than an object. A snore is a physical 
phenomenon but is not a physical object, in the common sense of the term. 
Arghol's snoring and Hanp's murderous reaction to it disturbs the mind- 
body scheme both because it inverts the relationship of disgust that 
Arghol, and perhaps the narrator, try to establish, and because snoring - 
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as something material and insubstantial, corporeal and disembodied - 
itself does not fit easily into this dualistic scheme. 
Arghol's snore and its effect on Ianp are described in vividly physical 
terms: 
Bluebottle, at first unnoticed, hurtling about, a snore rose quietly on 
the air. 
Drawn out, clumsy, self-centred! It pressed inflexibly on Hanp's 
nerve of hatred, sending hysteria gyrating in top of diaphragm, 
flooding neck. 
It beckoned, filthy, ogling finger. 
The first organ note abated. A second at once was set up: 
stronger, startling, full of loathsome unconsciousness. 
It purred a little now, quick and labial. Then virile and strident 
again. 
It rose and fell up centre of listener's body, and along swollen 
nerves, peachy, clotted tide, gurgling back in slimy shallows. Snoring 
of a malodorous, bloody, sink, emptying its water. 
More acutely, it plunged into his soul with bestial regularity, 
intolerable besmirching. 
Aching with disgust and fury, he lay dully, head against ground. 
At each fresh offence the veins puffed faintly in his temples. (ES, 117) 
The snore is presented as having a tangible effect on Hanp's 
consciousness: it `presses[s] inflexibly' on Hanp's nerves; it is personified 
as a `filthy, ogling finger'; and it is seen as having a liquid, rather than 
merely atmospheric, presence -a `clotted tide'. Arghol's snore `besmirches' 
Hanp's `soul' much in the same way that Arghol claimed that his `soul' was 
stained by the `process and condition of life'. Hanp's disgust at this 
`besmirching' snore is best understood as a disgust at the social, at the 
unavoidable presence of other people. In Lewis's work in general we can 
see a certain distaste for the aural: in `Cantleman's Spring-Mate' (1917) 
Cantleman's disgust at one of his fellow soldiers is indicated by his 
comment that `To see this face was like hearing perpetually a cheap and 
foolish music' (UP, 80); in Time and Western Man Lewis expresses a 
dislike for the penetrative quality of music, complaining of the way `music 
moves through you' (TWM, 170). Arghol's snore is also described as 
musical - an `organ note' - and is described as penetrating Hanp's body: 
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`It rose and fell up centre of listener's body'. Hanp's physical disgust with 
Arghol's snore mirrors Arghol's philosophical disgust with the world, and, 
unlike Arghol, Hanp is willing to use `his hands' to try and change the 
situation: 
Like a sleek shadow passing down his face, the rigour of his 
discomfort changed, sly volte-face of Nature. [... ] 
He got up, held by this foul sound of sleep, in dream of action. 
Rapt beyond all reflection, he would, martyr, relieve the world of this 
sound. 
Cut out this noise like a cancer. (ES, 117) 
Hanp's desire to surgically remove the object of his annoyance reflects 
Arghol's earlier statement that the `suicide's knife' is the only cure for 
`affliction got through indiscriminate rubbing against their fellows' (ES, 
ion). Unlike Arghol, however, Hanp is able to carry through his murderous 
desire and eventually even commit suicide himself. 
Arghol reacts to being stabbed in a mechanical way: `Arghol rose as 
though on a spring, his eyes glaring down on Hanp, and with an action of 
the head, as though he were about to sneeze' (ES, 118). This reaction 
suggests a purely instinctual and bodily response: at the moment of his 
death Arghol is, reasonably enough, a man of automatic instinct rather 
than one of ascetic contemplation and sophisticated philosophy. This 
reduction of Arghol to pure body is met with approval by Hanp: 
There was something incredible in the dead figure, the blood sinking 
down, a moist shaft into the ground. Hanp felt friendly towards it. 
There was only flesh there, and all our flesh is the same. 
Something distant, terrible and eccentric, bathing in that milky 
snore, had been struck and banished from matter. (ES, 118) 
By killing Arghol and reducing him to a pure mindless body Hanp removes 
something `distant, terrible and eccentric' that existed within Arghol and 
bathed in his `milky snore'. This `something' would seem most likely to be 
the `soul', whose `original solitude' Arghol felt had been stained by social 
life, and whose removal prompts `Relief of grateful universe' (ES, 1i8). 
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This relief, however, does not extend to Hanp, who experiences a `rapid 
despair [... ], a galloping blackness of mood', and he moves `quickly to 
outstrip it, perhaps' (ES, 118). As he moves out of the yard, Hanp 
encounters another person: 
Near the gate of the yard he found an idle figure. It was his master. 
He ground his teeth in this man's face, with an aggressive and furious 
movement towards him. The face looked shy and pleased, but civil, 
like a mysterious domestic. (ES, 118-9) 
It is unclear whether his `idle figure' is the ghost of Arghol or the uncle, as 
both are Hanp's `master', the former figuratively, the latter literally. This 
ambiguity is important as by subtly introducing the question of who is the 
`master' it makes us question the assumption, shared by both Hanp and 
Arghol, that Arghol is Hanp's master., ' Looking back at the `play' we can 
see that this assumption is based solely on Arghol's own rhetoric, in 
contradistinction to that of the status of the `uncle' as `master' which is 
based on physical violence. That the `uncle' is a more substantial `master' 
does not mean that it is his `shy and pleased' face that Hanp sees as he 
leaves the yard: indeed, from Hanp's point-of-view what is important is 
that he has encountered the figure of authority, whether real or spectral, 
and that this encounter leads to his suicide. Hanp leaves the `master' and 
`walked slowly along the canal to a low stone bridge. [... ] He sprang from 
the bridge clumsily, too unhappy for instinctive science, and sank like lead, 
his heart a sagging weight of stagnant hatred' (ES, 119). Hanp's suicide 
seems inevitable, as it restores the unhappy symmetry between him and 
Arghol, but we might ask Hanp the same question he asked Arghol after 
the initial beating: `Can't you kill him, in the name of God? ' (ES, loi). At 
both the beginning and the end of the play the appearance of the `master' 
forces someone into actions contrary to their physical self-interest, either 
submission or suicide. 
t1 This ambiguity is not present in the 1932 version of Enemy of the Stars where the figure 
that appears to Hanp is clearly identified as the `uncle', using his alternative designation 
as the `super'. Collected Poems and Plays, p. 191. 
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The appearance of the `master' at the beginning and the end of the 
play has been overlooked in previous interpretations of the `play', which 
focus on the dualistic bickering between Hanp and Arghol. Although the 
intricacies of this argument are obviously significant and interesting, it is 
important to remember that this is a `play' of three `characters', and that 
any speculation as to the meaning of the `play' must account for them all. 
Edwards writes that `Hanp versus Arghol [... ] is simply Arghol as his 
own ideal [... ] versus the part of Arghol that this ideal life is ashamed of. 
The idea that Hanp is in some way merely a part of Arghol or a projection 
of a part of him is interesting as it refigures the conflict of the `play' as one 
within an individual rather than as one between individuals. Indeed, 
Edwards argues that `Enemy of the Stars as a whole, including its 
philosophy, is presented as the projection of the same psychological 
conflict'. 12 A similar interpretation was proposed by Hugh Kenner, who 
wrote that `Arghol's grudge against Hanp is that, being in a sense Arghol's 
creation, he is Arghol's Ape' and that `Hanp, insofar as he is real for Arghol 
has been created by him'. 13 Toby Avard Foshay takes it even further, 
arguing that `The "plot" of Enemy is Arghol's gradual discovery that his 
conflict with Hanp is really a conflict internal to himself, between his own 
mind and body' and that Hanp's decapitation of Arghol is `a further 
physical correlative of the mind/body conflict taking place between himself 
and Arghol and within Arghol himself . 14 
Understanding Enemy of the Stars as a conflict within the individual 
psyche is an interesting and suggestive critical move, which accounts for 
the strange dream-like logic of the `play' and the awkward similarities 
between the two main characters. It does not, however, account for the 
`whole' of the `play', as it overlooks the figure of the `uncle', who has a 
structurally significant role in the action, initiating it with his violence and 
concluding it with his threatening appearance. If the `uncle' were to be 
included in such a psychological interpretation, this would involve a move 
12 Edwards, Wyndham Lewis, p. 154. 
13 Kenner, Wyndham Lewis, p. 23- 
14 Foshay, Wyndham Lewis and the Avant-Garde, p. 29. 
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from a dualistic model of the psyche to a tripartite one: in Freudian terms, 
this could be seen as a recognition of the role of the superego. The 
identification of Arghol as ascetic ego and Hanp as sensual id is fairly 
straightforward, and remains, figuratively, locked in one individual psyche. 
Introducing the `uncle' as superego into the equation both makes the 
interpretation more sophisticated, and, more importantly, extends it 
beyond the individual psyche, raising questions of social authority. The 
yard within which the agon between Arghol and Hanp is played out 
belongs to the `uncle', and so, on an allegorical level, it is he who sets the 
limits for the action. On a more literal level it is the fact that they are both 
employees of the `uncle' that brings Arghol and Hanp together: it may 
seem like a mundane point, but Arghol and Hanp are co-workers as well as 
philosophical archetypes. It is easy to see what is lost in the interpretative 
move from three literal characters to two allegorical characters made by 
most critics: the employer, and with it the recognition that in terms of 
work Arghol and Hanp share the same status. Restoring this literal 
occupational context alters the interpretation at an allegorical level: Arghol 
can now be seen as the archetypal university graduate stuck in an 
unfulfilling job, turning his bitterness against his less educated colleagues, 
rather than doing anything concrete to alter the situation. In designating 
Hanp as his `other' Arghol, and perhaps the narrator, construct an 
antagonistic dualism that represses the underlying structural opposition 
between the `uncle' on the one hand and his employees, Hanp and Arghol, 
on the other. This fundamental repressed dualism is far more available to a 
literal-minded reading than an eagerly allegorical one. 
Once this occupational context and repressed dualism is restored we 
can see clearly how Arghol's philosophising functions as ideology, in the 
Althusserian sense of that which `represents the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence'. 15 Arghol's dualistic 
philosophy provides him with an imaginative scheme which, although it 
15 Louis Althusser, `Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an 
Investigation' in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, trans. Ben Brewster, (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2001), p. 109. 
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misperceives his `real conditions', nevertheless makes it appear 
meaningful. Expressed in the terms developed in Chapter One, dualism is 
the `belief or `fantasy' by which Arghol attempts to maintain a meaningful 
sense of `reality' in the face of `the Real' of his situation. 
By restoring the fundamental dualism of the `play' by a literal-minded 
reading we are able to see how the play allegorises not only a particular 
philosophy, but also the general situation of philosophical thought. In 
Arghol's philosophising we can see the birth of theory out of the timid 
refusal of praxis: his philosophy and the dualism with which he 
understands the world is a response to Hanp's question `Can't you kill him, 
in the name of God? ' By imagining his existence as part of a dualistic agon, 
Arghol is able to forget his `uncle' and with it the real forces which limit 
and determine his existence. Hugh Kenner has described the relationship 
between Arghol and Hanp using an intriguing astronomical figure: 
like the double star Algol (Alpha Persei) after which he is named, 
Arghol must - as the very condition of his existence - waltz eternally 
about a common centre of gravity with this unluminous companion, 
which eclipses his light with clockwork periodicity and transforms 
the effulgence of genius into a recurrent demoniacal wink. 16 
It is this `common centre of gravity' which is disavowed in Arghol's 
dualistic philosophy and in dualistic interpretations of Enemy of the Stars: 
the `common centre' is the `uncle' and the mundane world of work. The 
disavowal of this `common centre' also allows Arghol to deny the 
commonality between him and Hanp, something which is ultimately 
restored at the end of the `play'. Arghol's philosophy is also an attempt to 
create a solid ontological distinction by the power of thought alone. There 
is perhaps an analogy here with The Childermass where, in response to 
Pullman's assertion that the peons are `Not like us', Salters replies: `Not 
like us? What is the difference? Are we very different? I believe we only 
think we're different' (C, 43). Enemy of the Stars dramatises Arghol's 
16 Kenner, Wyndham Lewis, p. 23. 
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efforts, and their failure, to establish, by means of metaphysical thought, a 
categorical ontological difference between himself and Hanp, between the 
big-city intellectual and the small-town labourer. But both characters are 
trapped in the same situation with the same `common centre of gravity', 
and in the end all that remains is their most basic, physical commonality: 
`There was only flesh there, and all our flesh is the same'. 
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The Wild Body: 
`Laughter is the brain-body's snort of exultation' 
Lewis's essay `The Meaning of the Wild Body' was published as part of The 
Wild Body (1927), a collection of short stories, most of them reworkings of 
pre-war works portraying the lives of peasants, mostly Breton, in an 
unsympathetically comic fashion. Together with the essay `Inferior 
Religions' `The Meaning of the Wild Body' attempts to set out Lewis's 
theory of the comic, and so elucidate the stories that precede it. The 
importance of mind-body dualism for the argument of `The Meaning of the 
Wild Body' is made clear in its opening lines: `First, to assume the 
dichotomy of mind and body is necessary here, without arguing it; for it is 
upon that essential separation that the theory of laughter here proposed is 
based' ('Meaning', 157). It is highly significant that Lewis `assumes' and 
sees as `necessary' but does not, or perhaps cannot, `argue' this 
`dichotomy', as this indicates that the philosophical ground on which he 
bases his theory of laughter is one that he cannot justify, and so does not 
form a solid ground for his theory. Lewis's `essential separation' is 
presented as something which has to be believed but cannot be fully 
known: a matter of faith rather than reason. I will argue that Lewis's 
theory of laughter presupposes a `belief in the distinction between the 
laugher and the laughed-at that his texts show is unstable, and, like the 
`beliefs' looked at in Chapter One, vulnerable to the intrusion of `the Real'. 
Lewis's theory of laughter is based on the idea that all human existence, 
particularly in its bodily aspect, is absurd: `There is nothing that is animal 
(and we as bodies are animals) that is not absurd' ('Meaning', 157). Lewis 
argues that in situations where there is a clear social or national distinction 
this absurdity is easily observable in others: `It is easy for us to see, if we 
are french, that the German is "absurd, " or if german, that the French is 
"ludicrous, " for we are outside in that case' (`Meaning', 158). This sense of 
absurdity observed from the `outside' remains, however, a partisan one 
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rather than the universal one which Lewis initially suggested with his 
reference to the general absurdity of the human body. Lewis argues that a 
sense of universal and undiscriminating absurdity is possible, although it 
is not so easy: 
What is far more difficult to appreciate, with any constancy, is that, 
whatever his relative social advantages or particular national virtues 
may be, every man is profoundly open to the same criticism or 
ridicule from any opponent who is only different enough. Again, it is 
comparatively easy to see that another man, as an animal, is absurd; 
but it is far more difficult to observe oneself in that hard and 
exquisite light. But no man has ever continued to live who has 
observed himself in that manner for longer than a flash. Such 
consciousness must be of the nature of a thunderbolt. Laughter is 
only summer-lightning But it occasionally takes on the dangerous 
form of absolute revelation. 
This fundamental self-observation, then, can never on the whole 
be absolute. We are not constructed to be absolute observers. 
('Meaning', 158) 
The move here from viewing others as absurd to the possibility of viewing 
oneself in the same `hard and exquisite light' demonstrates how Lewis saw 
absurdity as potentially universal. However, it is interesting that Lewis 
sees `absolute revelation' of one's own absurdity as `dangerous' and even 
lethal, as this insistence resonates with his claim in Time and Western 
Man, examined in Chapter One, that: 
we are surface-creatures only, and by nature are meant to be that 
only, if there is any meaning in nature. No metaphysician goes the 
whole length of departure from the surface-condition of mind - that 
fact is generally not noticed. For such departures result in self- 
destruction, just as though we hurled ourselves into space - into 
"mental-space, " if you like, in this case. (Tl'VM, 377) 
In both cases `observation' is seen as potentially destructive if it goes too 
far: `self-observation' is considered incompatible with the sense of self. 
`The Meaning of the Wild Body' is an interesting and significant essay as in 
it Lewis seems to be far less comfortable with maintaining an ungrounded 
surface `reality' than he was in Time and Western Man: he argues that, 
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although `self-observation' is lethal in its absolute form, `Where it does not 
exist at all, men sink to the level of insects' ('Meaning', 158). The idea that 
some `self-observation' is needed but not too much is a slight modification 
of the notion that `the "truths" from beneath the surface contradict our 
values' (TWM, 377): Lewis now sees some but not too much knowledge of 
what is `beneath the surface' as necessary to the maintenance of a sense of 
self. Both formulations, however, in the words of Zizek, are ones `of 
refusing to go to the end, of "keeping up appearances"' which try to keep 
`the Real' at a safe and manageable distance. '? `The Meaning of the Wild 
Body', perhaps because it is nearer to his fiction than Time and Western 
Man, allows `the Real' a little closer but still attempts to keep it safely 
repressed. Laughter is seen as a response to the approach of `the Real' that 
occurs in `self-observation', an idea also expressed in `Inferior Religions' 
where Lewis writes that `Laughter is the climax in the tragedy of seeing, 
hearing, and smelling self-consciously' ('Religions', 151). 
The `fundamental self-observation' which Lewis refers to is seen as 
lethal because it compels us to regard ourselves in the `hard and exquisite 
light' in which we view others as absurd objects to be laughed at. In other 
words, the absolute self-observation which Lewis regards as impossible 
would break down the `essential separation' of mind-body dualism as we 
would be forced to view ourselves as nothing more than an absurd and 
animal body. Lewis saw this reduction to the physical as essential to 
laughter, writing that the `root of the Comic is to be sought in the 
sensations resulting from the observations of a thing behaving like a 
person' ('Meaning', 158). Absolute self-observation would do away with 
this illusion of personality altogether; however, limited `observation' is 
necessary as the mind-body dualism which is axiomatic to Lewis's theory 
of the laughter depends on it, as it creates a distinction between the 
laugher and the laughed-at: 
'7 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, p. 24. 
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The essential us, that is the laugher, is as distinct from the Wild Body 
as in the Upanishadic account of the souls returned from the paradise 
of the Moon, which, entering into plants, are yet distinct from them. 
Or to take the symbolic vedic figure of the two birds, the one 
watching and passive, the other enjoying its activity, we similarly 
have to postulate two creatures, one that never enters into life, but 
that travels about in a vessel to whose destiny it is momentarily 
attached. That is, of course, the laughing observer, and the other is 
the Wild Body. ('Meaning', 157) 
In this passage the laugher and the laughed-at are presented as two 
distinct parts of the same individual, with the laughing mind `momentarily 
attached' to `the Wild Body', its vessel. In the story `A Soldier of Humour', 
published in The Wild Body, the narrator, Kerr-Orr, considers himself to 
exist in that way: 
This forked, strange-scented, blond-skinned gut-bag, with its two 
bright rolling marbles with which it sees, bull's eyes full of mockery 
and madness, is my stalking horse. I hang somewhere in its midst 
operating it with detachment. 18 
Where exactly this `I' hangs is open to question, but it is significant that it 
has a physical location at all, as this suggests, again, that Lewis's dualism is 
not completely pure and watertight: the non-physical has a physical 
location. This passage is reminiscent of the fight in Enemy of the Stars 
where `Soul perched like aviator in basin of skull' (ES, no). In the light of 
the ideas explored in Chapter One, it is interesting to note that Zizek 
argues that: 
The role of fantasy is [... ] in a way analogous to that of the ill-fated 
pineal gland in Descartes's philosophy, this mediator between res 
cogitans and res extensa: fantasy mediates between the formal 
symbolic structure and the positivity of the objects we encounter in 
reality - that is to say, it provides a "schema" according to which 
certain positive objects in reality can function as objects of desire, 
i8 Wyndham Lewis, `A Soldier of Humour', first published 1927, in The Complete Wild 
Body, ed. Bernard Lafourcade, (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1982), p. 18. 
94 
Chapter Two: Mind-Body 
filling in the empty places opened up by the formal symbolic 
structure. 19 
Kerr-Orr's `I', which is of the mind but located within the body, shares this 
quality of fantasy: the belief in its existence allows the `schema' of an 
`essential separation' between laugher and laughed-at to be postulated, 
and this separation to be denied in others and the absurdity of their 
pretence that they have minds to be laughed at. Whether or not `desire' as 
such is involved, Kerr-Orr's fantasy of selfhood, and the sense of 
separation from others that it allows, certainly provides a `schema' 
according to which other people can be seen as positive objects which can 
function as objects of laughter. 20 This laughing `I', separate from but 
enclosed within `the Wild Body', appears to be completely self-positing: 
constituted by the laughter it enables, it seems to have no independent 
existence of its own. Laughter creates the ground on which the laugher's 
identity is said to be based. In `Inferior Religions' Lewis hints that the 
figure of the laugher is a projection who must be imagined rather than 
simply existing: 
To introduce my puppets, and the Wild Body, the generic puppet of 
all, I must project a fanciful wandering figure to be the showman to 
whom the antics and solemn gambols of these wild children are to be 
a source of strange delight. ('Religions', 149) 
This `fanciful' figure is able to laugh at the mainly Breton characters 
satirised in the Wild Body stories because he is able to see that the 
`fascinating imbecility of the creaking men machines' is `the spectacle of a 
pattern as circumscribed and complete as a theorem of Euclid' ('Religions', 
149). He can do this, because he can see that what they see as `the normal 
real' is a product of `a savage worship', the `Inferior Religions' of the essay's 
title ('Religions', 149). Using the terminology of Chapter One, Kerr-Orr can 
19 Slavoj Lizek, The Plague of Fantasies, (London & New York: Verso, 1997), P. 7 
20 Kerr-Orr positions himself with an antagonistic comparison with Freud: `Freud 
explains everything by sex: I explain everything by laughter', `A Soldier of Humour', p. M. 
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perceive the `beliefs' on which the `reality' of the subjects of these stories is 
grounded; the `beliefs' by which they are able to think of themselves as 
`persons' rather than `things'. Kerr-Orr is able to perceive the subjects of 
the stories as `puppets', `creaking men machines' and `intricately moving 
bobbins', all terms which suggest mindless thingness rather that conscious 
personality. Lewis's `fanciful wandering figure' understands that `things' 
determine the behaviour of the `persons' attached to them: 
The boat's tackle and dirty little shell, or the hotel and its technique 
of hospitality, keeping the limbs of the men and women involved in a 
monotonous rhythm from morning to night, that was the 
occupational background [... ]. ('Religions', 149) 
This `monotonous rhythm' alters the sense of reality of the men and 
women involved in it: 
A man is made drunk with his boat or restaurant as he is with a 
merry-go-round: only it is the staid, everyday drunkenness of the 
normal real, not easy always to detect. We can all see the ascendance 
a "carousal" has on men, driving them into a set narrow intoxication. 
The wheel at Carisbrooke imposes a set of movements upon the 
donkey inside it, in drawing water from the well, that it is easy to 
grasp. But in the case of the hotel or fishing-boat, for instance, the 
complexity of the rhythmic scheme is so great that it passes as open 
and untrammelled life. This subtle and wiser mechanism merges, for 
the spectator, into the general variety of nature. ('Religions', 149) 
Lewis's laughing observer is able, apparently, to succeed in the difficult 
task of perceiving the complex `rhythmic scheme' at work under the 
`everyday drunkenness of the normal real' and can see that `we have in 
most lives the spectacle of a pattern as circumscribed and complete as a 
theorem of Euclid' (`Religions', 149). The laugher is able, in other words, to 
perceive `the Real' of the thing under the quixotic `reality' of the person. 
The distinction between `persons' and `things' is a key one in Lewis's 
comic theory, and is, as many critics have observed, an inversion of Henri 
Bergson's philosophy of laughter. According to Bergson's philosophy `We 
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laugh every time a person gives us the impression of being a thing'21; 
Lewis, on the other hand, argues that `The root of the Comic is to be sought 
in the sensations resulting from the observations of a thing behaving like a 
person' ('Meaning', 158). For Bergson, laughter functions as a corrective 
which prevents the mechanisation of the vital and spontaneous life of the 
soul: 
The rigid, the ready-made, the mechanical, in contrast with the 
supple, the ever-changing and the living, absentmindedness in 
contrast with attention, in a word, automatism in contrast with free 
activity, such are the defects that laughter singles out and would fain 
correct. 22 
Lewis's idea of laughter does not seek to do this, rather it serves to remind 
us of our essential absurdity and unfreedom, a condition he sees as 
inherent in our bodily existence: 
all men are necessarily comic: for they are all things, or physical 
bodies, behaving as persons. It is only when you come to deny that 
they are "persons, " or that there is any "mind" or "person" there at 
all, that the world of appearance is accepted as quite natural, and not 
at all ridiculous. Then, with a denial of "the person, " life immediately 
becomes both "real" and very serious. (`Meaning', 158) 
This `denial of "the person"' is antithetical to Bergson's idea of the function 
of the comic, which seeks to save the person from becoming a thing: 
Bergson's idea of laughter can be seen as a defence against reification; 
Lewis's as an attack against the denial of the "`real" and very serious' 
reified condition of humanity. 
The opposition between Bergson and Lewis can also be seen in the 
way they relate laughter to the idea of the human. Bergson argues that `the 
comic does not exist outside the pale of what is strictly human' and that 
laughter is one of the defining features of humanity: 
21 Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley 
Brereton & Fred Rothwell, (London: Macmillan, 1911), p. 58. 
22 Bergson, Laughter, p. 130. 
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Several [philosophers] have defined man as "an animal which 
laughs. " They might as well have defined him as an animal which is 
laughed at; for if any other animal, or some lifeless object, produces 
the same effect, it is always because of some resemblance to man, of 
the stamp he gives it or the use he puts it to. 23 
For Lewis, laughter does not have this humanising aspect, but rather 
breaks down any idea of the exceptional status of the human and its 
perceived separation from the rest of the natural world: 
To bring vividly to our mind what we mean by "absurd, " let us turn to 
the plant, and enquire how the plant could be absurd. Suppose you 
came upon an orchid or a cabbage reading Flaubert's Salammbö, or 
Plutarch's Moralia, you would be very much surprised. But if you 
found a man or a woman reading it, you would not be surprised. 
Now in one sense you ought to have been just as much surprised 
at finding a man occupied in this way as if you had found an orchid or 
a cabbage, or a tom-cat, to include the animal world. There is the 
same physical anomaly. It is just as absurd externally, that is what I 
mean. - The deepest root of the Comic is to be sought in this 
anomaly. ('Meaning', 158-9) 
The identity which Lewis posits between men and cabbages and tom-cats 
is based on an idea of matter and the material, which he sees as 
fundamental to everything that exists and which he opposes to an idea of 
the mind, which is here seen as an `anomaly'. In the mind-matter dualism 
Lewis presents in `The Meaning of the Wild Body', matter is the primary 
quality, mind being portrayed as an absurd and pretentious supplement to 
it: 
The movement or intelligent behaviour of matter, any autonomous 
movement of matter, is essentially comic. That is what we mean by 
comic or ludicrous. And we all, as human beings, answer to that 
description. We are all autonomously and intelligently moving 
matter. ('Meaning', 159) 
23 Bergson, Laughter, pp. 3-4. 
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According to Lewis's argument human life is entirely comic and should 
continuously provoke laughter, something which it manifestly does not do. 
The reason for this absence of laughter is the `belief in mind, which 
enables us to construct a `reality' which represses the comedy of `the Real': 
The reason why we do not laugh when we observe a man reading a 
newspaper or trimming a lamp, or smoking a pipe, is because we 
suppose he "has a mind, " as we call it, because we are accustomed to 
this strange sight, and because we do it ourselves. But because when 
you see a man walking down the street you know why he is doing that 
(for instance, because he is on his way to lunch, just as the stone 
rolling down the hillside, you say, is responding to the law of 
gravitation), that does not make him less ridiculous. But there is 
nothing essentially ridiculous about the stone. The man is ridiculous 
fundamentally, he is ridiculous because he is a man, instead of a 
thing. ('Meaning', 159) 
It is because `we suppose' that men, unlike stones, have minds that they 
can be seen as ridiculous: the same `belief which represses laughter also 
causes it, as this `belief posits the split between `person' and `thing', the 
failure of which is the root of the comic. The `belief in dualism denies the 
ultimate thingness of the person, but in so doing makes the things that it 
believes to be persons absurd as it claims that these things are not just 
simply things but are in fact persons which, in `the Real', they are not. 
A dualism of mind and matter is also essential to Bergson's theory of 
the comic, only for him the mind, or soul, is presented as the primary and 
motivating force, and matter as an impediment to its noble efforts: 
in every human form [we see] the effort of a soul which is shaping 
matter, a soul which is infinitely supple and perpetually in motion, 
subject to no law of gravitation, for it is not the earth that attracts it. 
This soul imparts a portion of its winged lightness to the body it 
animates: the immateriality which thus passes into matter is what is 
called gracefulness. Matter, however, is obstinate and resists. It 
draws itself to the ever-alert activity of this higher principle, would 
fain convert it to its own inertia and cause it to revert to mere 
automatism. It would fain immobilise the intelligently varied 
movements of the body in stupidly contracted grooves, stereotype in 
permanent grimaces the fleeting expressions of the face, in short 
imprint on the whole person such an attitude as to make it appear 
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immersed and absorbed in the materiality of some mechanical 
occupation, instead of ceaselessly renewing its vitality by keeping in 
touch with a living ideal. Where matter thus succeeds in dulling the 
outward life of the soul, in petrifying its movements and thwarting its 
gracefulness, it achieves, at the expense of the body, an effect that is 
comic. 24 
For Bergson, laughter is on the side of the `soul' against `matter', and it 
enables the `soul' to laugh at `matter' and so free itself from the laws of 
matter. In Lewis's theory, on the other hand, the object of laughter is 
inverted, and is directed against the `mind' which pretends to be separate 
from matter. The difference between Lewis's and Bergson's theories of the 
comic indicates two divergent views of human existence, which, though 
both relying on the same basic dualism, are diametrically opposed to each 
other. Both depend on a central idea of unmasking, or going behind 
appearance and exposing something more essential, with Bergson 
attempting to expose the soul behind matter and Lewis exposing the 
absurd thingness behind the facade of the person and the `belief in mind. 
Using the terminology developed in Chapter One, Lewis's idea of the comic 
exposes the thingness of `the Real' behind our everyday `reality' in which 
we quixotically believe ourselves to be `persons'. As we saw, in Time and 
Western Man, published in the same year as The Wild Body, Lewis set 
himself against the exposure of `the Real' and defended the `keeping up' of 
the appearance of the `reality' of the personality, writing that: 
our only terra firma in a boiling and shifting world is, after all, our 
"self. " That must cohere for us to be capable at all of behaving in any 
way but as mirror-images of alien realities, or as the most helpless 
and lowest organisms, as worms or as sponges. (TWM, 131-2) 
In his theory of the comic, with its assumption of a fundamental identity 
between men and cabbages, Lewis seems to be at odds with his argument 
in Time and Western Man. In the terms of `The Meaning of the Wild Body' 
any sense of `our "self" would appear to be `absurd', as it entails `a thing 
24 Bergson, Laughter, pp. 28-9. 
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behaving like a person' and not like one of `the most helpless and lowest 
organisms' to which we mistakenly and comically believe ourselves to be 
superior. It would be wrong, however, to view the two texts as completely 
opposed to each other, for, as we have seen, in `The Meaning of the Wild 
Body' Lewis portrays laughter as a force destructive of the personality, and 
in its absolute form humanly unsustainable, insisting that `We are not 
constructed to be absolute observers' ('Meaning', 158). Such observation is 
presumably destructive as it not only reveals other `persons' to the `things' 
but also reveals the `person' laughing as a `thing' as well. Laughter is 
directed against the absurd bodily aspect of others, but as the laugher has a 
body themself absolute observation will reveal them to be just as absurd as 
everybody else, and so in a less secure position from which to laugh at 
them. The fact that laughter itself is a physical act, one which no doubt 
looks absurd when observed from an absolute viewpoint, also works 
against the assumed separation of the laugher from the laughed-at. 
In `Inferior Religions' the physical aspect and implicit commonality 
of laughter is openly acknowledged, and is no longer so unequivocally 
directed against the Wild Body. Indeed, in this essay, laughter is presented 
as something which breaks down the mind-body dualism, which, in `The 
Meaning of the Wild Body' was its `essential' precondition. Two of the 
attributes of laughter that Lewis catalogues are of particular interest in this 
context: `Laughter is the Wild Body's song of triumph. [... ] Laughter is the 
mind sneezing' ('Religions', 151). Here, laughter is seen as both of the body 
and of the mind, and significantly its mental aspect is characterised using a 
physical metaphor - the automatic reflex of the sneeze. Lewis's definition 
of the Wild Body in `Inferior Religions' is subtly different to that in `The 
Meaning of the Wild Body': 
The Wild Body, as understood here, is that small primitive, literally 
antediluvian vessel in which we set out on our adventures. Or 
regarded as a brain, it is rather a winged magic horse, that transports 
us hither and thither, sometimes rushing as in the chinese 
cosmogonies, up and down the outer reaches of space. Laughter is 
the brain-body's snort of exultation. It expresses its wild sensation of 
power and speed; it is all that remains physical in the flash of 
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thought, its friction: or it may be a defiance flung at the hurrying 
fates. 
The Wild Body is this supreme survival that is us, the stark 
apparatus with its set of mysterious spasms: the most profound of 
which is laughter. ('Religions', 152) 
The first sentence of this passage presents a vision of the Wild Body 
similar to that given in `The Meaning of the Wild Body' of it as `a vessel to 
whose destiny [the laugher] is momentarily attached' and to Kerr-Orr's 
`stalking horse' in `The Soldier of Humour'. However, in the second 
sentence the Wild Body is `regarded as a brain', which breaks down the 
`essential separation' assumed in the other essay. The introduction of the 
figure of the `brain-body' is the third sentence seems to compound this 
breakdown, with what were seen as separate now integrated into a single, 
though hyphenated, identity. This conflation of the mental and the 
physical is exemplified by Lewis's claim that laughter `is all that remains 
physical in the flash of thought'. 
Even in `The Meaning of the Wild Body', however, there are hints of 
the breakdown of mind-body dualism. For example, Lewis writes that `in 
certain forms of laughter, we leap' over `the chasm lying between being and 
non-being over which it is impossible for logic to throw any bridge' 
('Meaning', 157). Laughter seems to function in a way similar to that of 
violence in Enemy of the Stars where `Thoughts fell on [Arghol] like 
punches', a phenomenon in which mind and body are confused but not 
fully integrated. 
In Lewis's theory of the comic, as set out in `The Meaning of the Wild 
Body' the assumed but unargued dualism is problematic: it is essential in 
that it establishes the distinction between laugher and laughed-at; but 
what the laugher laughs at is precisely the deluded pretence of the 
possession of such a dualism in the laughed-at. The dualism is not so much 
an ontological and universal one, in which the human subject is 
fundamentally split, but more of a social one, in which there is a 
distinction between those who are able to become comic observers, and 
those who are not, and so provide comic fodder for the eyes of the 
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laughers. As we will see in Chapters Four and Five, this pattern is also 
present in Lewis's attitudes towards race and gender. 
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Men Without Art: 
`The terms are strictly unusable' 
In Men Without Art Lewis uses the language of dualism to articulate a 
theory of satire, which both continues and develops ideas about `persons' 
and `things' found in The Wild Body essays, and deploys dualistic 
terminology to construct a distinction between his aesthetic and those of 
other writers. Lewis also argues against other people's dualistic 
categorisation of art and literature, finding fault with Virginia Woolf's 
division of writers into materialist realists and non-materialist modernists, 
and T. E. Hulme's sharp distinction between romanticism and classicism. 
Lewis's theory of satire is developed in part as a response to William 
Hazlitt's criticism of characterisation in the plays of Ben Jonson which 
Hazlitt sees as not `human' enough. Hazlitt writes: 
Shakespeare's characters are men; Ben Jonson's are more like 
machines, governed by mere routine, or by the convenience of the 
poet, whose property they are. In reading the one, we are let into the 
minds of his characters, we see the play of their thoughts, how their 
humours flow and work. ... His 
humour (so to speak) bubbles, 
sparkles, and finds its way in all directions, like a natural spring, In 
Ben Jonson it is, as it were, confined in a leaden cistern, where it 
stagnates and corrupts; or directed only through certain artificial 
pipes and conduits to answer a given purpose.... Sheer ignorance, 
bare-faced impudence, or idiot imbecility, are his dramatic 
commonplaces - things that provoke pity or disgust, instead of 
laughter. (quoted in MWA, 91) 
Lewis is far more comfortable than Hazlitt in laughing at `ignorance', 
`impudence', and `idiot imbecility', and sees Hazlitt's discomfort as rooted 
in an `ethical' concern with humanity. The reason why Hazlitt believes that 
`idiot imbecility' should not provoke laughter is, Lewis speculates, because 
such characteristics `being found in a human being, it is "letting down" [of] 
the species, and so to laugh at it would be unethical and inhuman' (MWA, 
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91). In contradiction to Hazlitt, Lewis embraces the idea of an `unethical 
and inhuman' laughter: 
Perfect laughter, if there could be such a thing, would be inhuman. 
And it would select as the objects of its mirth as much the antics 
dependent upon pathological maladjustments, injury, or disease, as 
the antics of clumsy and imperfectly functioning healthy people. 
(M WA, 92) 
Lewis defends laughter directed at people's physical appearance, claiming 
that `Infinitely more pain is inflicted by laughter provoked by some non- 
physical cause than by that provoked by the physical' (MWA, 92). Lewis's 
account of an inhuman and perfect laughter is not, however, the end of the 
matter: `Our deepest laughter is not, however, inhuman laughter. And yet 
it is non-personal and non-moral' (MWA, 92). `Our deepest laughter' does 
not achieve the status of `Perfect laughter', much in the same way as Lewis 
claimed in Time and Western Man that `No metaphysician goes the whole 
length of departure from the surface-condition of mind' (TWM, 377). In 
both cases the attainment of the absolute, in either its metaphysical or 
comic form, is denied to humanity. 
And just as the metaphysician, in Time and Western Man, must 
remain on the surface, so, in Men Without Art, must the satirist: Lewis 
defines satire as an art of the external, in contrast to Hazlitt's preference 
for an art which lets the reader `into the minds of the characters', the 
`method' which, Lewis writes, is `least suited to satire' which on the 
contrary `must deal with the outside' (MWA, 95). Lewis scorns Hazlitt's 
dislike of the mechanical nature of Ben Jonson's characters, dismissing it 
in terms familiar from The Wild Body essays: 
"Shakespeare's characters are men: Ben Jonson's are more like 
machines, " Hazlitt exclaims. And I have replied - "Of course they 
are! - in both cases that is just what they were intended to be. " But 
"men" are undoubtedly, to a greater or lesser extent, machines. And 
there are those among us who are revolted by this reflection, and 
there are those that are not. Men are sometimes so palpably 
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machines, the machination is so transparent, that they are comic, as 
we say. (MWA, 95) 
As in The Wild Body it is the art of exposing the hidden thingness of the 
person that is seen as comic. Lewis develops this argument in Men 
Without Art, introducing into the argument the concept of freedom and 
presenting laughter as a reaction to the recognition of its illusory nature: 
our consciousness is pitched up to the very moderate altitude of 
relative independence at which we live - at which level we have the illusion of being autonomous and "free. " But if one of us exposes to 
much his "works, " and we start seeing him as a thing, then - in 
subconsciously referring this back to ourselves - we are astonished 
and shocked, and we bark at him - we laugh - in order to relieve our 
emotion. (MWA, 95) 
The perception of the commonality between laugher and laughed-at which 
was seen as lethal in The Wild Body is here seen as fundamental to 
laughter: it is the recognition that the laugher shares the unfreedom of the 
laughed-at that provokes laughter. In The Wild Body laughter was 
presented as a response to the unfreedom of others; here it functions as a 
relief from the recognition that this unfreedom can be referred back to the 
laugher: laughter does not create distinction but helps relieve the 
realisation of its absence. The `essential separation' between laugher and 
laughed-at that was assumed but not argued in `The Meaning of the Wild 
Body' can no longer be sustained. Lewis does, however, resort to another 
distinction which creates another `essential separation': 
Freedom is certainly our human goal, in the sense that all effort is 
directed to that end: and it is a dictate of nature that we should laugh, 
and laugh loudly, at those who have fallen into slavery, and still 
more, those who batten on it. But the artistic sensibility, that is 
another "provision of nature. " The artist steps outside this 
evolutionary upward march, and looking back into the evolutionary 
machine, he explores its pattern - or is supposed to - quite cold- bloodedly. (MWA, 95-6) 
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Human nature is seen as split between the `dictate [... ] that we should 
laugh' and the `artistic sensibility', with the artist presented as being able 
to achieve the separation from the general condition of humanity that the 
laugher was in `The Meaning of the Wild Body'. In arguing for this `cold- 
blooded' view of the artist Lewis refers to his claim in Time and Western 
Man that his was `a philosophy of the eye' (TWM, 392) -a claim that will 
be examined in detail in the Conclusion - and his satirical mode of 
representation in The Apes of God, claiming of the latter that `no book has 
ever been written that has paid more attention to the outside of people' 
(MWA, 97). What is of interest here, however, is the way in which Lewis 
seeks to distinguish and separate what he calls his `externalist art' from 
that of other writers by the use of images of mind-body dualism. 
Lewis's attack on the art of the inside places him in opposition to a 
dominant strand in modernism, which sought to portray internal 
consciousness rather than external physicality. For Lewis, this type of 
writing is represented best by Virginia Woolf, and he attacks Woolf s idea 
of fiction in a chapter subtitled "`Mind" and "Matter" on the Plane of a 
Literary Controversy'. He begins his argument with a sceptical reflection 
on the terms of mind-body dualism: 
Body and Mind [... ] are, philosophically, two very shadowy counters. 
There are, on the market today, patterns of belief extending for the 
extreme position, on the one hand, that there is in fact no traceable 
psyche, but only one stuff, out of which our world is composed, 
properly neither "matter" nor "mind"; to the extreme position on the 
other, which, as a matter of fact, is much the same as the former, only 
with a more strongly marked subjective flavouring. The single basic 
stuff is more soulful at that end that it is at the other, the 
deterministic end, that is all. (MWA, 131) 
Lewis's insistence on the deep similarity between the philosophical poles 
he sets out here serves to belittle both of them, as does his use of the term 
`single basic stuff, which is hardly a standard philosophical phrase. This 
belittlement allows Lewis to remain, theoretically at least, neutral in the 
discussion that follows, in which he offers a mocking critique of Woolf s 
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attack on realism, as represented by Arnold Bennett, in `Mr Bennett and 
Mrs Brown' (1924). Lewis characterises the `conflict' between the two 
writers in a caricaturised fashion: 
Mrs. Woolf, the orthodox "idealist, " tremulously squares up to the big 
beefy brute, Bennett, plainly the very embodiment of commonplace 
matter - it is, in fact, a rather childish, that is to say an over-simple, 
encounter. It is a cat and dog match, right enough: but such 
"spiritual" values as those invoked upon Mrs. Woolfs side of the 
argument, are of a spiritualism which only exists upon the popular 
plane, as the complement of hard-and-fast matter. The one value is 
as tangible, popular and readily understood by the "plain reader" as 
the other. I doubt if, at bottom, it is very much more than a boy and 
girl quarrel (to change the metaphor from dog-and-cat). I believe it is 
just the incompatibility of the eternal feminine, on the one hand, and 
the rough footballing "he" principle - the eternal masculine - on the 
other. There is nothing more metaphysical about it than that. (MWA, 
133) 
Lewis's dismissal of this `conflict' as nothing more `metaphysical' than a 
`boy and girl quarrel' both belittles it, and implicitly invokes his own 
position as a superior one, and translates the opposition mind-matter into 
gendered terms. I will leave a detailed consideration of Lewis's views on 
gender to Chapter Three, however it is interesting to note that in his 
comparison masculinity is associated with the body and the feminine with 
the mind, as well as that his subsequent suggestion that there is a deep 
similarity between the characters of Woolf and Bennett undermines the 
clarity of any straightforward gender opposition: 
The preoccupations of Mrs. Dalloway are after all not so far removed 
from the interests of Mr. Bennett's characters. One is somewhat 
nearer to "the Palace, " the other to the "Pub. " But does that not even 
suggest a subtle kinship, rather than an irreconcilable foreignness? 
(MWA, 133) 
As we will see, this idea of a `subtle kinship' is one that has many 
resonances with Lewis's thinking about gender, as well as with the spectre 
of fundamental commonality that is present in Enemy of the Stars and The 
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Childermass. In the present context, this idea demonstrates again Lewis's 
tendency to undermine his binary oppositions almost as soon as he 
introduces them, as well as revealing a certain scepticism on his part about 
the `newness' of the modernism that Woolf sought to valorise against the 
`old' realism of Bennett and other British realist writers. In his attack on 
Henry James, Lewis expressed an explicit preference for the eye of the 
body over the eye of the mind (MWA, 120), a preference which would 
associate him, in Woolfs terms, with the `materialist' and outmoded 
realism of Bennett, Galsworthy, and Wells, rather than her idea of a non- 
materialist modernism. It is worth mentioning that the opposition mind- 
body is used by Woolf in her essay with in a far less guarded and self-aware 
way than by Lewis: indeed, in a passage quoted by Lewis, she writes that: 
If we tried to formulate our meaning in one word we should say that 
these three writers [Wells, Bennett, Galsworthy] are materialists. It is 
because they are concerned not with the spirit but with body that 
they have disappointed us [... ]. (MWA, 133) 
Lewis's response to this spirit-oriented modernism is twofold: he belittles 
the opposition used to define it; and he invokes a body-oriented vision of 
satire to counter it. This twofold response is, however, not a fully 
consistent one, as it seeks both to invert the opposition (with body taking 
precedence over mind) and to do away with it altogether (by dismissing it 
as nothing more `metaphysical' than a `boy and girl quarrel'). Lewis's claim 
that `Body and Mind [... ] are, philosophically, two very shadowy counters' 
is one which applies to his own work as much as to that which he would 
criticise. 
In his discussion of the difference between the `classic' and the 
`romantic' Lewis also has draws on images of mind-body dualism. Lewis, 
following H. J. C. Grierson's work on Romanticism, asserts that `The 
"destruction of the flesh in order to exalt the spirit" was a characteristic of 
the romantic mind' (MWA, 152). Following this assertion he attempts to 
characterise the difference between the romantic and the classical using 
the terms of mind-body dualism, albeit in a tentative and qualified way: 
log 
Chapter Two: Mind-Body 
Would it be possible to say, I wonder, merely as a means of reaching 
some concrete understanding of these terms, that (without at all 
involving any religious issue) the term classical should stand rather 
than not for the body, and the term "romantic" stand rather than not 
for "the soul"? - Or instead of flesh and spirit, let us put concrete and 
physical (matter and mind) - rather in the way that the Roman 
Catholic religion is always described by the theosophist as "such a 
material religion" - "material" used in some such connotation as 
that? (MWA, 152-3) 
The confusion of this passage - evident in the repetition of the awkward 
phrase `rather than not' and the swift move from the `without at all 
involving any religious issue' to `the Roman Catholic religion' - suggests 
that here, as in `The Meaning of the Wild Body', `the dichotomy of mind 
and body' can be assumed but not fully argued, and again takes the form of 
an apparently self-evident yet ungrounded axiom. In the sentence that 
follows Lewis does little to ground his assumption: `At all events, I always 
think of something very solid, and I believe it is a sensation I share with 
many people, when the term "classic" is employed, and of something very 
dishevelled, ethereal and misty, when the term "romantic" is made use of 
(MWA, 153). Lewis's argument here is not based on reason, but (ironically 
given his attack on and definition of romanticism) on belief: belief in what 
he `always thinks' and what he believes to be the `sensations' of others. 
Lewis returns to the distinction between mind and body later in his 
argument: 
The "classical" has a physiognomy of sorts, then: it has a solid aspect 
rather than a gaseous: it is liable to incline rather to the side of 
Aristotle than to the side of Plato: to be of a public rather than of a 
private character: to be objective rather than subjective: to incline to 
action rather than to dream: to belong to the sensuous side rather 
than to the ascetic: to be redolent of common sense rather than of 
metaphysic: to be universal rather than idiomatic: to lean upon the 
intellect rather than upon the bowels and the nerves. (MWA, 155) 
At the start of this sentence the `classical' is still associated with bodily 
qualities: it has a `physiognomy', is `solid', `objective', active and `sensuous'. 
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However, by the end of the sentence the dualism has been reversed: the 
`classic' `lean[s] upon the intellect' and the `romantic' is now associated 
with the body, represented by `the bowels and the nerves'. This reversal 
makes a dualistic opposition between the `classic' and the `romantic' less 
clear cut than it had been. Lewis is aware of the problematic nature of this 
dualism, as his discussion of T. E. Hulme's essay `Romanticism and 
Classicism' makes clear. Lewis turns to Hulme after finding the definitions 
proposed by Brunetiere inadequate and confused: `Do not let us despair of 
the terms "classic" and "romantic, " however, till we have gone back for 
enlightenment to Mr. T. E. Hulme' (MWA, 162). However, after examining 
Hulme's ideas in detail, Lewis does end up despairing: 
So the moment we get down to brass tacks, in the matter of these 
terms classic and romantic, even with such an intelligent critic as 
Hulme, back we are once more, upon the instant, among the 
confusions a la Brunetiere. There is no avoiding that, it seems. The 
terms are strictly unusable. (MWA, 164) 
Lewis identifies the reason for the obsolescence of these terms as 
historical: 
"Romantic" and "classical" are terms applicable only to a historical 
see-saw of influences in our formerly watertight Western World. And 
during this century we have slowly but surely left this world behind, 
in the sense that it is no longer necessary or possible to refer 
everything that happens to its narrowly-contrasted pagan and 
Christian - religious and secular - values. (MWA, 165) 
In this historical situation, Lewis argues, the use of these terms becomes a 
matter of farcical masquerade: 
Just as [... ] we are, undoubtedly, on all hands slipping back into the 
old narrowly European grooves, under the straitening pressures of 
the Slump, into economic and political nationalism: and, in the 
bosom of nationalism, into the old Tory-Whig, Catholic and 
Protestant antagonisms: so we are bandying about these words 
"classical" and "romantic. " But it is all extremely artificial - as 
artificial, for instance, as the Erse names in which the Irish at present 
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masquerade. Soon we shall all be expected to yodel in middle 
English, and then the man of the Danegelt will be incomprehensible 
to the man of the Saxon-south. All these things hang together - it is 
the end of history, and the beginning of historical pageant and play. 
(MWA, 165) 
The terms `classical' and `romantic', Lewis argues, offer the same sort of 
ersatz authenticity as nationalism, and are just as inappropriate to the 
historical situation. Perhaps Lewis would argue, as he does about 
Liberalism in Left Wings Over Europe, that in using this dualism `we think 
we have one set of people before us, whereas in fact we have quite a 
different set'. 25 Dualism, like Liberalism, is presented as a `belief 
inadequate to `the Real' it attempts to mediate. It is significant that Lewis 
here sees theoretical or philosophical thought as limited by historical 
conditions, as this suggests that the social has primacy over the 
intellectual. In my interpretation of Enemy of the Stars I argued that 
Arghol's philosophy was best understood as a response to a social situation 
rather than as pure metaphysics, and Lewis's later critique of another 
dualism supports my argument. Lewis's dualism in general is best 
understood in such a way - as a `belief which tries to make sense of a 
particular historical situation. Lewis's dualism attempts to establish a 
separation of the intellectual from the world, and in so doing to establish 
his freedom. But this separation is never portrayed as fully achieved and 
the repressed mechanical unfreedom of the `thing' upsets the assumed 
freedom of the `person', provoking laughter. Lewis writes that `the humble 
message' of Men Without Art is that `we are all compelled, to some extent, 
to enter into the spirit of the comedy' (MWA, 165) and in Lewis's work it is 
this enforced and inescapable laughter, associated with the absurdity of 
the human body, which triumphs over the immaterial aspirations of the 
intellect. 
25 Wyndham Lewis, Left Wings Over Europe: Or, How to Make a War About Nothing, 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), p. 316. 
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Wyndham Lewis has often been seen as an essentially masculine writer 
and artist, whose preference for the external over the internal, the hard 
over the soft, and linear clarity over impressionistic smudging, are 
symptoms of an antipathy to feminine elements in fiction and art. ' While 
there is much in the view of Lewis as a masculinist figure that is 
undeniable, such an approach tends to ignore Lewis's complex, even 
sophisticated anxieties about masculinity, and in so doing reinforces an 
image of Lewis that plays along with some of the excesses of his rhetoric 
rather than exposing the internal inconsistencies of his arguments. Critical 
appraisals of Lewis as unproblematically masculine which ignore Lewis's 
anxieties about gender deny themselves the possibility of enquiring into 
their historical basis. In this chapter I will examine Lewis's attitudes to 
gender in detail, focusing particularly on his ideas about masculinity. I will 
look first at his theoretical speculations on gender in The Art of Being 
Ruled (1926), and then read his fiction produced during the First World 
War - both short stories and the novel Tarr (1918) - in the light shed by 
the examination of the later work. Lewis's thinking on gender shares 
features and concerns with his thinking on other topics, and by examining 
these ideas and stories in detail I will not only reach a better 
understanding of Lewis's attitudes to the masculine and the feminine, but 
will also contribute to a fuller interpretation of his anxieties about the 
individual and society, the mind and the body, and the artist and crowd - 
indeed those anxieties than motivate and shape his work in its entirety. 
1 See, for example, Bonnie Kime Scott, `Jellyfish and Treacle: Lewis, Joyce, Gender and 
Modernism' in Beja Morris & Shari Benstock (eds. ), Coping With Joyce: Essays from the 
Copenhagen Symposium, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989). 
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The Art of Being Ruled: 
`the male is not naturally "a man"' 
Although The Art of Being Ruled is not specifically a book about gender 
there is much in it concerned with issues of gender difference and the 
nature of the masculine and the feminine, and I will explore sections of the 
book in which these issues are foregrounded. It is worth noting, before I 
begin my detailed analysis, that ideas about and images of gender do not 
remain neatly compartmentalised in this book. Indeed, Lewis explicitly 
connects them to his other concerns: 
How the sex war links up with the class war, the age war, and the war 
of the high and the low-brow, is as follows. "The prevalent dominance 
of men" is a phrase used commonly. Man in himself is a symbol of 
authority. Masculinity [... ] is in itself authoritative and hence 
arbitrary. The most miserable and feeble specimen of the male "class" 
is in that paradoxical position of representing the most devilish 
despotism and symbolizing brute force. He suffers from the accident 
that he symbolizes "authority" in an era of change and militant 
revolutionary revaluation. (ABR, 194) 
This linking of masculinity and authority is hardly original, but it is 
significant as it indicates that Lewis's anxieties about masculinity are 
linked to anxieties about authority in general. As I will argue later, Lewis 
sees `the Real' of femininity working against the `reality' of masculinity, 
and indeed against clear cut gender difference altogether. In light of this 
tendency, statements like the following, which may appear 
straightforward, gain new significance: 
This division into rulers and ruled partakes of a sexual division; or 
rather, the contrast between the one class and the other is more like 
that between the sexes than anything else. The ruled are the females 
and the rulers the males, in this arrangement. (ABR, 92) 
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As we will see in this chapter, in Lewis's work the idea of masculinity 
proves to be a shaky ground for the idea of a distinct and naturally 
superior ruling class. 
Lewis argues that gender difference is not an underlying human reality, 
shaped by nature and so preceding and unaltered by transient cultural 
phenomena such as fashion, but is itself a superficial phenomenon: 
A very great superficial difference still exists between women and 
men. As you see women walking about the streets they are (as far as 
possible) luxuriously and exquisitely dressed, very neat, as far as 
possible "chaque ceveu ä sa place"; their clothes are chosen as far as 
possible of flimsy and seductive material: they are still, in short, more 
ornamental, silken, frail, treated with cosmetics, and sedulously 
trimmed than are men. The sex specialization is with them the nature 
of an obsession, therefore, to that extent, in the sense that they still 
think of themselves more as "women" than men think first and 
foremost of themselves as "men. " They get themselves up so that they 
shall be graceful and seductive. But the mind of the woman, stripped 
of this secondary equipment of grace and feminineness, is not, as 
almost everyone will admit, very different to that of the man. 
When speaking of "women, " then, as we must sometimes do, it 
is naturally of this artificial, secondary creature - not of a platonic 
androgyne, of a naked soul, or of the violent or gentle, charming or 
offensive creature that you know as Rose or Mary to be at the heart of 
her specialization. (ABR, 185-6) 
The treatment here of `feminineness' as a piece of `secondary equipment' is 
interesting, as it suggests that in Lewis's eyes gender is more social than 
natural; or, using the terminology introduced in Chapter One, that it is on 
the side of `reality' rather than `the Real'. The idea that gender difference is 
part of social `reality' rather than `the Real' of nature seems to distance 
Lewis from many of his male modernist contemporaries, for whom gender 
difference represented a deeper and more permanent reality than that 
offered by modern society. 
Lewis's argument that gender difference is a product of `secondary 
equipment' would seem to suggest, following some of the ideas about 
dualism discussed in Chapter Two, that he saw it more as a phenomenon 
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of the mind than of the body, and this idea is present in The Art of Being 
Ruled. However, Lewis's placement of gender difference in the realm of the 
mind seems to serve to denigrate the body, and perhaps particularly the 
female body, rather than to enable an escape from rigid naturalistic ways 
of thinking about gender. 
To illustrate the consequences of a disincarnate view of gender 
difference Lewis uses the fictional example of a bridegroom who finds out 
on his wedding night that his bride is not a virgin. According to Lewis, 
most people think that this `deception' occurs `on the physical plane', a 
belief that he claims is wrong (ABR, 211). The unimportance of `the 
physical plane' can be seen, Lewis argues, if we consider the bridegroom's 
reactions to the possible circumstances in which his bride has lost her 
virginity: 
Suppose, for instance, that the disappointed bridegroom learns that, 
instead of being deflowered in the course of a love intrigue, his bride 
has been deflowered against her will on a lonely road by a tramp. 
Then the situation changes for him at once. There is a flood of bitter 
tears on the part of the bride; he folds her in his arms and all is well. 
For it is not the physical fact that has disturbed his repose of mind. 
It is the person, she, gazing at him out of her lovely, personal eyes, 
that it has caused him such a disagreeable shock to find he was not 
the first with. (ABR, 211) 
The assertion that this fictional bridegroom is more interested in his bride 
as a `person' than as a 'physical fact' could suggest that Lewis held a more 
enlightened view of relations between the sexes than is commonly 
believed; however, the distinction between the personal and the physical 
made here leads him to view the female body as a grotesque and irrelevant 
object, devoid of affect. Lewis goes on to argue that, in the case of this 
fictional rape: 
The act of deflowering, it is true, occurred, technically, on the 
physical plane. But that - were there no person attached to it - 
would be of no more importance than something happening to an 
automaton: no more than the daily dirtying of the hands, which are 
washed and then they are clean again: no more than the figure in the 
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Bois, in Mallarme's prose poem, observed embracing the earth. For it 
is a person, a mind, that he has married; incarnated and expressed, it 
is true, by a certain body. (ABR, 211) 
It transpires that by asserting that men love women for their minds Lewis 
creates an image of the female body which has no emotional or 
psychological significance, and consequently belittles the importance of 
violence done against it: rape is now `no more' than getting one's hands 
dirty, and just as reparable. The objectification of the (female) body 
necessitated by Lewis's distinction between the personal and the physical 
is made quite clear: 
that body is, in a sense (in the things that happen to it, if that is 
possible, independently of the mind), as unimportant by itself as the 
materials by which it is surrounded - its clothes, the tables and 
chairs, dust on the road, or bricks of the house. Disconnect it from 
the person, if that may be, and it is dead. In short, the body outraged 
by the tramp would be a corpse only. The body enjoyed by an earlier 
lover would be alive. In the latter case it would be she - Daphne, 
Joan, or Elizabeth. It is the personality he is in touch with when he 
looks into her eyes (and not a bit of flesh - that is, as flesh, of the 
same impersonal order as a bit of cloth, a lump of clay, a sponge, a 
vegetable) that all the trouble is about. (ABR, 211-12) 
The extreme split between the mind and the body proposed here can be 
viewed in terms of `reality' and `the Real', with `the person' representing a 
`reality' sustained by belief, and the body `the Real' of inanimate and 
inhuman objects. When viewed in this light, femininity, and perhaps 
gender difference in general, can be seen to be a function of `reality' rather 
than something fundamental to the Real'. The idea that love and sexuality 
are matters of a superficial and belief-sustained `reality' and that the 
physical facts generally associated with these phenomena are actually 
disconnected from and irrelevant to them is consistent with Lewis's 
assertion in Time and Western Man that: `We are surface-creatures, and 
the "truths" from beneath the surface contradict our values' (TWM, 377). 
The phrase `surface-creatures' is also used in The Art of Being Ruled, 
significantly in the context of a discussion of Samuel Butler's idea that 
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`there is no true love short of eating and consequent assimilation', and 
that, in matters of love: 
No merely superficial, temporary contact of exterior form to exterior 
form will serve us. The embrace must be consummate, not achieved 
by a mocking environment of draped and muffled arms that leaves no 
lasting taste on organization or consciousness, but by an enfolding 
within the bare and warm bosom of an open mouth -a grinding out 
of all differences of opinion by the sweet persuasion of the jaws, and 
the eloquence of a tongue that now convinces us all the more 
powerfully because it is inarticulate and deals but with one universal 
language of agglutination. Then we become made one with what we 
love - not heart to heart, but protoplasm to protoplasm, and this is 
far more to the purpose. 2 
Lewis adopts this statement as the complete antithesis of his own position, 
arguing against Butler's notion of love as a matter of depth and 
incorporation: 
Love, as we discursively understand it, can only exist on the surface. 
An inch beneath, and it is no longer love, but the abstract rage of 
hunger and reproduction of which the swallowing of the oyster, or the 
swallowing of the male by the female epira, is an illustration. And it is 
the spirit of the artist that maintains this superficiality, 
differentiation of existence, for us: our personal, our detached life, in 
short, in distinction to our crowd-life. (ABR, 232) 
The qualifying phrase `as we discursively understand it' is crucial here: 
Lewis is not arguing that love really exists only on the surface, but that it 
only has meaningful existence for us on the surface. In Lewis's eyes, love 
can only possess `reality' if the surface alone is considered and the depths 
beneath it ignored. Love, like the `difference [that] still exists between 
women and men', is for Lewis something superficial, maintained over and 
above `the abstract rage' that lurks `An inch beneath'. However, the idea 
that love is a matter of the incorporeal `person' and not the physical `thing' 
2 Samuel Butler, The Notebooks of Samuel Butler, ed. Henry Festing Jones, first 
published 1912, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1985), p. 205. Quoted in The Art of Being 
Ruled, p. 226. 
118 
Chapter Three: Gender 
suggests, particularly when considered in the light of Lewis's theory of the 
comic discussed in the previous chapter, that it is an illusion, and one 
which is in a precarious position. In Men Without Art Lewis wrote of how 
`our consciousness is pitched up to the very moderate level of relative 
independence at which we live - at which level we have the illusion of 
being autonomous and "free"'; love, as described by Lewis, would seem to 
exist on this superficial level as well, and so be equally vulnerable to being 
exposed as an illusion by the intrusion of underlying thingness (see 
Chapter Two and MWA, 95). The `realities' of love, of the `difference [that] 
still exists between women and men', and of freedom all depend on the 
successful repression of `the Real' which lies under them, and exercise 
which, as shown in Chapter One, is prone to failure. 
The structural similarity between love, gender difference, and 
freedom is interesting as freedom is one of the recurrent themes of The Art 
of Being Ruled. Lewis argues that the rise of modernity results in a general 
loss of individual freedom, and that most people are more-or-less happy 
with this as they find individual freedom in the old sense too onerous and 
unrewarding. Lewis does not present this situation as a simple move from 
general freedom to general unfreedom and servitude, but rather as the 
triumph of a particular concept of freedom, more obviously desirable for 
most of humanity, and which is practically indistinguishable from 
unfreedom, over another concept of freedom, which is desired only by 
certain individuals. 
Lewis associates the birth of the modern conception with freedom 
with two of the defining events of modernity: the Industrial and French 
Revolutions. Lewis argues that the modern ideal of freedom and what he 
sees as the modern reality of unfreedom, exemplified by generalised 
mechanisation, had a reciprocal relationship, in which the concept of 
freedom produced a situation of unfreedom, which in turn generated more 
dreams of freedom: 
the european community which participated in the great change-over 
from the predominantly agricultural to the industrial age presented 
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us with the French Revolution, which was made possible by the 
super-agriculturalist dreams of Rousseau. While these people bustled 
into factories, or were driven into them, building themselves more 
rigidly and irretrievably into a mechanical urban life, they exploded 
in dreams of bucolic "freedom. " Pictures of the "freedom" of the 
noble savage and the child excited them to a great outburst at the 
very moment when (as they must from their own point of view have 
regarded it had they not been so full of a false and exotic emotion) 
they were enslaving themselves more thoroughly to men. So it has 
been in the name of nature always that men have combined to 
overthrow the natural in themselves. (ABR, 41-2) 
Although this relationship is reciprocal it is also problematic, as the terms, 
freedom and slavery, would appear to contradict rather than reinforce each 
other. Lewis locates the cause of this apparent contradiction in the nature 
of the hearts and minds of those people who `bustled into factories': 
For their instinct to be so fallible, where, it would seem, so much is at 
stake for them - for them to proclaim so ardently that they wish to be 
"free" and nature's children, and yet, in effect, to carry through great 
movements that result in an absolute mechanization of their life - 
can only mean one thing. It must mean that they do not really know 
what they want, that they do not, in their heart, desire "freedom" or 
anything of the sort. "Freedom" postulates a relatively solitary life: 
and the majority of people are extremely gregarious. A disciplined, 
well-policed, herd-life is what they most desire. (ABR, 42) 
This assertion about what `the majority of people [... ] most desire' moves 
towards resolving the contradiction by claiming that one of the terms was 
misstated: although freedom was held up as desirable, this was inaccurate 
as `the majority of people' did not really desire it at all. However, this does 
not resolve the issue but merely shifts slightly the location of the 
contradiction, which now becomes a matter of rhetorical inaccuracy and 
psychological fallibility. Lewis's answer to the question of why `the 
majority of people' think they desire to be free when, in fact, `herd-life is 
what they most desire' introduces the notion of a `usually quite weak' 
impulse toward what he sees as genuine freedom: 
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That men should think they wish to be free, the origin of this grave 
and universal mistake, is the (usually quite weak) primitive animal in 
them coming into his own for a moment. It is the restless solitary 
ghost in them that in idle moments they turn to. The mistake can be 
best appreciated, perhaps, by examining a great holiday crowd. How 
can these masses of slowly, painfully, moving people find any 
enjoyment in such immense stuffy discomfort, petty friction, and 
unprofitable fatigue, you may ask yourself as you watch them. They 
ask themselves that, too, no doubt, most of them. That is the 
saturnalian, libertarian, rebellious self that asserts itself for a 
moment. (ABR, 42) 
This idea of a weak impulse for freedom which exists even in `the majority 
of people', but is only strong enough to assert itself `for a moment', implies 
a split or double nature of the human mind, which is, as a result, at conflict 
with itself. In accordance with his generally rather gloomy outlook on 
humanity, Lewis suggests that the weak, but clearly, in his eyes, superior 
impulse is generally going to lose out, and interestingly he attributes this 
loss of individual freedom to individual choice: 
if they [i. e. `the majority of people] have to choose between what 
ultimately the suggestions of the "free" self, and the far steadier, 
stronger impulse of the gregarious, town-loving, mechanical self, 
would lead to, they invariably choose the latter. So to be "free" for one 
person is not what to be "free" for another would be. Most people's 
favourite spot in "nature" is to be found in the body of another 
person, or in the mind of another person, not in meadows, plains, 
woods, and trees. They depend for their stimulus on people, not 
things. So inevitably they are not "free" nor have any wish to be, in 
the lonely, "independent, " wild, romantic, rousseauesque way. In 
short, the last thing that they wish for is to be free. They wish to 
pretend to be "free" once a week, or once a month. To be free all the 
time would be an appalling prospect for them. And they prefer 
"freedom" to take a violent, super-real, and sensational form. They 
are not to the manner born where "freedom" is concerned; and so 
invariably overplay it, when they affect it. (ABR, 42) 
I would argue that this idea of freedom as recreation has, despite its 
intrinsic snobbery and patronising assumption of knowledge about the 
desires of `the majority of people', some satirical force, even today: 
overpaid managers undergoing wilderness survival training is a perhaps 
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too obvious example. However, what is more relevant to the present 
argument is the way in which Lewis's ideas about freedom interact with his 
ideas about gender. 
In the chapter `Super-Freedom of the Revolutionary Rich' (ABR, 134- 
7) Lewis characterises four types of freedom: that of the child, the king or 
millionaire, the woman, and the intellect. These different types of freedom 
involve different relationships to other people and to power. Lewis writes 
that: `The type of freedom of which the child is the perpetual emblem, 
irresponsible freedom, and that other of which the king or millionaire is 
the emblem, that reposing on authority and power, are both rigidly 
dependent on other people' (ABR, 135). In contrast to these types of 
freedom, which Lewis sees as exercising power over others (by means of 
wealth or dependency) and which are `both obtained at the expense of 
other people' is the `third type of freedom, the feminine type', which `is a 
parasite of power', and has as its `first requisite [... ] a master' (ABR, 135). 
The fourth type of freedom, clearly Lewis's favourite, is described as `very 
rare', and is allegedly `possessed by the intellect alone': 
It is contingent on no physical circumstance, is not obtained or held 
at the expense of others - indeed, it is altogether independent of 
people; and although it is a source of power, is an unrecognized and 
unofficial source, and takes with it, under favourable circumstances, 
some of the advantages of irresponsibility; and at the worst, and 
deprived of all power, still, as freedom, remains unaffected by 
fortune. But it is not a type with which we need concern ourselves 
here. (ABR, 135-6) 
Although this fourth and ideal type of freedom is not personified in the 
way that the other derided types of freedom are, there is an implication 
that it is masculine in some way; the child and the millionaire mirror each 
other in that one exerts power through its lack of means, the other through 
its excessive possession of them, and if we were to try and find a 
characteristic to mirror the feminine in a similar way it would undoubtedly 
be the masculine. Indeed, by looking at the values Lewis ascribes to the 
fourth type of freedom we can get an idea of what he might associate with 
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the feminine: a reliance on `physical circumstance'; being `held at the 
expense of others'; not `independent of people'; and `affected by fortune'. 
Lewis's notion of `feminine freedom' is not gender-specific, in the 
sense that it can apply to men as well as women. Indeed, Lewis sees the 
spread of this feminine idea of freedom to regions previously masculine as 
one of the disturbing features of the modern world he criticises in The Art 
of Being Ruled: 
The commutative nature of freedom and irresponsibility in what I 
have called the feminine conception of freedom - which is the type of 
freedom which is gradually substituting itself today with the 
European for the masculine, which circumstances have almost 
compelled him to discard - that is the true key to this great 
movement throughout Europe. (ABR, 239) 
Lewis's account of the effeminisation of Europe is interesting as he 
presents this process as more natural than unnatural: `it is a law that, if left 
alone, or sufficiently supported by the intricacies of civilization, an 
individual invariably tends to evade any position of burdensome trust, or 
indeed any position at all' (ABR, 239). The idea that effeminisation is a 
product of the workings of a `law' unimpeded by the `intricacies of 
civilization' suggests that feminine freedom is the natural state of things, 
and that any distinction between the masculine and the feminine that may 
emerge is an unnatural aberration. 
For Lewis, the clearest sign of this general effeminisation of Europe 
was the increased visibility and acceptance of homosexuality in post-war 
society. Lewis argues that `Sex inversion for the male' is a `receipt' for the 
`evasion' of the responsibilities of masculine freedom and the assumption 
of `feminine freedom' in its place (ABR, 239). Lewis claims that the 
significance of homosexuality is primarily political: 
Separated from its physical peculiarities, disincarnate, and in its form 
of social impulse, if we can imagine it so, before it has been furnished 
with the particular body it at present has, male sex-inversion can be 
regarded, I believe, as the prognostication of a deep revolution in the 
european character. (ABR, 240) 
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Lewis here again relies on an idea of the separation of the mind and body, 
much as he did with the exemplary story of the disappointed bridegroom, a 
story that was in fact introduced to help break down what Lewis calls the 
`unfortunate conservative human-all-too-human norm that we are 
incessantly combating' in matters of sexuality (ABR, 211). With 
homosexuality, as with the loss of virginity, Lewis claims that it is wrong to 
assume that it is the `physical plane' that is significant, arguing that it 
`would be extremely unreasonable' to `be in some way physically offended 
by practices "against nature"' (ABR, 210). Lewis's argument proceeds not 
by insisting on the normality and acceptability of so-called `abnormal' 
sexual practices, but by stressing the arbitrary nature of all human norms, 
when viewed from an objective and transcendent perspective: 
to an impartial taste, divinely exempt from participation in either 
normal or "abnormal" joys, as we call them, their "normality" would 
be just as offensive. They might very well offend the most fastidious 
god more than the object of their disgust; for their "norm" should be 
merely the dislike or revolt of the senses against something different, 
not part of their personal norm of system. It would, in short, be the 
animal self-complacency and self-love that thinks itself "natural" and 
engaging, and everything else "unnatural" and disengaging. (ABR, 
210) 
Lewis's argument against prejudice against homosexuality works by 
degrading the normal to the level of the animal, rather than by dignifying 
the supposedly abnormal as human. Lewis invokes an almost paranoid 
feeling of the precariousness of the human position to emphasise the 
vanity and ephemeral nature of all human norms: 
Some human norm [... ] hates the rat and beetle. But its idea of the rat 
is not at all that which the rat has of itself; it loves its swift, clammy 
sausage of a body as much as the human being does his hairless, erect 
machine. That erect, conceited human norm may yet have to bend to 
the will of that rat or the serpent, and go about with its belly near the 
ground. (ABR, 210) 
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Lewis's removal of matters of sexuality from a normative idea of nature to 
the more malleable realm of culture and politics is not the progressive 
move it may seem to some postmodern anti-naturalists, as its prime 
consequence is to label homosexuality, and indeed sexuality in general, as 
fundamentally false, a fashionable affectation rather than a matter of 
involuntary desire. However, it would be wrong simply to dismiss Lewis as 
a particularly sneaky homophobe, as his sense of the fundamentally false 
nature of sexual identity is not restricted to homosexuality, a mode of 
masculinity to which he was unsympathetic, but also extends to modes of 
masculinity which were far more to his taste, for example, the aggressively 
virile avant-garde artist, and as we will see, perhaps masculinity 
altogether. 
Despite this general denaturalisation of sexuality Lewis does retain 
some idea of natural and genuine homosexuality, not caused by fashion or 
the revolt against masculine authority: 
The most agreeable inverts to be met [... ] are the true-blue inverts: 
those who, whatever the orthodoxy of the moment, would certainly 
be unaffected by it, and would be there busy with all the rather 
complicated arrangements incident to their favourite pursuit. (ABR, 
213) 
Indeed, Lewis characterises these `natural' homosexuals, who he refers to 
as `those people whom a displacement of sex psychology marks out for 
physical paradox', as exceptionally masculine: 
This male-pole type of invert is often entirely free from that feminine 
bias, resulting in caricature so often, of the female of the genus; or 
that of the convert to inversion, the most fanatical at all. What this 
male invert thinks of his female it is impossible to say without being 
one yourself. But certainly he gives the impression of being much 
more male in the traditional and doctrinaire sense that any other 
male. His pride is often enormous in his maleness. If perhaps a little 
over-fine and even mad, he can meet on equal terms the male of any 
other species - either the lion, the male of the farmyard fowl, the 
Samurai, the powdered male gallant of the Stuart stage. (ABR, 213) 
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This authentically abnormal figure is something of an anomaly in Lewis's 
argument as he generally emphasises the cultural and disincarnate aspect 
of sexuality rather than invoking any natural and physiological basis. 
However, Lewis has a logical need of the figure of the `true-blue invert' in 
order to convict the fashionable and non-pukka homosexual of being 
inauthentically abnormal, with a sexuality determined by their weak and 
over-impressionable minds rather than any genuine abnormality of their 
bodies. If Lewis did not maintain some minimal position of authenticity, 
even if it is an `abnormal' one, if he argued that all sexuality was culturally 
and politically constructed he would deprive himself of any Archimedean 
point from which to make his criticisms, as the difference would merely be 
between different types of constructed and false sexuality, rather than the 
more fundamental difference between the fashionably false and the 
`pukka'. 
This difference between the `pukka' and the false homosexual is 
presented in terms of social class: the fashion for homosexuality is, Lewis 
argues, `a bourgeois revolution', predominated by the `petit bourgeois 
type', a term of abuse which Lewis sees as going `as far as human 
vituperation will go' (ABR, 212-3). Andrew Hewitt, in his book Political 
Inversions: Homosexuality, Fascism, and the Modernist Imaginary 
(1996), has argued that the granting of authenticity to the figure of the 
`true-blue invert' is an expression of Lewis's political preference for an 
aristocratic ideal over a democratic one: 
The "super-masculine" reasserts itself here - subsumed under the 
general category of inversion - but asserts itself as "true-blue. " In 
other words, Lewis is envisaging a genuine - perhaps "blue-blooded, " 
or "aristocratic"? - revolutionary impulse emanating from the 
phenomenon of inversion. 3 
Hewitt argues that Lewis's finds in Fredrick the Great `a "true-blue" 
aristocratic model of inversion' who `open[s] up fascism as a realm of 
3 Andrew Hewitt, Political Inversions: Homosexuality, Fascism, and the Modernist 
Imaginary, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. i9o-1. 
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homosexualised politics to which he would be sympathetic'. 4 According to 
Hewitt, Lewis opposes the `true-blue' figure of Fredrick to the `transvestite' 
figure of Haroun al Raschid whose `most objectionable habit, namely that 
of spending his time disguised among his subjects as one of them' he saw 
as being practised by many contemporary rulers (ABR, 93). As we will see 
later, in the analysis of `The War Baby', Lewis saw `disguise' as being 
something which could performatively confer distinction, suggesting that 
Haroun al Raschid's habit was `objectionable' because it revealed the real 
situation - that he was merely `a pea disguising itself from a million other 
peas' (see below, and UP, 94). Hewitt writes that `It is as if Frederick were, 
so to speak, engaging in travesty not by dressing as a woman, but by 
refusing to do so'. 5 In terms of performance and disguise, Frederick 
maintains his `pukka' performance of a `ruler' by not disguising himself as 
what, in fact, he really is. 
Although the figure of the `true-blue invert' is an interesting one I 
would argue that its main function is to allow Lewis to expose the false 
rather than provide him with an image of the true. Hewitt's comment that 
`It would stretch the limits of [his] book to describe' what Lewis's 
`homosexualised' fascism `would look like' suggests that the `true-blue 
invert' is, like so many of Lewis's figures of authenticity, what Fredric 
Jameson calls a `a dead letter, a contradiction in terms, an ideal and 
impossible synthesis of incompatible characteristics, a merely logical 
possibility which no narrative - let alone real history itself - can 
concretely generate'. 6 
Although it would seem that history cannot `generate' his ideal of the 
natural, albeit `abnormal', man, Lewis does identify a precise historical 
cause for the modern `fashion' for false homosexuality: 
4 Hewitt, Political Inversions, p. 194. See also ABR, 73-4,181. 
s Hewitt, Political Inversions, p. 193- 
6 Hewitt, Political Inversions, p. 194. Fredric Jameson, Fables of Aggression: Wyndham 
Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 1979), p. 120. 
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it is in the experiences of war time that we must seek not only the 
impulsion, but in some sense the justification, of male sex-inversion 
[... ]. As a war-time birth it can be regarded as a reply to the 
implications of responsibility of those times: nature's never again in 
the overstrained male organism. 
After the war it was reported that french mothers [... ] were 
vociferating, as they probably did, that they would bring up no more 
children into the world to be brought up and then killed. But more 
than the mothers, during the war no doubt men too were saying to 
themselves subconsciously that at last, beyond any doubt, the game 
was not worth the candle: that the Heroic Age was nothing to this: 
that the "kiss" they would receive "when they came back again, " if 
they ever did, did not make them look any less foolish as "heroes, " 
but more so; and that the institution of manhood had in some way 
overreached itself or got into the caricatural stage. (ABR, 247) 
What is interesting about Lewis's account of homosexuality is not his idea 
of a `natural' response to a historical event, but the idea of the 
unnaturalness of masculinity that it implies. Lewis makes this implied 
unnaturalness explicit, rather than trying to deny it: 
Men were only made into "men" with great difficulty even in 
primitive society: the male is not naturally "a man" any more than the 
woman. He has to propped up into that position with some ingenuity, 
and is always likely to collapse. (ABR, 247) 
This idea of the constructed and precarious nature of masculinity is yet 
another indication of Lewis's view of gender as `secondary equipment', 
only now not of `grace and feminineness' but of pugnacious masculinity. 
Lewis's term `propped up' does not seem a very serious one, and his idea of 
the unnaturalness of masculinity is often treated as comic: 
There are very many male Europeans today who never become 
reconciled to the idea of being "men" (leaving out of the count those 
who are congenitally unadapted for the rigours of manhood). At 
thirty-five, forty-five, fifty-five, und so weiter, you find them still 
luxuriously and rebelliously prostrate; still pouting, lisping, and 
sobbing, spread-eagled on their backs, helpless and inviting caresses, 
like a bald-stomached dog. (ABR, 248) 
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However, we should not allow this apparent lack of seriousness to disguise 
the significance of Lewis's position; indeed, Lewis's jokiness may serve to 
distract from some of the more radical implications of his thinking. 
Lewis's account of the historical development of masculinity makes 
clear that he views it as ideological, in the sense that it is a cultural 
construct which has come to appear as a natural phenomenon: 
The position of the male today, and the symbolism of the word MAN, 
are purely artificial: no more for one sex than for the other are the 
heroic ardours, "intellectuality, " responsibility, and so forth, that we 
associate with male, natural. Men had grown to regard them as 
natural, because in the first place they had seemed profitable. (ABR, 
249) 
Lewis sees this artificial process of becoming a man as one to which the 
male has a natural resistance, writing that: 
A man, then, is made, not born: and he is made, of course, with very 
great difficulty. From the time he yells and kicks in the cradle, to the 
time he receives his last kick at school, he is recalcitrant. (ABR, 247- 
8) 
Given the male's `recalcitrance' to become a man, it perhaps seems unlikely 
that this transformation ever happens; Lewis is aware of this problem, and 
examines several possible explanations as to why this artificial process 
occurs. The first possibility examined is that males become men as the 
result of such `feminine taunt[s]' as `Be a MAN! '. or `CALL YOURSELF A MAN! ', 
but Lewis dismisses this possibility, claiming that `we can confidently look 
forward to the time' when these taunts `will be without effect' (ABR, 248). 
Lewis then considers the possibility that masculinity is constructed as a 
result of a sense of duty, itself motivated by vanity. This possibility is 
deemed unsatisfactory for two reasons: firstly, he claims that `vanity 
requires its regulation food, which gets scarcer every day'; and secondly, 
because vanity itself `is not such a primary thing as is usually supposed' 
(ABR, 248). The second reason is the clearer and more interesting of the 
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two, as Lewis argues that the vanity invoked by the `feminine taunt' to 
`CALL YOURSELF A MAN! ': 
depends on the concept s for its effectiveness. And that is a belief, 
like a belief in God. Reduce a man's vanity below a certain point, or 
destroy his capacity for belief, and he subsides into his natural and 
primitive conditions. (ABR, 249) 
Lewis sees this `capacity for belief and dependence on the 'concept MAN' as 
central, even arguing that the `instinct of self-preservation', which could 
`be dragged in as a hypothetic support of the man', is `artificial' rather than 
natural, claiming that it is `the result of training and experience' (ABR, 
249). This stress on the importance of a `capacity for belief in the 
construction of masculinity is another indication of the overlap of Lewis's 
thinking on gender and his ideas about reality and belief that were 
discussed in Chapter One. It is clear that Lewis sees his idea of an artificial 
masculinity enabled by belief as being on the side of `reality' and the sense 
of personality, rather than that of the depersonalising and feminine `Real'. 
Indeed, he explicitly connects the process of becoming a man with that of 
acquiring a personality: 
What it is painfully acquiring during the years of its gradual propping 
up and training in erectness, is a personality. Without a personality 
there is no instinct of preservation: or rather, the less personality 
there is, the less horror there is at the idea of losing it. Many animals 
whose lot it is to be eaten are probably willingly eaten, as has already 
been suggested. When the male of the epira is devoured by its mate in 
the midst of its tumescence, that is part of the fun. (ABR, 249) 
For Lewis the loss of `personality' and of the `capacity for belief, here 
associated explicitly with masculinity, results in animal violence in which 
the female is dominant, and the male `willingly' destroyed. 
In Lewis's argument subjective belief comes before and helps 
construct the material object that is supposedly believed in: the 
psychological notion of masculinity precedes the physiological man and 
gives it the `arbitrary [... ] machinery' needed to effect its propping up. 
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Masculinity in The Art of Being Ruled, like `reality' in Time and Western 
Man, `is in fact simply belief (TWM, 351). The constitutive power of this 
`belief, its power to physically shape reality, is indicated in Lewis's 
argument that men's bodies, as well as their minds, have been shaped by 
the ideology of masculinity: 
The large, bloated, and sinewy appearance of the male, again, is 
partly a result of manual work or physical exercise, but is the result as 
well of thousands of years of ACTING THE mAv. The more muscular 
frame of the male, and his greater hardihood, are illusions, like 
everything else about him, provisionally and precariously realized, 
but no more stable than the muscular development produced by 
some intensive course of physical exercise, resulting in the inflation 
of this system of muscles or that. He is blown out by vanity into a 
bigger and bonier creature than his consort, like Shakespeare's Ajax. 
He is in reality just the same size, and of just the same sort. (ABR, 
250) 
Although Lewis's account of the ideological development of masculinity 
may seem logically to lead to a notion of the artificiality of all gender, this 
passage makes it clear that, in this chapter of the book at least, he sees a 
key difference between the masculine and the feminine: whereas the 
masculine is a product of ideologically motivated performance - 
'thousands of years of ACTING THE MAN' - the feminine, in contrast to this, 
is seen as the natural state from which this aberration propped itself up. 
The collapse of masculinity is seen by Lewis as a collapse back into the 
feminine, not into some non-gendered state: 
Remove the arbitrary psychological machinery that in this way 
constitutes the mere male "a man, " or tamper with it too much, or 
overtax it, and he collapses and becomes to all intents and purposes a 
woman. [... ] The extreme rapidity with which these collapses occur 
(both in the specifically adipose bulk of the female, and the secondary 
muscular "manliness" of the male) has been witnessed since the war. 
(ABR, 250) 
This idea of the collapse of masculinity into the feminine is perhaps best 
understood in the terms of Ziiek's distinction between `reality' and `the 
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Real' introduced in Chapter One. Zizek's description of what happens 
when `the subject undergoes a "loss of reality"' and encounters `the Real' is 
analogous to Lewis's account of the collapse into the feminine, as the 
`nightmarish universe' which the subject experiences `is not "pure fantasy" 
but, on the contrary, that which remains of reality after reality is 
deprived of its support in fantasy'.? Likewise, in Lewis's account, what the 
masculine experiences when it undergoes a loss of masculinity is not 
something unreal, but that which remains of masculinity after masculinity 
is deprived of its `arbitrary psychological machinery', namely the feminine. 
This association of the feminine with `the Real', with `reality' deprived of 
its supporting fantasies or beliefs, may perhaps help explain Lewis's 
aversion to `the passion for the Real': the maintenance of `reality' can also 
be seen as a maintenance of masculinity, and Lewis's dislike of `the Real' 
becomes just another version of modernist misogyny. What is interesting 
about Lewis's misogyny and fear of the engulfing feminine `Real' is that is 
produces a notion of the performative nature of masculinity that not only 
seems ahead of its time, but also has great satirical force and considerable 
comic potential. 
7 Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies, (London & New York: Verso, 1997), p. 66 
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The War Stories: 
`a pea disguising itself from a million other peas' 
Lewis's argument that the collapse of masculinity he analyzes in The Art of 
Being Ruled was caused by the First World War raises the question of 
whether any such collapse can be seen in the fiction he was producing 
during the war. I believe that it can, and that the Great War, as well as his 
fictional output during it, provide an essential context for understanding 
Lewis's attitude toward gender. 8 
`The French Poodle' (1916) tells the story of a shell shocked soldier: 
Rob Cairn was drifting around London in mufti, by no means well, 
and full of anxiety, the result of his ill-health and the shock he had 
received at finding himself blown into the air and painted yellow by 
the unavoidable shell. His tenure on earth seemed insecure, and he 
could not accustom himself to the idea of insecurity. When the shell 
came he had not bounded gracefully and coldly up, but with a clumsy 
dismay. His spirit, that spirit that should have been winged for the 
life of a soldier, and ready fiercely to take flight into the unknown, 
strong for other lives, was also grubbily attached to the earth. It, like 
his body, was not graceful in its fearlessness, nor resilient, nor young. 
All the minutiae of existence mesmerized it. It could not disport itself 
genially in independence of surrounding objects and ideas. 9 
This description of shell shock, in which the spirit becomes like the body, 
and its aspirations for transcendence are rendered ridiculous by the 
realisation that it `was also grubbily attached to the earth', is similar to 
some of the more sophisticated clinical accounts put forward at the time, 
which understood shell shock as a form of `hysteria', normally considered a 
8 Lewis's war stories have not been as much the focus of critical attention as they should. 
However, for an interesting discussion which touches on several of the issues raised in 
this chapter see David H. Parker, `Tarr and Wyndham Lewis's War-Time Stories', 
Southern Review: Literary and Interdisciplinary Essays 8, (1975), pp. 166-8i. 
9 Wyndham Lewis, `The French Poodle', first published in 1916, in Unlucky For Pringle: 
Unpublished and Other Stories, eds. C. J. Fox & Robert T. Chapman, (London: Vision 
Press, 1973), P" 53" 
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female disease, linked causally to experiences of immobility and 
powerlessness in the trenches. '° Elaine Showalter summarises these views: 
When all signs of physical fear were judged as weakness and where 
alternatives to combat - pacifism, conscientious objection, desertion, 
even suicide - were viewed as unmanly, men were silenced and 
immobilized and forced, like women, to express their conflicts 
through the body. Placed in intolerable circumstances of stress, and 
expected to react with unnatural "courage, " thousands of soldiers 
reacted instead with the symptoms of hysteria. " 
The idea of a dissatisfaction with established ideas of masculinity 
expressing itself through the body can also be seen in Lewis's argument in 
The Art of Being Ruled that homosexuality can be understood as `nature's 
never again in the overstrained male organism' (ABR, 247). At another 
point in The Art of Being Ruled Lewis writes that `the whole structure of 
what we associate with manhood can crash, in the way that the personality 
of a shell-shocked man disintegrates in a moment' (ABR, 260). Lewis's 
description of Cairn's shell shock in `The French Poodle' also demonstrates 
how the experience of war removes the fantasies or `arbitrary psychological 
machinery' that sustain Cairn's masculinity: his belief that his `spirit that 
should have been winged for the life of a soldier, and ready fiercely to take 
flight into the unknown, strong for other lives' is shown to be inadequate 
to the experience of `the Real' of war. In place of his masculine fantasies 
Cairn has to confront feelings of insecurity and a lack of independence; 
instead of being an individual in control of his environment, Cairn has 
been reduced to the `it' of his body, which `could not disport itself genially 
in independence of surrounding objects and ideas'. The mesmerisation 
with `the minutiae of existence' which Cairn experiences is similar to the 
indiscriminate fascination characteristic of the infantile Salters in The 
Childermass. Lewis presents Cairn's shell shock, his `rather sullen 
10 See Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 
1830-1980, first published 1985, (London: Virago Press, 1987), in particular Chapter 
Seven: `Male Hysteria: W. H. R. Rivers and the Lessons of Shell Shock', pp. 167-94- 
11 Showalter, The Female Malady, p. 171. 
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neurasthenia', as stemming from the `thought of recommencing', as a `fear 
not of death but of being played with too much'. 12 This fear of being `played 
with' reinforces the idea that Cairn feels he has been reduced to an object 
which can be moved at the will of outside forces, and can no longer see 
himself as an independent and autonomous man, possessed of a masculine 
`spirit'. In the terms of Lewis's theory of the comic Cairn is exposed to be a 
`thing' rather than a `person'. It seems possible that Lewis's ideas about 
comedy were affected by the experience of the First World War, and that 
his later delight in the comedy of the collapse of the autonomy of the 
personality has historical roots that are more tragic than might 
immediately be apparent. 
The collapse of the masculine fantasy of personal autonomy in the face of 
`the Real' of the First World War is also a feature of `Cantleman's Spring- 
Mate' (1917), although in this story the protagonist is comically unaware of 
it, and the collapse occurs before he has experienced any combat. Most of 
the story takes place in the English countryside, and follows the thoughts 
and actions of Cantleman, a trainee soldier, as he meets, seduces, 
impregnates, and leaves a local woman called Stella. 
The story begins with a passage of mock-pastoral, in which 
Cantleman walks through `strenuous fields' full of animals joyfully mating 
with each other, a general fecundity characterised in comically anti- 
Romantic fashion: 
The birds with their little gnarled feet, and beaks made for fishing 
worms out of the mould, or the river, would have considered Shelley's 
references to the skylark - or any other poet's paeans to their species 
- as lamentably inadequate to describe the beauty of birds! The 
female bird, for her particular part, reflected that, in spite of the 
ineptitude of her sweetheart's latest song, which he insisted on 
deafening her with, never seemed to tire of, and was so persuaded 
that she liked as much as he did himself, and although outwardly she 
remained critical and vicious: that all the same and nevertheless, 
12 Lewis, `The French Poodle', p. 54. 
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chock, chock, peep, peep, he was a fluffy object from which certain 
satisfaction could be derived! ('Spring-Mate', 77) 
There is no natural harmony here between bird and bird but there is still 
desire for a `certain satisfaction' on the female's part, which persists in 
spite of the irritating nature of her mate's deluded advances, and results in 
her viewing him as an `object'. Although this mismatch of male and female 
desire is comic, there is a darker and more violent side to the denial of any 
Romantic or progressive view of nature: 
The only jarring note in this vast mutual admiration society was the 
fact that many of its members showed their fondness for their 
neighbour in an embarrassing way: that is they killed and ate them. 
But the weaker were so used to dying violent deaths and being eaten 
that they worried very little about it. - The West was gushing up a 
harmless volcano of fire, obviously intended as an immense dreamy 
nightcap. ('Spring-Mate', 78) 
The view of nature presented here is very much in a post-Darwinian, `red 
in tooth and claw', mould, and the reference to `The West' suggests that it 
extends beyond the animal to include the human world as well, specifically 
the First World War, uneasily described as `an immense dreamy nightcap'. 
This conflation of the human and the animal, the reproductive and the 
destructive, is central to this story, and significant in much of Lewis's later 
thought. 
Cantleman's desire for Stella is presented as non-human, as he views 
her first as an object, second as an animal: 
Cantleman in the midst of his cogitation on surrounding life, 
surprised his faithless and unfriendly brain in the act of turning over 
an object which humiliated his meditation. He found that he was 
wondering whether at his return through the village lying between 
him and the Camp, he would see the girl he had passed there three 
hours before. At that time he had not begun his philosophizing, and 
without interference from conscience, he had noticed the redness of 
her cheeks, the animal fulness [sic] of the childbearing hips, with an 
eye as innocent as the bird or the beast. ('Spring-Mate', 78) 
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The idea of the female object-animal, and the desire `it' arouses, impinging 
disruptively and involuntarily on male subjectivity and `philosophizing' has 
a long history in English literature and Western thought in general. The 
interesting thing about Lewis's reiteration of it lies in his comic treatment 
of it, the anxieties it reveals about masculinity, and the way in which it can 
be seen to be connected to the events of the First World War. 
Cantleman, like many of Lewis's protagonists, sees himself as 
superior to those around him, assuming a cosmic snobbery: 
Cantleman had a more human, as well as a little more divine 
understanding, than those usually on his left and right, and he had 
had, not so long ago, conspicuous hopes that such a conjecture might 
produce a new human chemistry. But he must repudiate the human 
entirely, if that there were to be brought off. ('Spring-Mate', 79) 
Cantleman assumes the role of the `observer', and considers himself able to 
perceive the truth of his situation: 
The miraculous camouflage of Nature did not deceive this observer. 
He saw everywhere the gun-pits and the "nests of death. " Each puff of 
green leaves he knew was in some way as harmful as the burst of a 
shell. [... ] The hypocrisy of Nature and the hypocrisy of War were the 
same. ('Spring-Mate', 82) 
Convinced of the identity of `Nature' and `war' , Cantleman sets 
himself 
defiantly against both, desiring not only to `repudiate the human' but `life' 
in general: 
He, Cantleman, did not to want to owe anything to life, or enter into 
league or understanding with her. The thing was either to go out of 
existence: or, failing that, remain in it unreconciled, indifferent to 
Nature's threat, consorting openly with her enemies, making war 
within her war upon her servants. In short, the spectacle of the 
handsome English spring produced nothing but ideas of defiance in 
Cantleman's mind. ('Spring-Mate', 82-3) 
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Cantleman's `ideas of defiance' provide him with a handy philosophical 
reason to have sex with Stella, who is associated in his mind with `Nature' 
and `War': 
As to Stella, she was a sort of Whizzbang. With a treachery worthy of 
a Hun, Nature tempted him towards her. He was drugged with 
delicious appetites. Very well! He would hoist the Unseen Powers 
with his own petard. He could throw back Stella where she was 
discharged from (if it were allowable, now, to change her into a 
bomb) first having relieved himself of this humiliating gnawing and 
yearning in his blood. 
As to Stella, considered as an unconscious agent, all women 
were contaminated with Nature's hostile power and might be treated 
as spies or enemies. [... ] So he approached Stella with as much falsity 
as he could muster. ('Spring-Mate', 83) 
Cantleman's `falsity' culminates in a marriage proposal: 
At their third meeting he brought her a ring. Her melting gratitude 
was immediately ligotted with long arms, full of contradictory and 
offending fire of Spring. On the warm earth consent flowed up into 
her body from all the veins of the landscape. (`Spring-Mate', 83) 
Cantleman's attitude towards sex is not one of `gratitude' but of violent 
resentment: 
That night he spat out, in gushes of thick delicious rage, all the lust 
that had gathered in his body. The nightingale sang ceaselessly in the 
small wood at the top of the field where they lay. He grinned up 
towards it as he noticed it, and once more turned to the devouring of 
his mate. He bore down upon her as though he wished to mix her 
body into the soil, and pour his seed into a more methodless matter, 
the brown phalanges of floury land. As their two bodies shook and 
melted together, he felt that he was raiding the bowels of Nature: he 
was proud that he could remain deliberately aloof, and gaze bravely, 
like a minute insect, up at the immense and melancholy night, with 
all its mad nightingales, piously folded small brown wings in a 
million nests, night-working stars, and misty useless watchmen. 
('Spring-Mate', 83) 
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This passage could be read as a simple expression of male sexual 
aggression, Lewis's as much as Cantleman's, but this would be to ignore 
the irony of Cantleman being described as a `minute insect', a simile which 
suggests that he is not as `aloof from nature as he thinks he is. The image 
of the insect was generally a negative one for Lewis - his references to 
`insect communism' in Time and Western Man (TWM, 298) are typical - 
and it is significant that in The Art of Being Ruled one of the examples of 
`the abstract rage of hunger and reproduction' was `the swallowing of the 
male by the female epira' (ABR, 232), an image of the violent destruction 
of the male by female sexuality that, while it might not escape a charge of 
misogyny, renders ironic Cantleman's claims to `defiance', and his belief 
that it is he who does the `devouring'. In The Art of Being Ruled Lewis also 
suggests that the male epira allows itself to be eaten by the female as he 
has no personality: `Without a personality there is no instinct of 
preservation: or rather, the less personality there is, the less horror there is 
at the idea of losing it' (ABR, 249). Although Cantleman spends most of 
the story trying to assert his individual personality, it seems that, in the 
light of Lewis's later work, he is unsuccessful and despite all the exertions 
of his vanity becomes unpropped and collapses, and is engulfed the 
`abstract rage of hunger and reproduction' over which he has tried to 
sustain himself. 
There is also irony when Cantleman returns to the camp with `a smile 
of severe satisfaction on his face': 
It did not occur to him that his action might have been supremely 
unimportant as far as Stella was concerned. He had not even asked 
himself if, had he not been there that night, someone else might have 
been there in his place. He was also convinced that the laurels were 
his, and that Nature had come off badly. ('Spring-Mate', 84) 
This passage heavily hints that `his action' was indeed `supremely 
unimportant' to Stella, and that he was mistaken in his conviction `that 
Nature had come off badly'. Although Cantleman views `his action' with 
Stella as a carefully philosophised act of violent defiance against a nature 
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which has been fooled by his falsity, the narrative voice consistently 
undercuts this, juxtaposing jarring and ironic notes to his stream of vast 
and anti-social self-admiration. The story ends with an uneasy passage, 
which again conflates sex and war and nature: 
And when he beat a German's brains out it was with the same 
impartial malignity that he had displayed in the English night with 
his Spring-mate. Only he had considered there too that he was in 
some way outwitting Nature, and had no adequate realization of the 
extent to which evidently the death of a Hun was to the advantage of 
the world. ('Spring-Mate', 84) 
Again, the real significance of Cantleman's action is shown to be at odds 
with his perception of it, and his belief that he is acting against nature is 
shown to be deluded and unreal. Cantleman's attempts at a defiant and 
aggressively masculine individuality are shown to be effortlessly 
reintegrated into a `Nature' which is characterised as both feminine and 
military, and full of the `abstract rage of hunger and reproduction'. This 
failure of individuality could also be seen as allegorising the inability of the 
individual, however sophisticated their philosophy may be, to separate 
themselves from and remain unaffected by the social, political, and 
military reality of the First World War. 
In The Art of Being Ruled Lewis theorised that `abstract rage of 
hunger and reproduction' could only be avoided by maintaining a 
superficiality and separation, arguing that `we are surface creatures' (ABR, 
231). Lewis saw art and the figure of the artist as an essential factor in 
maintaining this superficiality: `it is the spirit of the artist that maintains 
this superficiality, differentiation of existence, for us: our personal, our 
detached life, in short, in distinction to our crowd-life' (ABR, 232). The 
comedy of `Cantleman's Spring-Mate' comes from Cantleman's inability to 
maintain a `differentiation of existence' and his continued ignorance of his 
failure. While he is far from an everyman character the comedy of 
Cantleman's failure follows the pattern of the crisis of masculinity in the 
First World War: the realisation that the old beliefs and conventions that 
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had defined ways of being male could not cope with the new realities of 
modern war, a realisation that was personally traumatic as well as 
productive of great social change. 
In `The War Baby' (1919), a story with a protagonist far more self- 
aware and with more of `the spirit of the artist' than Cantleman, the self- 
conscious performance of a masculine individuality is as prone to 
becoming unpropped and collapsing as Cantleman's. The description of 
the `West Berks Hotel', where much of the action of `The War Baby' takes 
place, introduces a sense of theatre early on in the story: it `was like 
theatrical store. It contained a variety of military properties' ('Baby', 85). 
This sense of theatre also manifests itself in the self-conscious 
performance of the protagonist, Richard Beresin. Like Cantleman, Beresin 
considers himself superior to those around him, and when he joined the 
army: 
He became a little literary - snubbed, in a schoolboy way, with an 
impermeable contempt, his fellows with less fortunate histories. He 
wore a bracelet, read Huysmans in his dug-out, wore mufti whenever 
opportunity offered, acquired a settled consciousness of the 
aristocratic idea. He began to visualize himself as a young blood - he 
sought in his ancestry for the bluest seeming streams, courted 
imaginary ghosts. His Nietzschean illusion almost broke the heart of 
his subservient soldier-servant. [... ] Both he and his soldier-servant 
saw the same popular image of a perfection. ('Baby', go) 
However, the pursuit of this `image of a perfection' is hampered by the 
situation in which he finds himself: 
the war grew more and more a sinister phantom. The death-line was 
always there, crackling, thumping away. He could not take his 
aristocratic ideal to his bosom, and luxuriate with it, so near to a 
harsh extinction. ('Baby', go) 
The conflict between Beresin's ideals of masculinity and the reality of the 
First World War is given clear expression here, and echoes the conflict 
between Cairn's `spirit' and his `fear of being played with too much'. In 
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both cases fantasies of masculinity are shown to be irreconcilable with `the 
Real' of war, exactly the mismatch that can be seen as the basis of shell 
shock. 
Beresin is at least partially aware of the artificiality of the distinction 
he attempts to maintain. In an imagined discourse with his servant, he 
makes the following statement: 
You are always a pea disguising itself from a million other peas. The 
other peas all know you are a pea, and love to think of a pea like 
themselves being a soft, subtle, clever, insolent pea! But your identity 
is precarious. Yes, you must be lavish; otherwise - you will receive 
that deadly look that one pea gives another when pretence is laid 
aside. ('Baby', 94) 
The idea that Beresin's sense of distinction and aristocratic superiority is a 
matter of disguising a fundamental uniformity by the means of deliberate 
performance is similar to Lewis's ideas about the performed nature of 
masculinity in The Art of Being Ruled. In both instances there is an 
attempt to create distinction out of a fundamental uniformity through a 
performance: for Beresin, acting the aristocrat when really just a pea like `a 
million other peas'; in The Art of Being Ruled by `ACTING THE MAN' when in 
fact `There is no mysterious difference between the nature of the sexes' 
(ABR, 250). 
Beresin's attempted disguise of his `pea'-hood by the adoption of a 
`Nietzschean illusion' is presented as based on a psychological need, rather 
than any innate nobility: 
all he required was an illustrious segregation, a superiority. He would 
imitate any figure that would satisfy the natural vanity of a young 
animal with an acute sense of its personal life, without worrying too 
much about the details of your argument. ('Baby', 94) 
The idea that Beresin's aristocratic performance is a product of his animal 
vanity is not only interesting as a possible moment of unguarded and 
perceptive self-criticism by Lewis, but also as an indication of how Lewis's 
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later ideas in The Art of Being Ruled were already taking shape during the 
First World War. In The Art of Being Ruled Lewis, as we have seen above, 
argues that vanity can be seen to play a part in the construction of 
masculinity, but that it is not the fundamental motivation -a role taken by 
belief in personality (ABR, 249). Despite vanity being considered of 
secondary importance Lewis sees it as a typically masculine characteristic, 
writing that the man `is blown out by vanity into a bigger and bonier 
creature' than the woman (ABR, 250). In the character of Beresin Lewis 
had already created a figure `blown out by vanity' into masculinity, and one 
who, as we shall see, was `always likely to collapse'. 
One of the ways in which Beresin attempts to perform his aristocratic 
role and achieve the `superiority' he desires is through the adoption of a 
violent attitude towards women and sexual relationships with them: 
I want a woman so shy that she can hardly bear to be looked at. To 
undress her would be like tearing a shell off a living crab. Her nudity 
would be so indecent that I should rush out of the room, at first, in 
horror. She would at the same moment faint on realizing that she was 
there - ('Baby', 95) 
The melodramatic and abstract nature of Beresin's statement is 
emphasised by his servant who interrupts his grandiloquence with some 
earthy and entirely practical advice: `I can see you're in a bad way, old 
chap. Why don't you run up to London for a few days? " ('Baby', 95)" 
Like Cantleman, Beresin consciously and deliberately adopts a 
sexually aggressive attitude toward women as a means of propping up his 
vanity, and assuring himself of his active and autonomous role in the 
world. Both the characters' attitudes are presented as theoretical ones: 
neither Beresin nor Cantleman appears to be `naturally' sexually 
aggressive; rather it is a posture they adopt as a result of their own 
`philosophising', a means of rationalising their `common' desires in such a 
way that they can think of themselves as distinct and defiant. 
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Beresin conveniently finds, or believes that he finds, his ideal woman 
in the figure of his landlady's daughter, Tets. At first Beresin's 
`Nietzschean' methods of courtship are absurdly unsuccessful: 
"I kiss you because I don't believe too much in individuals. " 
"Go hon! " 
"I want to know what you taste like, and I want to keep fat. " 
"You're quite fat enough. " 
"Kisses take one back six thousand years. It is a delicious 
journey. " 
"Don't be so silly. " 
"But I promise you -! That's it. Kiss a woman and you become 
naked at once. " His talk of the crab's shell and swooning nudity had 
got no further. ('Baby', 98-9) 
Again we are presented with a comic mismatch of masculine fantasy and 
feminine reality: 
The cheap sententious mysticism of the imperial bard recoiled before 
the deaf reality of this rather psychic, rather Eastern, young lady. So 
far did the brave Beresin get and there he unaccountably stuck. Just 
as the jolliest romances are apt to draw up abashed before too naked 
realities, so presumably his light-hearted lechery had been damped 
and cowed to its nursery by the contact of a full being. ('Baby', 99) 
Tets's `deaf reality' here has the same effect as the `harsh extinction' of the 
`death-line': in both cases Beresin finds it impossible to `luxuriate' his 
`aristocratic ideal'. Beresin eventually sexually consummates his 
relationship with Tets when he receives `his marching order': 
Now the quickened pace, the uprooting process, the quickening of 
military duties, caused a change in Richard Beresin. He clung to his 
exquisite habits, burnished his contempt every day and held it coolly 
up to his fellows with politeness when he considered they had 
appeared mentally untidy before him. He said his daily prayers to his 
deities; but even a philosopher should be efficacious. He was going 
very soon now back to War. How had he spent his spell of leisure? It 
was not enough of a figure that he had filled this space with to satisfy 
him. Not conscious of it, the animal things had their way. [... ] He 
became more ostentatiously the jeune signeur that all spirited youth 
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should be: the natural man swelled and concentrated itself, on the 
contrary, in equal measure. ('Baby', 99-100) 
The split in Beresin's character, between `ostentation' and `spirit' and `the 
animal things', brought about by the `death-line' coming closer 
demonstrates how unsuited his ideals and illusions are to the real situation 
in which he is unavoidably caught. Beresin invites Tets to London, where, 
after a night of not-particularly-aristocratic entertainment and 'guzzl[ing]' 
of `war-wine', Tets does `not deny the Bacchanalia its culmination' ('Baby', 
ioo). Their rather artificial `Bacchanalia' occurs because of the pressure of 
time caused by the imminence of war rather than because of anything like 
Beresin's autonomous and masculine free-will: 
As they drove through the black streets afterwards they lay in each 
other's arms and sealed their unwisdom with the ultimate 
convulsions of love. The eating up of the pennies and yards on the 
taximeter was an intense and palpable symbol of time. ('Baby', loo) 
Although Beresin apparently gets what he wants, these `convulsions' are 
hardly a triumph for him, as they were brought about by the `animal' 
desires of his `natural man' having their way over his idea of `the jeune 
signeur that all spirited youth should be'. Beresin, like Cairn, finds that his 
`spirit' is not `winged', but `like his body' and `grubbily attached' if not to 
the earth, then to his own `animal things'. The sexual relationship of 
Beresin and Tets is presented as being `grubbily attached' to the war: 
The next morning Beresin found a warm mass beside him in bed, and 
realized, as he would have done at the presence of a pool of blood or a 
dead body, that the preceding evening had been marked by a human 
event. The mass stirred, and a cumbrous bestial scented arm passed 
round his body. In the middle of a thick primitive gush of hair, he 
found the lips with their thoughtful pathetic spasm. He looked with 
curiosity and uneasiness at what he found so near to him. 
The corpses of the battlefield had perhaps cheapened flesh? 
Anyway, realities were infectious; and all women seemed to feel that 
they should have their luxurious battles, too; only they were playing 
at dying, and their war was fruitful. ('Baby', ioo-1) 
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Even Beresin's `Bacchanalia' is no escape from `the harsh extinction' of the 
war; even here the `illustrious segregation' he seeks is not achieved due to 
the `infectious' nature of reality. Having sex with Tets is not presented as a 
triumph for Beresin: it does not indicate the achievement of an `illustrious 
segregation, a superiority' but rather his unavoidable attachment to the 
`human events' and `realities' which surround him. Sex is seen as the 
failure of separation rather than as its achievement. 
The clearest example of the collapse of Beresin's masculinity is his 
sexual failure with non-white prostitutes in Egypt. As we might expect, 
Beresin's attitude to these women is framed in typically aristocratic terms: 
he looks round at the Black and the Brown. They, as we all know, 
help you along with the White. But much more than that, this caviare 
[sic] of a dark and acrid skin is the test, surely, of whether your palate 
is a noble, an adventurous palate, or a plebeian one! This was 
perhaps the bitterest pill. Beresin could never bear to think of that 
failure! (`Baby', 104) 
Beresin's failure is not only traumatic in that he temporarily fails to 
perform the role he has ascribed to himself, but also as it changes his self- 
perception; it leaves him `blackened in his own eyes for ever, ethiopianly 
blackened' ('Baby', 104). Once again Beresin's `Nietzschean illusion' 
collapses when faced with reality, and with it the separate and superior 
status he seeks, a distinction in this case that involves discourses of 
colonialism and race as well as of gender. Beresin's `blackening' indicates 
that he perceives an identity between him and the non-white women he 
finds so sexually intimidating: once again there is a realisation of a 
fundamental uniformity, that the (white) man, once his `arbitrary 
psychological equipment' has been kicked from underneath him, `is in 
reality just the same size, and of just the same sort' as the (non-white) 
woman (ABR, 250). I am not trying to suggest that Lewis is in any way 
celebrating human equality; rather he is dramatising its unavoidability, 
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and finding comedy, and perhaps some repressed tragedy, in the failure of 
those who would deny or disguise it. 
Beresin's `aristocratic ideal' comes under further pressure when he 
encounters some `genuinely' aristocratic officers. This episode is 
interesting, as it demonstrates just how much Beresin's ideas of aristocracy 
are psychological and artificial projections, rather than reflections of 
physical or `natural' fact: 
The short, scrubby physique, the thoroughly villainous stupidity of 
the noble, who was also his colonel and enemy, appeared to him in 
the highest sense, peculiarly, attributes. The stupidity, which he also 
saw, was the divine stupidity of the Noble! The physical 
commonplace - which he noted - how characteristic, paradoxical, 
and in fact the "real thing"! ('Baby', 105) 
Beresin's failed attempt to `disguise' himself as a `soft, subtle, clever, 
insolent pea' is here projected on those he considers `genuine' aristocrats, 
turning the obvious fundamental likeness - they are mentally and 
physically `commonplace' - into an image of `divine' nobility. Unable to 
maintain his own `Nietzschean illusion' Beresin tries to delude himself into 
finding it in others, a `peculiar' attempt, which only succeeds in creating 
`fresh despondencies' for him ('Baby', 105). 
The final failure of Beresin's deluded ideals is embodied by his and 
Tets's baby (Tets dies in childbirth), a `pulpy and stormy little totem' who 
soon `became a dull human being' ('Baby', io8). Beresin unenthusiastically 
views Tets's pregnancy as an unstoppable natural process: `Something had 
been started that nothing could arrest' ('Baby', 103). Beresin sees himself 
as a victim of this process, using terms that echo Lewis's image of the 
female epira devouring her mate: `He goes out on the female hunt; lodges 
in his trap, incidentally: now he is being slowly devoured by his prey' 
('Baby', 104). This transition from activity to passivity, from the hunter of 
women to their prey, is similar to the one that Rob Cairn, in `The French 
Poodle', experienced as shell shock: Beresin discovers that his sexuality, 
like Cairn's spirit, `could not disport itself genially in independence of 
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surrounding objects' ('Baby', 53). Beresin's aggressively masculine 
sexuality, which formed an important part of the `Nietzschean illusion' at 
the heart of his self-definition and attempt at `an illustrious segregation, a 
superiority', results in a dependent from which he cannot separate himself. 
And just as Beresin's aristocraticism was imitative and based on vanity ('he 
would imitate any figure that would satisfy the natural vanity of a young 
animal'), so is his baby's behaviour: `She would attempt to stimulate 
interest, cause pity, or induce amusement, by mincing or conducting 
herself in babyish style, to mesmerize you into seeing her "en petit"' 
('Baby', io8). This performing baby, the unwanted result of the 
capitulation of his `spirit' to his unconscious `animal things', provides the 
ultimate and appropriate reply of the feminine and the natural to Beresin's 
pretensions of superiority. The story ends ironically: `No aristocrat could 
have had a less appropriate child! ' (`Baby', io8). Just as in `Cantleman's 
Spring-Mate' the forces of aspiring masculinity are shown to be comically 
subordinate to and unconsciously complicit with the realm of the feminine 
and the natural that they seek to defy. Beresin's attempt at autonomy, for 
an `illustrious segregation, a superiority' fails, and not only is he revealed 
as `a pea disguising itself from a million other peas', but he becomes the 
unwilling participant in the propagation of more `peas'. 
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Tarr: 
`a grimacing, tumultuous mask' 
One of the main themes of Lewis's novel Tarr (1918) is the struggle of Tarr, 
one of the two central male protagonists, for autonomy, a struggle in which 
issues of gender and sexuality are crucial. Like Cantleman and Beresin 
Tarr's struggle for autonomy has two aspects: he wants to escape from 
sexual desire and the uncontrollable drives of the body altogether; but he 
also wants to use the performance of his sexuality to achieve and display 
his desired autonomy. Sexual desires for and relationships with women are 
things to be overcome, but this overcoming can be displayed through an 
involvement with them, by enacting them in a way that demonstrates his 
disdain for and mastery over them. Tarr's struggle for autonomy from sex 
involves a performance of masculinity similar to but more developed than 
those displayed by Cantleman and Beresin, and is illuminated by 
comparison with the ideas Lewis put forward in The Art of Being Ruled. 
Early on in the novel Tarr meets and engages in an argument with Hobson, 
an acquaintance of his, for whose `outfit [Tarr] had the greatest contempt' 
(T, 22). The argument begins with some schoolboyish teasing, with Tarr 
pulling Hobson's hair and asking him when he is going to get it cut (T, 23). 
However, things get more heated when Tarr's German fiancee, Bertha 
Lunken, is mentioned. Bertha is introduced into the conversation in an 
interesting way: Tarr aggressively asks Hobson `What on earth possesses 
you to know so many Germans? ', a question that Hobson throws back at 
him: 
"It seems to me that you know more Germans than I do. = But you're 
ashamed of it. You do everything you can to hide it. Hence your 
attack on me a moment ago. =I met a Fräulein Brandenbourg the 
other day, a German, who claimed to know you. I am always meeting 
Germans who know you. She also referred to you as the `official 
fiancee of Fräulein Lunken. ' = Are you an `official fiancee? ' And if so, 
what is that, may I ask? " 
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Tarr was taken aback, it was evident. 
Hobson laughed stridently. (T, 24) 
Tarr has been exposed as being `guilty' of the same vice which he accused 
Hobson of, something which he finds awkward to respond to: 
Tarr was recovering gracefully from his relapse into discomfort. If 
ever taken off his guard, he made a clever use immediately afterwards 
of his naivete. He beamed on his slip. He would swallow it tranquilly, 
assimilating it, with ostentation, to himself. When some personal 
weakness slipped out he would pick it up unabashed, look at it 
smilingly, and put it back in his pocket. 
"As you know, " he soon replied, "`engagement' is an 
euphemism. And as a matter of fact my girl publicly announced the 
breaking off of our engagement yesterday. " 
He looked a complete child, head thrown back as though 
proclaiming something he had reason to be particularly proud of. _ 
Hobson laughed compulsively, cracking his yellow fingers. (T, 24-5) 
There is some ambiguity about Tarr's reaction here; the first paragraph 
would seem to suggest that it is `graceful'; the last paragraph, in which Tarr 
is likened to a `complete child', is less flattering. One of the key stylistic 
features of Tarr is the extremely slippery use of free indirect discourse, so 
that it becomes difficult to say with any certainty whether we are reading 
comments of the narrator or the narrated thoughts of characters. I would 
argue that in the case in question it is the last paragraph that forms a 
narrative comment on Tarr; the word `looked' is crucial here, as it suggests 
a visual and hence exterior, perspective on Tarr, a perspective lacking in 
the first paragraph. With this reading, the first paragraph can be read as 
Tarr's own view of his response, and the discrepancy of this with the 
perspective of the narrator given in last paragraph can be seen as an ironic 
comment on Tarr, who acts `as though [... ] he had reason to be particularly 
proud', but, it is heavily hinted, does not. 
Tarr's reaction to the `fundamental likeness' that Hobson has exposed 
- the fact that they both socialise with Germans - is to rationalise his 
position in a performance of sexually aggressive masculinity that exceeds 
those of Cantleman and Beresin in energy as well as scope. 
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"Sex is a monstrosity. It is the arch abortion of this filthy universe. 
[... ] I am the Panurgic-Pessimist, drunken with the laughing gas of 
the Abyss. I gaze on squalor and idiocy, and the more I see it, the 
more I like it. = Flaubert built up his Bouvard et Pecuchet with 
maniacal and tireless hands. It took him ten years. That was a long 
draught of stodgy laughter from the gases that rise from the dung 
heap? He had an appetite like an elephant for this form of mirth. But 
he grumbled and sighed over his food. =I take it in my arms and 
bury my face in it! [... ] 
"I bury my face in it! " = (He buried his face in it!! ) = "I laugh 
hoarsely through its thickness, choking and spitting; coughing, 
sneezing, blowing. = People will begin to think I am an alligator if 
they see me always swimming in their daily ooze. As far as sex is 
concerned I am that. ["] (T, 26-7) 
Tarr claims that the reason for his predilection for a predatory immersion 
in the `ooze' of sex lies in his artistic nature, which compels him to take an 
attitude different to the normal, non-artistic man, and which explains and 
even excuses his `engagement' to Bertha: 
["]I will explain why I am associated sexually with this pumpkin. 
"First, I am an artist. = With most people, not describable as 
artists, all the finer part of their vitality goes into sex. They become 
third-rate poets during their courtship. All their instinct of drama 
comes out freshly with their wives. The artist is he in whom this 
emotionality normally absorbed by sex is so strong that it claims a 
newer and more exclusive field of development. = Its first creation is 
the Artist himself, a new sort of person; the creative man. [... ] 
"The tendency of my work, as you may have noticed, is that of 
an inevitable severity. Apart from its being good or bad, its character 
is ascetic rather than sensuous, and divorced from immediate life. 
There is no slop of sex in that. But there is no severity left over for the 
work of the cruder senses either. [... ] 
"All the delicate psychology another naturally seeks in a woman, 
the curiosity of form, windows on other lives, I seek in my work and 
not elsewhere. ["] (T, 29-30) 
Tarr's idea here is a variation on the theory that artistic energy is 
sublimated sexual energy, but for him it is a sublimation of judgment and 
taste, which leaves his sexual energy intact but undiscriminating. 
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Tarr's argument serves the purpose of defending himself from his 
own criticisms: the confrontation with Hobson started when Hobson 
reflected Tarr's criticism that he knew `too many' Germans back on Tarr, 
supplemented with the observation that as well as knowing Germans Tarr 
was sexually involved with and engaged to one. Tarr's argument is a 
reaction to his own criticism of others, criticisms which he himself cannot 
withstand, and it is in this context that it should be understood. Faced with 
a similarity - both he and Hobson know `too many' Germans - Tarr 
attempts to establish a difference. Indeed, he attempts to elevate this 
difference to a superiority by asserting that his behaviour is not just a case 
of normal and non-artistic sexual desire but a deliberate predatory 
immersion that indicates his artistic nature. Tarr's vision of himself as an 
artist and sexual alligator is a rationalisation of the same type as 
Cantleman's deluded `ideas of defiance' ('Spring-Mate', 83), which ignores 
the fact that he is in the same immersed position as `most people, not 
describable as artists', with the only difference being that he 
retrospectively claims that he chose to be there, and that his `choice' is a 
mark of distinction. The idea that Tarr's outburst is a performance, rather 
than, say, an expression of his innermost being, is reinforced by the 
comment that `Tarr needed a grimacing, tumultuous mask for the face he 
had to cover. = The clown was the only role that was ample enough' (T, 
29). Like Beresin, Tarr is only `a pea disguising itself from a million other 
peas', and he fears that Hobson may have given him `that deadly look that 
one pea gives another when pretence is laid aside' ('Baby', 94). 
In his book Modernism and the Fate of Individuality (1991), Michael 
Levenson analyzes the way individuality is represented in Tarr and sees 
performance as playing a central role: 
Personality is a theatre-prop in a drama staged by the imagination, 
and in this respect Lewis anticipates a perception that has become a 
sociological commonplace: that identity is a part one plays; one plays 
at being oneself. Lewis gives that idea a turn towards the macabre. 
His characters are consistently betrayed by the roles they have 
chosen; the drama never goes as planned, with the result that 
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characters are left staring blankly at the costumes they have 
donned. 13 
This sense that personality is performed has its roots in Lewis's response 
to the Great War: the `turn towards the macabre' and the sense that `the 
drama never goes as planned' that Levenson writes of, can be seen to be 
prefigured in the war stories, where the `spirit' fails to `disport itself 
genially', and where the individual is shown as not in control of himself. As 
Levenson writes, `Lewis submits the helpless mind to the exactions of 
matter, leaving little for consciousness to do but witness its own 
degradation'14: a process that mirrors the collapse of the fantasy of 
masculine autonomy in the First World War. 
Tarr's helplessness and lack of self-control is shown when, after his 
confrontation with Hobson and similar conversations with two other male 
friends, he visits Bertha with the intention of decisively leaving her, 
something which he finds he cannot do (T, 49-73). He explains his 
inability to leave Bertha to himself using imagery which suggests some sort 
of physical conjoinment: 
His tenderness for Bertha was due to her having purloined some part 
of himself, and covered herself superficially with it as a shield. Her 
skin at least was Tarr. She had captured a bit of him, and held it as a 
hostage. She was rapidly transforming herself, too, into a slavish 
dependence. She worked with all the hypocrisy of a great instinct. 
People can wound by loving; the sympathy of this affection is 
interpenetrative. Love performs its natural miracle, and they become 
part of us; it is a dismemberment to cast them off. Our own blood 
flows out after them when they go. (T, 72) 
This account of Tarr's involvement with Bertha contrasts with his earlier 
claim that he `buries' his face in the `monstrosity' of sex, and that he should 
be seen by others as an `alligator [... ] swimming in their daily ooze' (T, 27). 
Whereas the earlier images suggest an active and willed immersion in sex, 
13 Micheal Levenson, Modernism and the Fate of Individuality, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). P. 128. 
14 Levenson, Modernism and the Fate of Individuality, p. 129. 
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the later image suggests that his `interpenetrative' mingling with Bertha is 
a result of the `natural miracle' of love, rather than his own aggressive 
volition. This idea of love is closer to Samuel Butler's `a grinding out of all 
differences', an idea that as we have seen Lewis attacked in The Art of 
Being Ruled, than Tarr's own ideal (see above and ABR, 226-32). That his 
relationship with Bertha is `interpenetrative' also undermines the implied 
masculinity of the `alligator' image: Tarr wants to think that he enters the 
`ooze' deliberately, but it becomes clear that the `ooze' has also entered 
him, a penetration he cannot resist and which undermines his `will' to 
leave Bertha. Tarr's belief that, unlike the crowd-like Hobson, he is an 
individual is shown here to be false: like Arghol in Enemy of the Stars Tarr 
finds that he is `Always a deux! ' (Bl, 8o). 
The rhetoric of dualism, a feature of Lewis's work discussed in 
Chapter Two, appears in Tarr in an often quoted passage: Tarr, 
contemplating his relationship with Anastasya, sets out what could be 
called an ontological hierarchy of gender: 
Woman and the sexual sphere seemed to him to be an average from 
which everything came: from it everything rose, or attempted to rise. 
= There was no mysterious opposition extending up into Heaven, and 
dividing Heavenly Beings into Gods and Goddesses. There was only 
one God and he was a man. =A woman was a lower form of life. 
Everything was female to begin with. A jellyish diffuseness spread 
itself and gaped on the beds and in the bas-fonds of everything. 
Above a certain level of life sex disappeared, just as in highly 
organised sensualism sex vanishes. And, on the other hand, 
everything beneath that line was female. = Bard, Simpson, 
MacKenzie, Townsend, Annandale - he enumerated acquaintances 
evidently below the absolute line and who displayed a lack of energy, 
permanently mesmeric state, and almost purely emotional reactions. 
He knew that everything on the superior side of the line was not 
purged of jellyish attributes; also that Anastasya's flaccid and 
fundamental charms were formidable, although the line has been 
crossed by her. (T, 313-4) 
This passage is intriguing, as even though the gendered ontology it 
proposes appears to be clear cut its exact application to the characters in 
the novel is typically unclear. Despite images that suggest a typical 
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misogynist disgust at the female body -j ellyfish' being the most obvious - 
the fact that acquaintances of Tarr who are presumably male are placed on 
the feminine side of the `line' indicates that this scheme is significantly 
different from traditional biological views of sexual difference. Fredric 
Jameson's interpretation of this passage is interesting: 
It should be noted that while women, the organic, and sex itself are 
here all identified within a mythic, clearly negative term, there is no 
correlative celebration of the male principle. The peculiarity of Lewis' 
sexual ideology is that, while openly misogynist, and sexist in the 
obvious senses of the word, it is not for all that phallocentric. The 
positive term which logically corresponds to the negative one of the 
female is not the male, as in D. H. Lawrence, but rather art, which is 
not the place of a subject, masculine or otherwise, but rather 
impersonal and inhuman [... ]. 15 
This reading suggests a link between this passage and Lewis's ideas of 
gender in The Art of Being Ruled, ideas which Jameson unfortunately does 
not discuss, where masculinity is seen as artificial and associated with `the 
spirit of the artist' (see above and ABR, 232). Jameson's distinction 
between the ideas of masculinity and of `impersonal and inhuman' art is 
unnecessary as for Lewis they were practically identical. However, he is 
right to say that Lewis's positive term does not `logically correspond' to the 
female, as for Lewis masculinity and femininity are not two fundamentally 
different and opposed types of existence. Rather masculinity is seen as a 
supplemented femininity; using Ziiek's terms, the `reality' of masculinity is 
nothing more than `the Real' of the feminine mediated by the `arbitrary 
psychological machinery' of belief in the masculine personality. As Lewis 
says, `Everything was female to begin with', the masculine being merely 
something `propped up' from this fundamental state. Although the 
identification of women with the organic is, as Jameson says, `openly 
misogynist, and sexist in the obvious senses of the word', Tarr's gendered 
ontology is not without anxiety for the male, as it both allows the 
possibility that men can fall below the `line' into the feminine, and that 
15 Jameson, Fables ofAggression, p. 97. 
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women can cross the `line' into the masculine, something Tarr considers 
Anastasya to have done. 
Tarr's feeling that Anastasya has `crossed the line' and become 
masculine is not completely mistaken, as Anastasya is in some ways the 
most masculine character in the novel, the most independent, intelligent, 
and sexually dominant, all characteristics that Tarr and Lewis himself 
idealise as masculine. Anastasya's disruption of stereotypical thinking on 
gender is demonstrated by Sara Danius's bizarre misreading of an episode 
in Tarr in her book The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, 
and Aesthetics (2002). Danius writes that in Tarr `the gazer is male and 
the gazed-upon female', adding that `In modernism at large, the alienating 
and reifying gaze is usually associated with masculinity'. 16 However, if we 
take the trouble to actually read the passage Danius is referring to, we 
discover that the `gazer' is in fact female and the `gazed-upon' male: 
He had already been examined by the beautiful girl. Throwing an 
absent far-away look into her eyes, she let them wonder over him. 
Afterwards she cast them down into her soup. As a pickpocket, after 
brisk work in a crowd, hurries home to examine and evaluate his 
spoil, so she then collected what her dreamy eyes had noted. (T, 98) 
Despite the fact that the `gazer' is female, the gaze itself is gendered as 
male - the `pickpocket' examines `his spoil' - which would suggests that 
something is going on here that does not fit easily into `modernism at 
large' - or at least Danius's account of it. This episode would seem to be an 
example of Anastasya, or at least one part of her, `crossing the line' in the 
way that Tarr, and sophisticated twenty-first-century criticism, finds 
disturbing. 
Anastasya's feminine identity, which is heavily sexual and captivates 
both Tarr and Kreisler, is characterised as a result of performance: `She 
seemed to feel herself a travelling circus of tricks and wonders, beauty 
shows and monstrosities. Quite used to being looked at, she had become 
16 Sara Danius, The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics, 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. i6o. 
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resigned to inability to avoid performing' (T, ioo). In his book Literature, 
Politics, and the English Avant-Garde: Nation and Empire 1901-1918, 
Paul Peppis argues that as `the passivity of this language confirms, 
Anastasya's facility as a performer is the result of being made the subject 
and locus of male desire'. 17 However, the image of Anastasya's gaze as male 
seems to complicate this interpretation as it suggests that in terms of 
gender her identity is not unitary but fragmented and contradictory: her 
gaze is male, but `her' eyes are femininely `dreamy'. Anastasya's performed 
identity does not simply enhance and develop her given biological identity 
but exceeds it, allowing part of her to function in a masculine way: 
although in general she `acts the woman' her gaze `acts the man'. This 
performance of the masculine gaze also calls into question the notion of 
`male desire': if Anastasya can look at men with a masculine gaze perhaps 
she can also desire them in a masculine way as well? 
Anastasya's disruption of the typical male-'gazer'/female-gazed- 
upon' dualism can also be seen later on in the novel, when she actively 
initiates sexual relations with Tarr. After an evening of drinking and 
arguments about art and life, Tarr and Anastasya go their separate ways; 
Tarr returns home to find that he has lost his key, but that his front door is 
open; inside his flat he finds Anastasya naked, and `laughing with a harsh 
sound like stone laughing'; she suggestively offers to `model' for him, an 
offer which, although he briefly prevaricates over, he does not refuse (T, 
306-7). This scene is similar to Kreisler's rape of Bertha earlier on in the 
novel: in both cases, `modelling' is the pretext for sex, but whereas in the 
earlier scene the painter forces himself on the model, in the second scene 
the relationship is reversed, with Anastasya taking the leading role, 
although she does not actually rape Tarr. Anastasya's deflation of Tarr's 
masculine bubble is made clear in their conversation the following 
morning, during which Tarr declares to Anastasya: 
"I am your slave! " 
17 Paul Peppis, Literature, Politics, and the English Avant-Garde: Nation and Empire 
i9oi-1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 151. 
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Anastasya rolled up against him with the movement of a seal. 
"Thank you, Tarr. That's better than having a slave, isn't it? " 
"Yes, I think everything is in order. " 
"Then you're my efficient chimpanzee? " 
"No, I'm the new animal; we haven't found a name for it yet. It 
will succeed the Superman. Back to the Earth! " 
"Jean-Jacques Rousseau. = Kiss me! " (T, 307) 
Not only does Tarr accept the role of slave - not part of the philosophy he 
expounded to Hobson - but his `Nietzschean illusion', his claim that he is 
`the new animal' which `will succeed the Superman', is ridiculed, albeit 
with some affection, by Anastasya. The reference to Rousseau is 
interesting, as in The Art of Being Ruled his `super-agriculturalist dreams' 
and `Pictures of the "freedom" of the noble savage and the child' were seen 
as the ideas of natural freedom under which Europeans paradoxically 
`enslav[ed] themselves more thoroughly' (ABR, 41-2). Tarr seems to have 
undergone a similar process, although under the banner of Nietzsche 
rather than Rousseau. Like Cantleman's hopes that he `might produce a 
new human chemistry' Tarr's Nietzschean aspirations collapse in the face 
of the feminine. The failure of Tarr's avant-garde and masculine hopes is 
consolidated by his marriage to Bertha - the German `pumpkin' to whom 
he was embarrassed about being engaged to at the start of the novel - who 
is pregnant with Kreisler's child (T, 318). The marriage of Tarr and Bertha 
is very much one of convenience, arranged in order to legitimise Bertha's 
child and to prevent her falling foul of established social convention. In 
terms of Tarr's initial philosophy the marriage can be seen as a 
capitulation to both the feminine and the social, and does not seem to 
further his ambition to `succeed the Superman'. 
The ultimate collapse of Tarr's masculinity and the failure of his 
attempt at autonomy is evident in the last paragraphs of the novel: 
Two years after the birth of the child, Mrs. Tarr divorced him. She 
then married an eye-doctor, and lived with a brooding severity in his 
company and that of her only child. 
Tarr and Anastasya did not marry. = They had no children. 
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Tarr, however, had three children by a lady of the name of Rose 
Fawcett, who consoled him eventually for the splendours of his 
"perfect woman. " = But yet beyond the dim though solid figure of 
Rose Fawcett, another rises. This one represents the swing back of 
the pendulum once more to the swagger side. The cheerless and 
stodgy absurdity of Rose Fawcett required the painted, fine and 
inquiring face of Prism Dirkes. (T, 320) 
Fredric Jameson writes that `the only way to read the novel's enigmatic, 
unresolved final paragraph' is as `the triumph of the sexual term, which 
can be described as the dreary and cyclical repetition of the organic, a 
meaningless succession of sex acts'18. I would again slightly modify 
Jameson's interpretation, using the terms discussed in Chapter One, and 
read the conclusion of the novel as the triumph of `the Real' of femininity 
over the constructed `reality' of the masculine personality which Tarr 
attempts to maintain through his clownish performances and spurious 
rationalisations. Tarr certainly does not, as Alistair Davies has argued, 
achieve a Nietzschean `creative Selfhood' and joyful wisdom'19: the novel 
tells a story of toppling over rather than of overcoming. 
In The Art of Being Ruled Lewis wrote that `Absence of 
responsibility, an automatic and stereotyped rhythm is what most men 
desire for themselves', adding that `possession of the self is not compatible 
with a set rhythm' (ABR, 130). The automatism of Tarr's pendulum-like 
swinging between two types of women seems to suggest that even he, the 
self-proclaimed `individual', `alligator', and successor to Nietzsche's 
Superman, ends up in such a `set rhythm', and consequently that he does 
not possess a 'self. Tarr, the avant-garde artist struggling for autonomy 
from the `monstrosity' of sex and the `foul haunting' of women, ends up by 
achieving the sort of `freedom' characterised in The Art of Being Ruled as 
`feminine'. His confession to Anastasya that he is her `slave' reveals the 
truth of the Tarr's character: in the terms of The Art of Being Ruled Tarr is 
one of the `ruled' and not a `ruler'. In The Art of Being Ruled Lewis 
18 Jameson, Fables ofAggression, pp. 101-2. 
19 Alistair Davies, `Tarr: A Nietzschean Novel', in Jeffrey Meyers (ed. ), Wyndham Lewis: 
A Revaluation, (London: The Athlone Press, 1980), p. 118. 
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imagines `the really sensible woman' saying to herself `How enjoyable to be 
a slave! [... ] How divine to have a master! ' (ABR, 132), and this is the 
lesson that Anastasya, the only `really sensible' person in the novel, teaches 
Tarr when she affirms that being a slave is `better than having a slave' (T, 
307). The ending of Tarr follows that pattern of the `collapse of 
masculinity' that we have seen conceptualised in The Art of Being Ruled 
and fictionalised in Lewis's stories of the First World War. This collapse of 
Tarr's masculinity into the `stereotyped rhythm' of `feminine freedom' 
testifies to the anxiety inherent in the book's more easily noticeable 
misogyny. Anne Quema, in her book The Agon Of Modernism: Wyndham 
Lewis's Allegories, Aesthetics, and Politics (1999), argues that, despite 
Lewis's protests that his idea of femininity was detached from real existing 
females, or in other words that his idea of gender was cultural and so 
independent of biological sex, `It is obvious that [... ] "female" and 
"feminine" are synonymous in his vocabulary'. 20 However, the narratives 
of Tarr and the war stories, as well as the arguments of The Art of Being 
Ruled, also make `obvious' that `male' and `masculine' are not so 
consistently synonymous, and that, to use Tarr's image, men do not always 
succeed in their attempt to rise from `the average from which everything 
came' and often remain part of the feminine `jellyish diffuseness'. 
As I suggested at the beginning if this chapter, this anxiety about 
masculinity introduces an anxiety into Lewis's ideas of the `rulers': if the 
`ruled are the females and the ruled the males' then they are `in reality just 
the same size, and of just the same sort' (ABR, 92,250). Tarr's collapse 
into the `stereotyped rhythm' of `feminine freedom' is also a collapse into 
`what most men desire for themselves'. Like those who Lewis disparagingly 
refers to as the `masses of slowly, painfully, moving people' Tarr's idea of 
freedom takes a `violent, super-real prospect' as, like them, he is `not to the 
manner born where "freedom" is concerned: and so [he] invariably 
2O Anne Quema, The Agon Of Modernism: Wyndham Lewis's Allegories, Aesthetics, and 
Politics, (Lewisburg, Pa.; Cranbury, NJ.: Bucknell University Press; Associated University 
Presses, 1999), P. 9o 
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overplay[s] it' (ABR, 42). The figure of the ruler would appear to be, to 
reuse Jameson's phrase, `a dead letter [... ] which no narrative [... ] can 
concretely generate'. As I have shown in this chapter, not only is this figure 
not generated by Lewis's narratives, but the seemingly inevitable failure of 
those who aspire to such a position is ridiculed. The question remains, 
however, whether, precisely by means of this ridiculing, Lewis tries to 
recuperate the masculinity portrayed as lost in his narratives on a stylistic 
level; whether his satirical vision is an attempt to achieve Tarr's ideal style: 
one of `an inevitable severity [... ] ascetic rather than sensuous, and 
divorced from immediate life' with `no slop of sex' in it (T, 30). Whether or 
not Lewis's style achieves this, it is clear that the gendered body does not 
function as a solid ground for identity in Lewis's work. Indeed, the body is 
seen as intrinsically feminine, and masculinity and gender difference in 
general are seen as unnatural supplements to a natural state of feminine 
materiality. Lewis's decoupling of gender and biology does not just 
produce the anxiety and comedy of masculine failure, it also raises the 
prospect of women `crossing the line' into the idealised and incorporeal 
state of masculinity. 
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In this chapter I am going to examine how Lewis's attitudes towards and 
use of the concept of race changed between the mid 192os and the late 
1940s. I will look in detail at parts of five books in which the concept of 
race played an important part: The Lion and the Fox (1927), Paleface 
(1929), Hitler (1931), The Hitler Cult (1939), and America and Cosmic 
Man (1948). I will argue that Lewis's attitude toward the concept of race is 
ambivalent: on the one hand, he finds many of its basic theoretical 
assumptions unacceptable, on the other, he seems to find useful and even 
enjoy the language of race; and so the rhetoric of race is retained in his 
work, even as the theory of race is denied. In terms of the grounding of 
identity I will argue that although race does not operate as an 
unambiguously solid ground for Lewis, it is not abandoned altogether. 
Race, like the peons in The Childermass, both collapses and reassembles in 
Lewis's work. 
I am going to concentrate my analysis on Lewis's treatment of race as 
a theoretical category, rather than do what some previous critics have done 
and simply catalogue various offensive racial stereotypes that he used: I 
hope that this approach will achieve a deeper understanding of Lewis's 
attitude towards the idea of race and his relationship to mainstream 
modern racism. 
Central to the concept of race is the issue of racial differentiation: it is 
clear that any racial thought contains within it an idea of the existence of 
different races, and so the question of Lewis's notions of exactly what it is 
that differentiates between races, what attributes and values signal those 
differences, and the basis - scientific, philosophical, or political - that 
underpins the differentiation, is, or rather should be, inseparable from the 
question of his racism. In this chapter I shall be looking not only at Lewis's 
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racial rhetoric but also at the theory of race that underpins such 
expression. Attention to this issue of differentiation is vital to an 
understanding of Lewis's attitudes toward race because, as David Theo 
Goldberg has written, `racialized discourse does not consist simply in 
descriptive representations of others. It includes a set of hypothetical 
premises about human kinds [... ] and about the differences between 
them'. ' The analysis of Lewis's `hypothetical premises about human kinds' 
is essential, for without understanding exactly how Lewis viewed and 
constructed in his writing the differences between different human groups 
any discussion of the values he subsequently attributes to those groups will 
be conducted with an unconscious and unargued assumption that a 
particular method of differentiation is at work. 
In his book Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning 
(1993), David Theo Goldberg writes that there are `two general forms' of 
twentieth-century thought on race, the first of which `accepts the standard 
biological sense of race as subspecies genetically interpreted, of race as 
natural kind' and: 
attempts to explain relations between real racial groups so 
interpreted [... ] by reducing the racialized phenomena to underlying 
social (or in some cases biological) terms or relations. These 
underlying terms are deemed more primary, more universal, more 
constitutive or basically motivating, and more fundamentally 
determining of social structure. 2 
This strand of thought rests on the assumptions that social relations are 
the result of a deeper underlying reality which can function as interpretive 
key to other, less `primary', realities. Race is in this interpretation a deep 
cause, as opposed to the more superficial and artificial nature of such 
purely social phenomena such as class. 
The other `explanatory paradigm', Goldberg writes, `gives no 
independent content to the notion of race'; rather, it `takes race as a social 
David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), P" 47" 
2 Goldberg, Racist Culture, p. 69. 
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kind and interprets appeals to race as nothing other than recourse to social 
considerations and relations, again, like class or culture. ' In this view race 
is seen as lacking any `determining or motivational force of its own' and 
`any appeal to race is seen as mystificatory, a form of (self-deceived) false 
consciousness or misleading ideology. ' To summarise, `the first paradigm 
reifies race as an unquestioned biological given, the second conceives race 
and racial characterization of social relations as ghostlike. ' 3 
What makes Lewis's racial discourse interesting is that he seems to 
combine elements of both these strands in his thinking, at times 
representing race as something that is primary and `fundamentally 
determining of social structure', at others explicitly regarding it as 
`ghostlike' and `mystifactory'. This ambivalence at the centre of his 
thinking on race is attributable to an identical ambivalence in his thoughts 
on the reality of body: as we have seen, he attempted to repress `the Real' 
of the body while maintaining a sense of its `reality', and so Lewis's 
representations of the body vacillate between the disgustedly and precisely 
visceral and the abstract and insubstantial. Ideas of the body are central to 
the idea of race, for, as Goldberg writes, `racialized discourse may be seen 
to acquire unity in terms of bodily relations' and `racist expression 
assumes authority and is vested with power, literally and symbolically, in 
bodily terms. '4 Given Lewis's denaturalisation of the body and the way in 
which it is treated imaginatively in his fiction and painting - fragmented, 
mechanised, animalised, politicised - it should be clear that his use of a 
discourse and mode of expression to which the body is central is going to 
be problematic - Lewis's body is not the same body as that of nineteenth- 
century science. One of the key issues on which Lewis's view of the body 
differs from that of mainstream modern racism is the assumption that the 
physical body and its appearance and attributes expresses in some way the 
quality of the mind. As we have already seen in the second chapter the 
mind-body question was a difficult one for Lewis as he was both attracted 
by and extremely anxious about the idea that the minds of human beings 
3 Goldberg, Racist Culture, p. 69. 
4 Goldberg, Racist Culture, p. 53, P. 54- 
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were reducible to a purely material ground. Modern racism, as developed 
out of and by the human sciences of the Enlightenment, was far less 
uncertain on this point, as George L. Mosse has pointed out: 
the quest for unity and harmony in the affairs of man and the cosmos 
led to belief in the unity of body and mind. This, in turn, was 
supposed to express itself in a tangible, physical way, which could be 
measured and observed. 5 
In this context, the idea of race gains its appeal from being, or appearing to 
be, an entirely rational way of explaining difference and of gaining an 
assurance that beneath the apparently disparate and disunited social world 
of modernity there is actually after all some sort of order and what appears 
to be chaotic can, in fact, be explained. Science, with its emphasis on 
objective truths and its self-proclaimed autonomy from the social sphere, 
would seem to be an ideal guarantor of such unity and epistemological 
certainty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, Lewis more 
often sees science as being an active agent in the disintegration of the man- 
world relationship that he sees occurring in modernity. Far from being a 
bulwark against the disintegration of modernity science had become, for 
Lewis, very much part of the problem. 6 
However, even though Lewis was at odds with some of the theoretical 
presuppositions of racial discourse that emerged in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries he could still make use of the racist expressions and 
prejudices that developed out of it. Racism can be seen to have, to put it 
simplistically, a theoretical and a rhetorical aspect which historically 
developed together but which can, as times change, separate from each 
other, allowing the rhetoric of racism to still be used even as the concept of 
race is being theoretically dismissed. The imaginative appeal and linguistic 
usefulness of a concept can survive the theoretical discrediting or 
5 George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism, (London, 
Melbourne & Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1978), p. 2 
6 See, for example, ABR, 24, and TWM, 381-95. 
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disavowal of the concept itself, and continue to provide great rhetorical 
resources even to those who would seem to be theoretically opposed to it. 
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The Lion and the Fox: 
`all personality, is raceless for practical purposes' 
The questions of the reality of race and of its importance in determining 
subjectivity and creativity, as well as questions of the relative importance 
of class and nationality, are explored in the appendix to The Lion and the 
Fox: The Role of the Hero in the Plays of Shakespeare (1927), which is 
titled `Shakespeare and Race'. In the introduction to The Lion and the Fox 
Lewis comments that: 
The Appendix may seem unnecessarily remote from the ostensible 
object of the book: but it greatly serves to effect the necessary 
isolation of Shakespeare's personality; it disposes of the claim of 
some vague blood, of a legendary flesh and bone, on this singular 
mind [... ]. (LF, ii) 
The issue of race is being brought into the picture rather apologetically and 
for a slightly strange purpose: although it may seem remote from the topic 
of Shakespeare's genius, Lewis argues, race as an explanation of genius in 
general needs to be discussed here in order that it might be disposed of, 
and so that the mind of Shakespeare can have its isolated autonomy re- 
emphasised. Race is significant to the argument of The Lion and the Fox 
precisely because it is insignificant, or rather, as becomes apparent, 
because Lewis believes that its significance has been wrongly overstated in 
influential accounts of Shakespeare, in particular that of Matthew Arnold. 
Rather than seeking the source of Shakespeare's genius in his race, which 
is what he accuses Arnold of doing, Lewis locates it in Shakespeare's 
negation of his racial background, a feature of genius that Lewis 
generalises: 
Not only genius [... ] but all personality, is raceless for practical 
purposes: for the characteristic work of personality is to overcome 
the mechanical ascendancy of what is imposed on it by birth and 
environment. So, since it illustrates itself by triumph over race, class 
and fashion, these things are rather what it is not, than what it is. 
(LF, 295-6) 
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In this account race is grouped together with class and fashion, 
phenomena which are not normally seen as so directly related to biological 
nature as race, as the heteronomous factors from which `personality' frees 
itself. Race is seen as a determining force opposed to the autonomy of the 
`personality', as one of the many impositions on the self by external 
pressures that the self must overcome in order to become autonomous. 
However, this autonomy does not take the form of a simple opposition, but 
something more like a dialectical progression or aufhebung, in which the 
autonomous `personality' is not a priori opposed to the heteronomy of race 
as an abstract principle, but has to do work in order to become 
autonomous of it, a task for which the tools and energy it uses are provided 
by that which it opposes itself to: `in this struggle [personality] uses 
aptitudes and forces that it derives from the things it is destined to combat' 
(LF, 296). 
This overcoming of `race, class and fashion' is a version of Lewis's 
mind-body drama in which the mind seeks to separate itself from the body 
of which it is a part, and to which, in its freedom, it becomes opposed. 
Lewis's argument is not that the racialised body as a determining 
biological ground for consciousness and identity does not exist; it is that 
the biological can, through the work of the `personality', cease to exist as a 
determining factor for a select few: 
A man's race is the most interesting thing about him, usually - class 
is a parvenu category compared to it. But Shakespeare's race (not his 
nation), if we knew it, would not be the most interesting thing about 
him. [... ] In Shakespeare's case there is less temptation than in that of 
almost anybody to occupy ourselves with where he came from: for 
where he got to is a matter of such great and universal interest that it 
would be sure to dwarf his origins, as it dwarfed his immediate 
environment. However far back you went down the stream of his 
blood, you would not be likely to meet anything so worth your 
attention (however picturesque) as himself. (LF, 295-6) 
The distinction that is made here between men for whom race is `usually' 
the `most interesting thing' about them, and those men for whom race is 
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not, makes clear that Lewis's vision of the negation of race by `personality' 
does not extend to the progressive universalism that a superficial reading 
might suggest, as `personality' is not seen as a universal human attribute. 
Race is still very much the basis of a hierarchical differentiation between 
different types of men but the grounds for the difference is now not 
between superior and inferior races but between those with race and those 
who, by dint of their `personality', have negated it and become raceless. 
This re-formulated racially based prejudice is made clear when Lewis 
writes of his: 
suspicion that very strong race-characteristics in an individual, in 
their face, gait or mental disposition, probably means, at all events 
to-day, that they are not the highest examples of their kind; that had 
they been more creative and mentally active they would not have 
been content to repeat - even physiologically: nor would they have 
followed mechanically the rules laid down by nature and humdrum 
tradition. (LF, 297-8) 
The association of `nature and humdrum tradition' here reinforces the way 
in which, in The Lion and the Fox at least, Lewis associates the biological 
with the socially banal and everyday, and his assertion that the `more 
creative and mentally active [are] not [... ] content to repeat - even 
physiologically' suggests that the person possessed of `personality' or 
`genius' does not only escape social convention but physiological 
convention as well. What this willed non-repetition of the typical `race- 
characteristics' actually means or looks like in practice Lewis unfortunately 
does not explain. 
The association of the idea of race with repetition and `humdrum 
tradition' and the opposition of all these ideas to that of `genius' or 
`personality' reveals the cultural-political basis for Lewis's antipathy to 
race here: as race is essentially a collective category and one to which 
individuals belong irrevocably by the fact of their birth, it defines the 
individual through their relations to others and is not a self-generated 
identity, and so denies the autonomy of the creative individual. This 
essentially heteronomous nature of race, when used as a category for 
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cultural criticism is seen as an idea which lays claim to the true possession 
of individual `genius' and which denies the autonomy of `personality'. Race 
is seen by Lewis as a tool of the collectivist and depersonalising tendencies 
of modernity, another mindless `inferior religion', a point that he makes 
quite clear, writing that he approaches the question of race `as a factor in 
the programme of depersonalization' (LF, 300). Race performs such a 
function because it provides an explanation for the inexplicable and 
individual genius of `personalities' by transferring the responsibility for 
such genius to a collective, rather than individual, agency: 
If a whole race could be found to have conspired in such a result as 
Shakespeare, then such a monstrosity would no longer offend. Or if 
such greatness could be transferred to the shoulders of a race [... ] 
then in a sense "greatness" [... ] has been explained: or rather, pushed 
so far back, and so dispersed, it no longer requires explaining. (LF, 
300) 
Lewis's rejection of race is motivated by his dislike for other people taking 
credit for the artistic achievements of `personalities', a category in which 
he surely included himself as well as Shakespeare. Lewis saw 
Shakespeare's emergence in England as proof of the claims of `personality' 
against those of race: 
He is the greatest poet in the world; and here he is, pat, just where he 
ought not to be, in the middle of an extensive plain, with nothing in 
the surrounding landscape to provide the slightest physical 
explanation of how he got there. When in the midst of such a 
community as the Saxon-English such a personality as Shakespeare 
arises, then there can no longer be any doubt at all - there is such a 
thing as a person after all, and in spite of most people's persistent 
wish that that may be disproved. (LF, 300-1) 
Race, in Lewis's eyes, tends to explain phenomena which do not have the 
`slightest physical explanation' and which he thinks should remain 
unexplained and mysterious, perhaps even in some sense spiritual. It is 
important to note that he does not reject race altogether: as we have seen, 
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for those without `genius' or `personality' race, it is implied, is still `the 
most interesting thing about' them. 
This idea that the basic difference between people is that between 
those with race and those who have negated race provides a fine example 
of the disparity between Lewis's theory and rhetoric of race. After arguing 
the non-racial basis for Shakespeare's genius, Lewis goes on to attack 
Matthew Arnold's book On the Study of Celtic Literature (1867), in which, 
Lewis writes, `you get [the racial] delusion presented in perhaps its craziest 
and most magnificent form. You get in Arnold, in its purest form, the 
pseudo-racial contrast' (LF, 302). Lewis goes on to criticise the book even 
further, writing that: 
Ethnologically, it is true, Arnold's book is worthless: he was not even 
a great student of celtic literature. He only went to the "Celt" 
hurriedly, on a political mission, to get ammunition for his war with 
the "creeping Saxon. " (LF, 306) 
The point Lewis is making here is that the Celt as presented by Arnold is a 
political construction rather than an ethnological reality and that what is 
presented as a race is merely a concept used for an ideological purpose. 
However, Arnold's Celt is not rejected completely, and Lewis goes on to 
write that: 
The only thing in german or latin Europe possessing mysterious 
power and expressing itself with a lovely faultlessness - whether you 
call it "celtic" or leave it merely as an exhalation having its seat along 
the western fringes which were the extreme landmarks of the ancient 
world, influencing the people who settled these like some drug in the 
air - is saluted by Arnold. That he salutes it by the name of "Celt" is 
unfortunate: but what he says, apart from this, is admirably true. (LF, 
307) 
It is not Arnold's values that Lewis is opposed to, but the ground which he 
uses to explain their emergence - race, and the name with which he 
`salutes' them - Celt. Lewis rejects any sort of physical or racial cause for 
the `Celtic' values, claiming instead, as with Shakespeare, that their `genius' 
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came from the transcendence of both the body and race. The name `Celt' is 
retained but modified by Lewis to represent something disembodied rather 
than something grounded in race and the racialised body: `It was the 
disincarnate quality of the fastidious knightliness of welsh myth that 
enabled every country to adopt it at once [... ]. It was as spirits, not as men, 
that these patterns of knighthood descended upon Europe' (LF, 309). 
The fact that for `whatever the reason, they had disposed of all trace 
of race, of feudal machinery, and indeed terrestrial reference altogether' 
was seen by Lewis as `the secret of the celtic success' (LF, 309). The 
argument here is basically the same one used about Shakespeare and his 
`triumph over race, class and fashion' but whereas in the case of 
Shakespeare it was an individual that triumphed over race, in the case of 
the `celtic success' it appears to be a collective group that triumphed over 
race. What exactly the difference is between Lewis's idea of a collective 
group formed by their environment and Arnold's idea of race is unclear. 
Given that Lewis wrote that it was `unfortunate' that Arnold saluted the 
`celtic' values of chivalry by the name of `Celt' it seems bizarre that Lewis, 
two pages on, is doing exactly the same thing and referring to the `celtic 
success' rather than, say, the `chivalric success', and so retaining the racial 
category that he criticised Arnold for using. In this contradiction we can 
see the disparity between the theory and the rhetoric of Lewis's thought on 
race: as much as Lewis wants to get away from the `pseudo-racial contrast' 
of Arnold's criticism, it seems that he has not yet developed an alternative, 
non-racial, vocabulary of his own with which to discuss such cultural 
developments and differences. This situation brings back to mind 
Jameson's description of Lewis's literary practice, in which, he writes, the 
`modernist renewal must be effectuated within the confines of dead 
storytelling conventions which remain massively in place, in a world 
already overinfected with culture and dead forms and with a stifling weight 
of dead ideas. '? If `cultural-critical' is substituted for the word `storytelling' 
we have an accurate description of Lewis's relation to Arnold, at least in 
7 Jameson, Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist, (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979), p. 65. 
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the appendix to The Lion and the Fox, with race as one of the `dead ideas' 
that Lewis's attempted critical renewal is weighed down by. However, 
Lewis is not only `weighed down' by the ideas of race, but actively uses 
some of the rhetoric of race in his criticism. His opposition to Arnold's 
theory of race does not extend to a rejection of the rhetoric of race in cases 
where its imaginative resources can be used for Lewis's own ends. For 
example, Lewis might dismiss Arnold's racial idea of the Celt but he does 
not do the same to the `creeping Saxon', the complement and opposite to 
the Celt in Arnold's schema. In this case Lewis is far less uneasy with using 
Arnold's racial term: in the same passage in which he writes disparagingly 
of the `pseudo-racial contrast' in Arnold's writing and Arnold's idea of 
`what is known as a "Celt"', he writes that `a considerable reality must 
certainly be conceded' to Arnold's `creeping Saxon' (LF, 302). This initial 
dismissal of the racial category of the `Celt' and the retention to some 
degree of the `creeping Saxon' suggests that Lewis is more comfortable 
with the use of race in a derogatory sense than in a positive one: lack of 
culture can be ascribed to race, the possession of culture cannot. 
However, race is retained not only as a derogatory category: Lewis 
sees the attainment of such genius as Shakespeare's as rare and so he 
admits that `race is a very great reality' and goes on to speculate as to its 
influence on creative achievements that, however highly he rates them, he 
considers to be inferior to Shakespeare's, writing of `How amusing it is, for 
instance, to speculate whether the pictorial attainments of the modern Jew 
has its rationale in the turanian intermixture, showing itself so often in the 
features of jewish immigrants' (LF, 298). This `amusement' suggests that 
Lewis's re-formulated racial thinking can tend result in the same old value 
judgements about the inferior, completely racialised, and thus de- 
individualised, achievements of Jews. However, the second example he 
gives of art where `race is a very great reality' is `the ethnologic question 
mark' of `renaissance Italy', whose artistic achievements, he implies, were 
due to the `largely oriental slave population' that `far out-numbered the 
native Romans' and which `left huge deposits of human stocks, opposite to 
those provided by the northern invasion' (LF, 298). The emphasis on the 
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racial mixture in the Roman and modern Jewish populations is not one 
that most European racists of the period would have made, and he goes on 
to make plain that `intermixture' is linked to creativity, writing that `Any 
analysis of a great creative period - and we are concerned with that too - 
must have this chaotic spot in its centre: the incalculable factor of racial 
intermixture' (LF, 298). 
This positive view of `intermixture' is the logical outcome of his 
previous assertion that the `more creative and mentally active [are] not [... ] 
content to repeat - even physiologically', as the issue of such 
`intermixture', commonly seen as being not one thing nor another, can also 
be seen as being something new. By negating in some way the racial 
characteristics of both `parent' races the product of `intermixture' can be 
seen to negate race, in a similar way to `personality'. 
Robert J. C. Young has pointed out that one of the five main 
positions held on miscegenation in the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-centuries was: 
the idea that miscegenation produces a mongrel group that makes up 
a "raceless chaos", merely a corruption of the originals, degenerate 
and degraded, threatening to subvert the vigour and virtue of the 
pure races with which they come into contact [... ]. 8 
However, as Young points out, this `raceless chaos' can be seen as 
subversive of racial theory, as `these "raceless masses" which attain no new 
species through hybridization threaten to erase the discriminations of 
difference: the naming of human mixture as "degeneracy" both asserts the 
norm and subverts it, undoing its terms of distinction, and opening up the 
prospect of the evanescence of "race" as such. ' Young sees this as the `most 
anxious, vulnerable site' of racial theory in which, potentially, `its dialectics 
of injustice, hatred and oppression can find themselves effaced and 
expunged. '9 This idea of a utopian space in which race is done away with is 
8 Robert J. C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, (London & 
New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 18. 
9 Young, Colonial Desire, p. 19. 
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evident in Lewis's praise for the `chaotic spot' of `intermixture': however, 
the creative negation of race by `intermixture' differs fundamentally from 
the negation of race by `personality' in that the former applies to a 
population, perhaps more precisely a `crowd', whereas the latter is a more 
individual affair. In this distinction we can clearly see the outlines of one of 
Lewis's more straightforward racial/national prejudices: the belief that the 
English are more solitary, and therefore more independent and possessed 
of freedom, than either Jews or Mediterraneans. This prejudice can 
perhaps be best seen in the 1924 essay `The Strange Actor' in which Lewis 
writes that `English "independence, " individualism, or whatever you like to 
call it, must be a thing very abhorrent to the Jew' as `an almost morbid 
sociability, clinging gregariousness, and satisfaction in crowds, 
characterizes him'. 10 In the case of Shakespeare, however, this prejudice 
would seem to cut both ways, as the individuality of his `personality' is 
seen as a result of a perceived paucity of creativity in the England in which 
he lived, a situation Lewis described as `his towering and hanging in the 
air, for no reason, where mostly everything is flat' (LF, 299). 
It is also significant that Lewis sees `intermixture' as `incalculable' as 
well as `chaotic', as this demonstrates for him that the problem of race as a 
ground for identity has an epistemological aspect as well as a cultural- 
political one: race might well be a deep cause of culture and cultural 
difference, but it is something `incalculable' that is essentially beyond the 
scope of our knowledge. Lewis expresses this problem in terms of the 
rivalry between class and race as interpretive categories: 
Sometimes the fashionable error of the moment is to neglect the 
factor of race, as though there were no such thing as race, but only 
classes or nations or empires; and sometimes it has been the fashion 
to exaggerate that factor, as though there were not such a thing as 
persons, but only races. Class in these adjustments is, of course, the 
great rival of race: it is also a very much easier thing to fix. Race is for 
10 Wyndham Lewis, `The Strange Actor', in Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change: 
Essays on Art, Literature and Society 1914-1956, ed. Paul Edwards, (Santa Rosa: Black 
Sparrow Press, 1989), p. 9o. 
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the most part too obscure a force for us to be able to organize it into 
anything coherent, so it is perhaps rightly ignored. (LF, 295) 
Lewis is here going against the mainstream of racial thought, as one of the 
main appeals of race seemed to have been its greater fixity as a category 
when contrasted to class in a society where class boundaries were rapidly 
changing. As Zygmunt Bauman has written, `the philosophical essence of 
racism' is that `Man is before he acts; nothing he does may change what he 
is. 'll In this view race is given an ontological primacy and stability that 
phenomena like class simply cannot have, and so it is assumed that 
knowledge based upon race is knowledge of this deeper ontological level, 
making it more real than knowledge based on less deep factors. In the 
passage above Lewis seems to be denying the claims of race as a deeper 
reality by positing it only as an alternative to class, and by apparently 
making the choice as to which of the two to use by reference to their 
epistemological efficacy: because race is `too obscure a force [... ] it is 
perhaps rightly ignored. ' But the uncertainty signalled by that `perhaps' is 
greatly amplified in the sentences that follow: 
In an art-form like elizabethan drama, if the race factor could be got 
at, it might tell us a great deal more than anything else - as it goes 
deeper and farther back - about the impulses at work in it, giving it 
its particular physiognomy. But it is the only thing that is impossible 
to chart. We can only argue, rather uncertainly, from the results, and 
inductively work back to a supposed origin; where some particular 
idiosyncrasy, oddly flowering and challenging our curiosity, suggests 
a new road to the virgin regions behind us. (LF, 295) 
There are two problems in these passages: the reality of race, and its 
epistemological accessibility. Lewis is not so much rejecting the reality of 
race, as I have argued he tends to do in the rest of the appendix, but 
claiming that the reality of race lies at such great a depth that it is not 
knowable to us. Like mainstream racism Lewis here does see race as an 
underlying reality that can explain cultural phenomena like drama better 
11 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), P. 
6o. 
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than class, but unlike most racists Lewis does not claim to have any 
knowledge of this racial reality, as for him it is a force that runs too deep to 
be known. 
This positing of a reality that is so deep and unknowable that 
any claim to knowledge of it is unreal is a conceptual pattern that is not 
unique in Lewis's work; indeed, as shown in Chapter One, it is an idea that 
is central to his work. In The Lion and the Fox race takes the place of `the 
Real', representing a reality that is both fundamental and unknowable. 
Lewis's assertion in Time and Western Man that `we are surface creatures 
only' suggests that if race really does go `deeper and farther back' than 
anything else then it will inevitably be `impossible to chart'. Lewis's 
attitude to race here is also consistent with the idea that `the Real' is 
opposed to and destructive of the personality: race is seen as opposed to 
personality which is said to be `raceless for practical purposes'. The phrase 
`for practical purposes' is reminiscent of other qualifications made by 
Lewis: for example, the idea in The Art of Being Ruled that `Love, as we 
discursively understand it, can only exist on the surface' (ABR, 232), and 
the statement in `The Meaning of the Wild Body' that `to assume the 
dichotomy of mind and body is necessary here, without arguing it' 
('Meaning', 157). In all these cases Lewis's qualifications indicate that his 
statements are not of ultimate truths or of `the Real' but belong to a more 
superficial and human level; a level which is always vulnerable to 
intrusions from `the Real' which it has to repress as a condition of its 
existence. In many ways Lewis's notion of the `raceless' nature of 
personality and genius is similar to his assumption of `the dichotomy of 
mind and body' as both seek to deny `the unity of body and mind', the 
belief which Mosse sees as central to the historical development of racist 
thought. In the terms of Lewis's theory of the comic, race is a matter of 
`things' rather than `persons', which although it makes race a disagreeably 
reductive category for him nevertheless means that it is a very `Real' one. 
In the essays `Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change' (1926) Lewis is 
emphatic in his assertion that race does go `deeper' than anything else: 
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the only true classes (and in consequence the only true wars, if you 
believe in the virtue of the crudest animal combat) are biologic in 
character, and not classes based on wealth [... ]. All other conflicts are 
highly artificial, require a constant political or theologic manipulation 
and a whole gigantic sham structure of hypothesis and illusion to 
sustain them. 12 
The fact that all non-racial conflicts can only be sustained by `a whole 
gigantic sham structure' demonstrated that such non-racial characteristics 
as personality and genius are in Lewis's eyes matters of belief-sustained 
`reality' rather than `the Real'. When read in the light of the ideas discussed 
in Chapter One, there is no contradiction between Lewis's claims that race 
is unknowable and that it is the only truth. The disparity of tone of The 
Lion and the Fox and `Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change' 
highlights the ambivalence of Lewis's thinking on race and on biology in 
general: on the one hand he sees it as `the only true' ground for identity, 
based as it is in `the Real'; but, precisely because of this basis, it is, to 
paraphrase Time and Western Man, to a truth from `beneath the surface' 
which contradicts his values. Race may go `deeper and further back' than 
any other factor, and so provide a solid ground for identity, but it cannot 
ground, indeed it actively undermines, the identity in which Lewis is 
primarily interested - that of the supposedly autonomous genius - and so 
he attempts to relegate it safely to the position of `the only thing that is 
impossible to chart'. As we will see, Lewis cannot get rid of race so easily, 
and even though it theoretically collapses in The Lion and the Fox it soon 
reassembles. 
rr 12 Wyndham Lewis, `Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change' in Creatures of Ha 
and Creatures of Change, p. 144. 
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Paleface: 
`Race or Ideas? ' 
Many of the themes which are tentatively explored in the appendix to The 
Lion and the Fox form the main focus of Lewis's 1929 book Paleface: The 
Philosophy of the `Melting-Pot', in which, as is made clear by both the title 
and the original cover design, 13 the political problems of the `colour line' 
take centre stage. The introduction of the book seems to makes clear 
Lewis's main concern - the future of the white race and of European 
civilisation. Lewis writes that: 
For what our white skin is worth, symbolically or otherwise, it is in 
America that its destinies are today most clearly foreshadowed: the 
essential universality of the problems provided for the Palefaces of 
America by the indian factor in Latin America, by the Negro in North 
America and the West Indies, and by the proximity of Asia to the 
western shores of the United States, makes their attitudes in face of 
them of some moment to Europeans. And though there is no White 
Man's Burden in Europe at present, the isolation of Europe is rather 
artificial; and so, politically, even, the questions lightly touched upon 
in this book are not insignificant. (P, v) 
The language Lewis uses here - in particular his reference to the `White 
Man's Burden' - draws upon the discourse of colonialism, and the idea of 
the `destinies' of `our white skin' suggests that the model of race being used 
is a simple and familiar one. The anxiety expressed about the `problems' of 
racial mixing, which is seen as happening already in America and 
inevitable in Europe, suggests that Lewis has a rather pessimistic, even 
apocalyptic vision of the `destinies' of `our white skin'. This air of anxiety is 
noticeably lacking in the next sentence: `there is an inexhaustible fund of 
simple amusement in consciousness of pigment' (P, v), a statement which 
seems at odds with the apocalyptic tone of the sentences preceding it. This 
disjuncture between the pessimistic and the playful runs throughout the 
13 The original dust jacket is reproduced in Bradford Morrow & Bernard Lafourcade. A 
Bibliography of the Writings of Wyndham Lewis, (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 
1978). 
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book, which is almost impossible to summarise, containing as it does 
moments of unimaginative and depressing prejudice next to cutting 
criticisms of primitivism and some very interesting philosophical and 
political speculation. This heterogeneity of both style and content has 
meant that the book has been interpreted in different ways. Paul Edwards 
writes that `Paleface is in some aspects an excellent essay in cultural 
criticism, ' that extends `the critiques of Time and Western Man' to try and 
prove that: 
The fantasy of a primitive authenticity in other races or cultures, 
romanticised as a transcendent force that might redeem the 
atomisation of urbanism and industrialism of white European 
decadence, is of a piece with other fantasies of hidden "natural" 
power [... ]. As a fantasy of unconsciousness it is indeed, as Lewis 
claims, effectively an embrace of precisely the mechanisation that it 
believes itself to be rebelling against [... ]. 14 
In views such as those of Edwards, Paleface is primarily a critique of 
western attitudes towards different races rather than an attack on the 
values of those races. While there is a lot in Paleface that does do exactly 
that - for example, Lewis's extended dismissal of D. H. Lawrence - not all 
critics have been convinced by this sympathetic reading, Andrea Freud 
Loewenstein, for example, explicitly rejects the claims of Lewis as 
primarily an anti-primitivist, and writes of the book's `blatant and virulent 
racism'. 15 The awkward truth is that both accounts are correct: Lewis does 
attack fantasies of `primitive authenticity in other races' but he also uses 
language which is, as we have seen in the passage quoted above, indebted 
to rather than critical of established racial thinking. To analyse and 
evaluate Paleface properly we should not try and decide which aspect of 
the book is the more prominent or representative but rather try and 
understand how an at times insightful critique of the construction of race 
14 Paul Edwards, Wyndham Lewis: Painter and Writer, (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2000), p. 382. 
15 Andrea Freud Loewenstein, Loathsome Jews and Engulfing Women: Metaphors of 
Projection in the Works of Wyndham Lewis, Charles Williams, and Graham Greene, 
(New York and London: New York University Press, 1993), P. 151. 
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by western artists can be articulated alongside the apparently unreflective 
use of standard racial stereotypes. This mixed position, in which the 
conclusions of both the pro- and anti-Lewis camps are acknowledged, 
should not be seen as an indecisive compromise but as the only way of 
understanding the complexity and contrariness of the text. 
Paleface is concerned with what Lewis sees as the clash between two 
opposed sets of forces which are familiar themes in his earlier cultural- 
critical writings: the rational and the irrational, the intellectual and the 
sensual, the male and the female, the stable and the fluid, space and time, 
the mind and the body. What substantially differentiates Paleface from 
The Art of Being Ruled and Time and Western Man is the inclusion of the 
non-European in the analysis: the criticism in the earlier books was aimed 
at forces clearly perceived as interior to the European world whereas 
Paleface takes America into account as well as looking specifically at the 
representation of non-Europeans - mainly African-Americans and Native 
Americans - in European culture. Lewis characterises the two sets of 
clashing forces as belonging to a `White' and a `Dark' demon, and writes 
that `Against this Dark Demon I oppose everywhere (for the sake of 
argument and "purely and simply to amuse myself") a White Demon or 
daimon; the spirit of the White Race against the spirit of the Dark Race', a 
statement that suggests Lewis had a very simple, black-and-white, 
racialised and racist view of the world. However, he immediately claims 
that it is `the "mystical" "dark" race of the romantic-White imagination' to 
which he is opposed, and not `any flesh and blood Black brother, or fellow- 
slave, of the moment' (P, 147). This move from embodied `race' to 
imagined `ideas' is typical of the book and suggests that `race', in a 
standard biological sense of the word, is not, at least explicitly, Lewis's 
main concern. However, he goes on to write that `With its White Demon I 
believe the White Race can be saved (instead of perishing on its way to the 
Melting-pot)', which suggests that the motivating concern for Lewis is the 
survival of the `White Race' as a race, and not, in his eyes at least, just a 
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product of `the romantic-White imagination' (P, 148). 16 Regardless of what 
it is that defines and grounds these two demons it is clear that Lewis sees 
their mixing as problematic for the `White Race', writing of `the perils for 
our race (in its march towards the Melting-pot) of the "dark" familiars' (P, 
147). In this sentence we can see the characteristic tension between 
separation and aggregation of Lewis's work: although he sees the ultimate 
aggregation of `Melting-pot' as inevitable and not necessarily undesirable, 
he also expresses a desire to keep the `white' and the `dark' separate until 
that ultimate point is reached, a desire whose ultimate futility is 
recognised by Lewis. 
Whether or not the `White demon' and the `Dark demon' should be 
seen in terms of embodied `race' or imagined `ideas' is a question that is 
explicitly discussed by Lewis, a fact that is overlooked by critics hostile to 
the book, and which would seem to problematise the notion that the book 
is simplistically and blatantly racist. I would argue that explicitly 
questioning the value of race as a means to categorise cultural forces is not 
a typical racist strategy, and is something which although it does not 
mitigate the offensive parts of the book does add to the book's interest and 
significance, and demonstrates the complexity and self-conscious nature of 
Lewis's thinking on race. Lewis realises that the issue of the existence of 
race itself is an issue that requires discussion and can not just be tacitly 
assumed: 
There is a great deal of argument today as to whether the idea 
expressed in the proverb that "There are seeds in the body of the hare 
that are fatal to the body of the lion" is a true one or not. One set of 
disputants will tell you that "all people are the same" (in the face of 
much evidence to the contrary); and the other set will tell you that 
East is East and West is West, and that the consciousness of a race is 
deeply fixed, that it obstinately goes on its way, and when its 
consciousness is starved, inhibited or destroyed, it, too, the race, 
16 Two years later in Hitler Lewis spells out what he saw as the political context for this 
`exoticism' in a passage whose astute linkage of the colonial and the primitivist is perhaps 
unexpected in a book which endorses German National Socialism and its race theory: 
`What after all is the Exoticist but the White Conqueror turned literary and sentimental? 
[... ] Mr D. H. Lawrence, five hundred years ago, would have been a Cortes - or nothing' 
(H, 117-18). 
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ceases to exist. Perhaps the truth is not quite on the side of either of 
these disputants, but somewhere else and not to be answered by such 
a simple statement. (P, 155) 
This statement presents what Goldberg calls the `two general forms' of 
twentieth century thinking on race, and it is significant that Lewis does not 
decide in favour of either side but suggests the need for another way of 
looking at the issue: that he does not find such another way, but remains 
trapped in the either/or situation he described was unfortunate. Despite 
this, however, he starts the next paragraph by stating that `there are many 
facts that suggest that a race has a soul (or "consciousness, " or whatever 
you like to call it): that it is vulnerable and of vital importance to the race' 
(P, 155). The evidence that Lewis gives to support this claim comes in the 
form of quotations from the section The Art of Being Ruled that deals with 
homosexuality, an association that is in itself significant, for it links the 
decline of the soul of a race with a decline in male heterosexuality and the 
failure to maintain gender boundaries, a linkage which Lewis does not 
emphasise as much in Paleface as he does in The Art of Being Ruled. In 
The Art of Being Ruled Lewis discusses anthropological accounts of 
homosexuality in the Chukchee people of Siberia, emphasising the 
elasticity of their sexuality and the way which `the males [relapse] into 
what in Sodom are technically called "bitches, " in a process of almost 
physiological transformation' (P, 156). In Paleface he is more interested in 
the way in which the `soul' of the Chukchee collapsed on contact with other 
races, writing that: 
The Chukchee ... 
in spite of their hardiness, are, however, subject to 
annihilating collapses of vitality of which the phenomenon of "arctic 
hysteria" is a celebrated symptom. But another symptom is equally 
striking. Prolonged slumber, lasting many weeks, is common with 
them -a suddenly recurring hibernation or estivation. A man will 
collapse, feeling unwell, and go to bed and sleep, and so remain until 
he either dies or recovers. So the rigour of the climate, claiming of 
them unnatural hardihood and powers of resistance, overwhelms 
them in this way once it passes their guard. After the subjection of 
neighbouring tribes by the Cossacks some fifty years ago, it is said 
that the whole population suddenly collapsed: they lost all interest 
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and zest in life, neglected their usual occupations, sank into a listless 
poverty, and became almost a burden and a menace to their 
conquerors. (P, 156) 
In The Art of Being Ruled Lewis adds that: 
These facts are interesting as showing the precarious nature of this 
sublime hardiness and male virtue that we associate with many 
northern races: how, a spring of activity and the sense of freedom 
once touched roughly, the whole structure of what we connect with 
manhood can crash, in the way the personality of a shell-shocked 
man disintegrates in a moment. (ABR, 260) 
It is interesting that Lewis presents the `collapse' of the Chukchee as being 
a gender problem in The Art of Being Ruled but as a race problem in 
Paleface, not only because it clearly demonstrates the connection between 
the two phenomena in his thought but also because it suggests that Lewis 
does not see the racial characteristic of the Chukchee, about which he is 
largely positive, as something natural but, like masculinity, as something 
artificial and precarious. Rather than being a natural deep cause the racial 
characteristics of the Chukchee are superficial and unnatural - he writes of 
their `unnatural hardihood and powers of resistance' - and their `collapse', 
whether caused by external forces, as in the case of Cossack invasion, or 
internal forces, the spontaneous `Prolonged slumber' Lewis writes of, is 
represented as a fall back into nature from their previous unnatural 
position. It would appear that the racial characteristics of the Chukchee are 
opposed to nature rather than in harmony with it, an idea that sits well 
with Lewis's general antipathy towards the biological as a ground for 
identity. 
So having established, to his satisfaction at least, the reality of racial 
decline Lewis goes on to enquire as to the grounds for the difference in 
races that he sees as causing that decline. In the chapter `Race or Ideas? ' 
Lewis addresses the question of whether cultural differences, which he 
takes as a given, necessarily have a corporeal ground: 
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Is it necessary for this different "consciousness, " between which and 
ours "there is no bridge, no canal or connection, " this soul, to be 
incarnated in a Mexican Indian (or a Hindu, a Polynesian or a 
Bantus, to choose Mr. Lawrence's other examples)? Or can this be 
merely a disincarnate idea? Is the scientist or mathematical man of 
genius as good for those destructive purposes as the Toltec or Hopi? 
Or must it be a race? (P, 170) 
The initial answer to the questions is given in terms of the opposition he 
sees between the belated romanticism of D. H. Lawrence and his own more 
abstract and intellectual outlook. He writes that: 
The romantic side in Mr. Lawrence, his love of the sensationally 
concrete, would always dispose him to seek this situation in the 
physiological clash of races, as others can see it only in classes. He 
sees it as a race situation and also quite conventionally, as a 
conventional and wholly melodramatic race situation. (P, 170) 
Lewis associates Lawrence's outlook with Kipling's, adding that, for 
Lawrence `East is East, and West is West, and the unbridgeable something 
- the alien and unassimilable seed in the matrix of the Indian 
"consciousness, " will not accommodate itself to the White' (P, 170). 
Against what he sees as the romantic, physical, and possibly colonialist 
mentality of Lawrence Lewis sets what he calls his `more abstract 
interests', which, he argues, lead him to `seek it rather in ideas than in 
races' (P, 170), the `it' here being the ground of cultural difference. This 
sort of simple and dualistic opposition between the disembodied 
intellectual classicist and the sensational physical romantic is common in 
Lewis's writing, and, as we have already seen in Chapter Two, is equally 
commonly followed by a series of qualifications which complicate and 
render more interesting what would seem at first a rather rigid and 
unimaginative dualism. In `Race or Ideas? ' Lewis does exactly that, adding 
that: 
the culture of one race, acquiring a political mastery other another, 
and imposing its ideas upon it, is able and very likely to destroy the 
soul and so the physical life of another race. There are too many 
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events that testify to it in recent history for that not to be beyond 
possibility of question. But an idea is quite as powerful. Even a race, 
for that matter, can annihilate another race with a swarm of ideas, or 
intellectualized notions; ideas proper to itself but with properties of 
disintegration for another race; or with ideas not necessarily its own, 
but such as it could manipulate without injury to itself, and which are 
destructive to its adversary. (P, 171 
Here the hitherto opposed notions of `ideas' and `races' are confused and 
conflated, with Lewis casting ideas as being `quite as powerful' as races, 
and writing of them as being able to be used as weapons by races against 
other races, a situation which necessarily implies the existence of races. 
This confusion of race and ideas is also a confusion of the physical and the 
intellectual, with Lewis describing the effects of ideas in terms more 
conventionally used for physical phenomena: ideas come in `swarms', 
`annihilate' races, and are capable of causing `injury' and `disintegration'. 
Lewis seems to be aware that he is confusing what he had previously 
opposed, writing that `If we were in touch with an alien "consciousness" 
[... ] we should find that "consciousness, " no doubt, inimical, confusing and 
dangerous to our vital impulses, as Mr. Lawrence describes' (P, 171-2). 
Lewis's admission that the descriptions of the romantic and 
physically minded Lawrence are applicable and that `our vital impulses' 
are endangered in the event of contact (interestingly, the phrase `in touch 
with', with its distinctly physical connotations, is used) with an alien 
`consciousness', seems to suggest that he does not see the separation 
between race and ideas, between the corporeal and the disincarnate, as 
being one that is absolutely watertight. Just as with his mind-body dualism 
discussed in Chapter Two, clear-cut distinctions are always haunted by the 
possibility of indistinctness. This impression is given further weight when 
he writes that: 
Whites certainly are finding the attack of alien ideas confusing and 
dangerous for their Will and Imagination, just as much as though 
they were clearly, sharply and picturesquely incarnated in some alien 
people, with who we came in daily contact, and who had tested us 
politically. (P, 172) 
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Lewis argues that although it is disincarnate ideas and not corporeal race 
that is the ground of cultural difference it is as though it were race: 
whatever deep cause is chosen the surface phenomena appear the same, 
and so racially based language can be used effectively to describe them. 
Indeed, the apparent identity of `alien ideas' and `alien people' is stressed, 
with Lewis concluding that: `the racial analogy will serve. But you must fix 
your eye on something less palpable - on systems of ideas, and a restless 
mass of theories' (P, 172). Although Lewis consistently argues against the 
idea that cultural difference is grounded in corporeal difference he is 
unable to discard it entirely, and ends up using the corporeal rhetoric of 
race to describe phenomena which he sees as fundamentally non-racial 
and disincarnate. 
This confused approach to race and ideas is given one last, highly 
peculiar, imaginative flourish by Lewis, in an extended metaphor which 
mixes together not only the physical and the intellectual, but also the 
ancient, the non-European, the archaeologist, death, history, refuse, 
infection, and modernist literary practice. He writes that: 
We are almost reminded of the superstitions associated with the 
tombs of the egyptian dead, and the belief in the unlucky nature of 
the enterprise of the excavator: the late Lord Carnavon and 
Tutankamen, for instance. His death seemed to come very suddenly 
after disturbing Tutankamen. - The White Man has unearthed and 
brought to light an enormous historical rubbish-heap: there is 
nothing he has not excavated and brought into his own 
"consciousness" for examination. Some of the distant charms and 
remote systems have released into his "stream of consciousness" 
things that are not healthy for it, perhaps? (P, 172) 
Here the `stream of consciousness' is seen as a blood-stream, and so as 
susceptible to infection in a quasi-physical way. This becoming physical of 
the mental is complemented by the mummified corpse of Tutankamen 
becoming abstracted into a `historical rubbish-heap': just as the mind can 
be affected physically, the dead body can produce intellectual decay. It no 
longer matters whether disembodied ideas or corporeal race is at the root 
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of the disintegration of the consciousness of the `White Man' as the two 
initially opposed concepts have become effectively interchangeable and 
interdependent: the `White Race' is meaningful only because of the `White 
Demon', the `Dark Races' only because of the `Dark Demon' (itself a 
product of the `White Race'). Although he does not say so himself, it seems 
that Lewis's racial terms, like the terms `classic' and `romantic' in Men 
Without Art, are, when looked at closely, `strictly unusable'. 
In The Lion and the Fox, Lewis discusses race primarily as an 
interpretative category, rather than as a historical phenomenon, and 
associates its use as such with the `depersonalisation' that he saw as 
symptomatic of modernity. Three years later, in Paleface, the concept of 
race seemed to have becomes more of a pressing issue for Lewis: rather 
than being apologetically discussed in an appendix, race took central stage 
and provided the unifying theme for a whole book. Even so, we can still see 
considerable doubt about the physical reality of racial difference, 
particularly in the `Race or Ideas? ' chapter, in which the split between 
Lewis's racial theory and rhetoric is clearly demonstrated. Race is in 
Paleface still viewed as essentially a negative phenomenon, the antithesis 
of the individual, independent and disembodied intellect that Lewis 
advocated, and despite some serious qualifications the negative values of 
race are primarily associated with non-white people and the positive 
values of non-race with whites. This splitting of values along a `colour line' 
is partly due to the critical nature of the book, for in part it is the 
attribution of the characteristics of race - instinct, collective existence, 
unconscious creativity - to non-whites by whites, and artists in particular, 
that Lewis is criticising, and so it can be argued that Lewis is being 
negative not about non-whites as such, but about the stereotype created of 
them by some whites. However, this splitting is also perpetuated by the 
book itself, as is shown in the introduction and the chapters on 
miscegenation, which both show a clear and untheorised preference for the 
white over the non-white. There may be no theoretical basis for racism 
expressed in Paleface, indeed theoretically the book is, if anything, anti- 
racist in many ways, but rhetorically there is a great deal of racist 
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expression: the ideas themselves may be innocuous enough, but the way 
they are presented clearly demonstrates that the racist rhetoric of the 
white world being swamped by the non-white is at work. 
The true meaning of Paleface can not be solely attributed to either of 
these two competing aspects of the book - non-racist theory or racist 
rhetoric - but is found in their uneasy coexistence, which demonstrates 
not only Lewis's personal ambivalence about race but also the epistemic 
shift which the concept and theory of race was undergoing in the inter-war 
period. Whereas in the nineteenth century the theory and rhetoric of 
racism were more-or-less still unified and interdependent on each other, 
by the 192os and 3os each had achieved a degree of autonomy which 
meant that racist expressions could be used without the racial discourse 
that had formed their theoretical basis still being believed in. Thus it is 
that in Paleface that Lewis is able to argue against the concept of race 
while still using racist expression for which that concept would appear to 
be a logical necessity. 
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Hitler: 
`The Instinct of the Blood' 
If in Paleface race was still viewed as an essentially negative and non-white 
phenomenon and its reality was still in question, in Hitler (1931) it seems 
to have been uncritically accepted, given a positive meaning, even in its 
most collective and `mindless' aspects, and attributed to whites, that `race' 
whose genius had previously been seen precisely in its capacity to allow the 
emergence of individuals who could negate their racial backgrounds and 
achieve some sort of universal `genius' or `personality'. If we are to 
understand Lewis's attraction to and endorsement of German National 
Socialism within the perspective of his career as a whole, it is this severe 
conceptual change on his part that needs most explanation, rather than his 
sympathy with an aesthetic of order, his attraction to a strong leader 
figure, or even his desire for an alternative to capitalism and communism, 
all of which, while important factors, remain rather straightforward 
explanations and do not register the abrupt philosophical change that 
Lewis underwent. Lewis's support for a doctrine which had the notion of a 
collective consciousness embodied in race as one of its theoretical 
cornerstones must seem strange if viewed in the light of his previous 
thoughts on this subject, but however illogical it might seem it remains a 
historical reality, and one which must be explained. 
Nazi race-theory is not just quietly accepted in Hitler but actively 
discussed: one of the six sections of the book is titled "`Race" and "Class"', 
and another "`All That is Not Race in This World is Dross"', the latter of 
which deals exclusively with race theory. 
Lewis begins "`All That is Not Race in This World is Dross"' by 
suggesting `that you earnestly grapple with the nationalsocialist doctrine of 
Blutsgefiihl [blood-feeling]' because `the whole bag of tricks of 
nationalsocialist theory is contained in that bloody portmanteau-word' (H, 
103). We can see here that Lewis sees blood-feeling as central to National 
Socialist doctrine and not just some incidental and exotic addition, indeed 
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he writes that `Nationalsocialism is founded upon the "Blood-feeling"' (H, 
105). Lewis quotes a passage from the Nationalsozialistische Briefe 
(November 15,1930) in which the writer, in Lewis's translation, declares 
that: 
Nationalsocialism teaches the Age of Blood. Out of the blood-feeling 
a new will to Nationalism and to Socialism shall be born. Out of the 
conscious blood feeling. 
The Middle-ages also lived upon the basis of a blood-connection 
between the individual members of the race. Only then the blood- 
connection was not conscious. The Ethic of the Middle-ages was 
christian. The Blood-metaphysic was suppressed because of the 
monkish asceticism, which always operated in a Blood-denying 
sense, since theirs was a world established only upon mind. The body 
was felt to be a hindrance and denied - attention to the Blood- 
peculiarity stamped out as a sin of the flesh. 
In spite of all these measures against the Blood-instinct, it is 
still alive today. Nationalsocialism builds upon this Blood-feeling. (H, 
105) 
In this passage (which is representative of much of contemporary Nazi 
race thinking) we can see the positive valorisation of several things that 
Lewis had previously denigrated - nationalism, socialism, race, the body, 
instinct - but which he here endorses, writing that: 
The Instinct of the Blood - the bodily pose, colour, shape and smell - 
that is to be the bond - but a bond based upon similarity, not upon 
difference. That profound race-sympathy is to be encouraged at all 
costs: likewise the first instinctive revulsion to all that is strange, and 
belonging to a distinct and alien culture, must not be suppressed, it 
must be enthusiastically admitted to our consciousness and 
entertained. (H, 105-6) 
In Paleface Lewis had written derisorily of `The consciousness in the 
abdomen', which, in his view, `removes the vital centre into the viscera, 
and takes the privilege of leadership away from the hated "mind" or 
"intellect, " established up above in the head' (P, 177). If we look back to the 
passage from the Nationalsozialistische Briefe we can see the praise of a 
consciousness which, grounded as it is in the body and not the mind, 
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seems remarkably similar to the visceral `conscious in the abdomen' that 
was condemned in Paleface as a romantic and anti-authoritarian 
sentimentality. Rather than evading this comparison in Hitler Lewis 
actually introduced it, writing that the Nazi blood-feeling was the same as 
what `Walt Whitman termed "the talk of the turning eyeballs"' (H, lo6). 
Having made the comparison between Nazi blood-feeling and Walt 
Whitman - `with his cosmic enthusiasms, his bursting and blatant 
romanticism, his lyrical cult of a universal brotherhood' - Lewis tried to 
deny its validity, writing that: 
whereas Walt Whitman [... ] sought to enlist this sort of fleshy 
second-sight in the service of diffusion, the present-day Blutsgefühl 
doctrinaires invoke it on behalf of a greater concentration. For the 
american Nineteenth Century prophet would have it employed to 
decipher "the talk of the turning eyeballs" in the heads of whatever 
man they revolved (provided he "went upright" and was certified a 
"human being"). But these newer germanic blood-mystics invoke the 
human body to an end opposite to that of the great revolutionary 
sentimentalist and romantic [... ]. (H, 1o6) 
What `these newer germanic blood-mystics' desired was, Lewis wrote: 
a closer and closer drawing together of the people of one race and 
culture, by means of bodily attraction. It must be a true bodily 
solidarity. Identical rhythms in the arteries and muscles, and in the 
effective neutral instrument - that should provide us with a 
passionate exclusiveness, with a homogenous social framework, 
within the brotherly bounds of which we could all live secure from 
alien interference, and so proceed with our work and with our 
pleasures, whatever they may be. (H, io6-7) 
This stressing of the importance of `bodily attraction', `bodily solidarity', 
and `Identical rhythms in the arteries and muscles' in National Socialism 
suggests the merging of the individual members of a race into one giant 
entity, an image that Lewis had in fact used earlier in the book when 
describing Nazi rallies, in which he wrote that `there was something like 
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the physical pressure of one immense, indignant thought' (H, 1o-11). 17 This 
taking over of individual bodies by an external consciousness and will was 
something that Lewis had previously been highly critical of, associating it 
with mass life in both its capitalist and communist forms. As David Ayers 
writes, `It seems at first strange that Lewis, who praised personality and 
separation from the masses, should now come to praise a collectivism 
which makes each individual the bodily part of one single individual'. 18 
What makes it more strange is that the language he used to describe Nazi 
crowds is remarkably similar to that which he attacked in Paleface: for 
example, he quoted the following passage from Sherwood Anderson's 
Dark Laughter, describing what Lewis calls `the peculiar solidarity of [... ] 
negro workers': 
The bodies of all the men running up and down the landing-stage 
were one body. One could not be distinguished from another. They 
were lost in each other. Could the bodies of people be so lost in each 
other? (quoted in P, 221) 
Lewis replies to this rhetorical question thus: 
The answer of course to that last question [... ] is "Yes they can. It is 
quite easy for White Men, as well as Negroes, to become Mass men, 
`not to be distinguished from one another. ' Intensive Industrialism is 
able to achieve that for you whoever the bosses. " But Intensive 
Industrialism is what Mr. Anderson never ceases to fulminate 
against. And his reasons for hating it appear to be precisely that is 
does merge people in the way that he exultantly describes the Negro 
workers as being merged, in one featureless anonymous black 
organism, like a gigantic centipede. So in the same breath he is 
gloomy and joyful over the same phenomenon! The black skin 
appears to have the power of disguising the reality from him. (P, 221- 
2 
This image of the (racialised) crowd as organism is an image that he had 
already developed in his work, and which in Hitler has had its valorisation 
17 In The Hitler Cult Lewis would describe the same crowd as a `mastodon [... ] the New 
Proletariat in its first months of epileptic life' (HC, 5)- 
18 David Ayers, Wyndham Lewis and Western Man, (London: Macmillan, 1992), P. 197" 
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and context changed. In Hitler Lewis seems to be joyful' about what in 
Paleface he had been `gloomy': in his case, though, it was the white skin 
and the threat he imagined it to be under which had `the power of 
disguising the reality from him. ' In the case of Anderson he writes that a 
`subsidiary confusion is caused [... ] by the fact that the mechanical Negroes 
are given as a characteristic feature of the free natural life of the 
Mississippi before the arrival of Industrialism' (P, 222). The same basic 
confusion is also present in Hitler, in which Lewis writes of Hitler himself 
as a `peasant' and of Nazism as `the militancy of an armed peasant' (H, 32, 
45) and presents both as expressions of a natural and pre-modern 
simplicity, writing that: 
you get in [Hitler], cut out in the massive and simple lines of a 
peasant art, the core of the teutonic character. And his "doctrine" is 
essentially just a set of rather primitive laws, promulgated in the 
interest of that particular stock or type, in order to satisfy its especial 
requirements and ambitions, and to ensure its vigorous survival, 
intact and true to its racial traditions. (H, 31-2) 
This identification of Nazism with some sort of pre-modern peasant 
authenticity fails to register its highly modern character and the fact that it 
was only made possible through the resources, intellectual and 
technological, of modernity: just as Anderson wrongly saw the `the 
mechanical Negroes' as symbolic of the pre-industrial, Lewis wrongly sees 
the very modern phenomenon of Nazism as a continuation of some 
mythical pre-modern ideals. 19 
So Lewis's support for Nazism in Hitler uses images similar to ones 
that he has previously criticised and is subject to precisely the criticisms he 
had made of the `romantic' Sherwood Anderson, but, despite his 
19 Zygmunt Bauman has described the relationship of racism to modernity in terms that 
are very useful, writing that: `Modernity made racism possible. It also created a demand 
for racism; an era that declared achievement to be the only measure of human worth 
needed a theory of ascription to redeem boundary-drawing and boundary-guarding 
concerns under new conditions which made boundary-crossing easier than ever before. 
Racism, in short, is a thoroughly modern weapon used in the conduct of pre-modern, or 
at least not exclusively modern, struggles. ' Modernity and the Holocaust, pp. 61-2. 
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recognition of the similarity between Nazism and the romanticism of 
Whitman, he maintains that there is an essential difference between the 
two movements because the one concentrates, the other diffuses. But what 
exactly is it that is being concentrated? The two most likely possibilities 
would seem to be either Western civilization or the white race, but Lewis 
seems to deny these possibilities. Lewis writes that `romantic cosmos-fans', 
such as Whitman, William Blake, and D. H. Lawrence `prepared the way 
for the disintegration of our Western society' and that `That society was a 
poor thing, but our own, and we surely would have improved it, if we had 
only known how to keep it intact' (H, 107, io8). The use of the past tense 
here suggests that Lewis sees `Western society' as already disintegrated, 
which would make any attempt to prevent that disintegration a futile and 
belated one. Indeed, it is part of Lewis's tragic world-view that modernity 
has irreparably changed the world and that, as desirable as it may be, there 
is no going back. 
So if it is not `Western society' that he wishes to preserve and 
concentrate perhaps it is Western man in a racial sense. This idea is partly 
discredited, with Lewis writing that "`Aryan" is a useful word - it conveys 
something that is well-defined enough, for me at all events, but is 
ethnologically indefensible, I daresay. And I do not pretend myself to 
regard many of their dogmas in detail as acceptable' (H, lo8). If it was the 
`Aryan', or some vision of Western man analogous to it, that Lewis sought 
to preserve and concentrate he was in the strange position of defending an 
ethnicity that he claimed was `ethnologically indefensible', as well as trying 
to halt the disintegration of an already disintegrated society. Despite his 
reservations about both Western society and Western man it is exactly 
these things that he is trying to preserve and concentrate, as he makes 
quite clear a little later: 
So by developing (rather than relaxing, as happens in the 
Cosmopolitan West) the love and understanding of blood-brothers, of 
one culture, children of the same tradition, whose deepest social 
interest, when all is said and done, are one: that is the only sane and 
realistic policy in the midst of a disintegrating world. (H, log) 
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Here the notion of `blood-brothers' seems to replace the notion of the 
Aryan, although what is the difference between them is never explained 
and would appear to be entirely negligible, and what was previously 
disintegrated is now disintegrating, leaving the previously foreclosed 
possibility of regeneration open. Lewis's statement that the Aryan was 
`ethnologically indefensible', made only a page before, seems forgotten and 
an entirely uncritical notion of some sort of Western civilised spirit 
embodied in the blood seems to have been adopted in spite of it. This idea 
of a new racial consciousness for white Europeans had already been aired 
in Paleface, where Lewis wrote that: 
I really believe that we could, if we wanted to, get up quite a fellow- 
feeling for our fellow Palefaces. What I fear is that as things stand at 
present it would immediately result in our looking askance at our 
Black and Yellow brothers: for everybody has been so long 
indoctrinated with intolerant attitudes of mind, that dogmatical 
mechanical reversals have become the only way that the average 
Paleface is now able to express himself at all. (P, 20)20 
With the publication of Hitler and Lewis's accommodation and 
endorsement of the `ethnologically indefensible' concept of the Aryan it 
seems that Lewis himself had been subject to just such a `dogmatical 
mechanical reversal'. The fact that Lewis had accurately described a 
process which he would undergo two years later should not be seen to 
mitigate his support for Nazism, but the way in which the earlier text 
seems to anticipate, at least on a conceptual level, his later political 
development is significant, for it suggests that there is a continuity 
between the texts on the level of conceptual patterns if not on the level of 
20 Lewis goes on to write that: `As far as I am concerned I would rather have things as they 
are than provoke in any way a reactions of intolerance. But there is no fear of that for the 
moment: and when the reactions comes, as it must, I hope that what I shall have had to 
say will serve to make its manifestations less ridiculous, and to offer some resistance to 
the colour-blind fanatic who can only see one colour at a time, as it were, and not 
simultaneously embrace a walnut brown and an ivory white, as we should be able to do 
with ease and conviction' (P, 21). As in The Hitler Cult ten years later, Lewis seems keen 
to reserve his own personal right to miscegenation. 
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values. It is as if Lewis had mapped out a series of possible positions which 
remained present throughout his career but that which of those positions 
was seen as favourable and which as not changed, as we can see in the 
changing fortunes of the ideas of a bodily based consciousness or of the 
crowd functioning as a single organism. 
There is in these passages a strong sense of double-think: Lewis is 
defending the indefensible, falling back on concepts that he has previously 
attacked, and resorting to empty assertions like `it conveys something that 
is well-defined enough' which unsuccessfully tries to hide the fact that the 
`something' that is conveyed is a `something' that he finds `indefensible'. 
Indeed, later on in the text, Lewis writes that: 
under the compulsion of emergency conditions, values change, and 
we are forced to admit arguments which, in other circumstances, we 
might regard as unsound. In brief, we are compelled, I think, to lay 
more stress upon what is pragmatical and useful, and less upon what 
is perhaps eternally true. It is a case of force majeure. I surrender, 
therefore, to the argument of the Fox and the Goose, the Cat and the 
Mouse. - We are in the greatest danger. Gentleness, beauty, sweet 
reason must veil their heads, they must give way to arguments of 
power. (H, 129-3o)21 
The admission that his acceptance of Nazi race theory is a matter of 
pragmatism and surrender rather than one of eternal truth, and the 
comment that these are arguments `which, in other circumstances, we 
might regard as unsound' hardly forms a ringing endorsement of the Nazi 
position and would seem to serve badly as propaganda. 
21 In Men Without Art Lewis uses a similar justification and the same terminology to 
argue that all politics are useless: `But this is not a question of right and wrong, but of 
force majeure. That is why it is a pure waste of time to discuss solemnly the rights and 
wrongs of the matter. Nature (aided by science) is too bountiful: but the human power- 
complex (aided by science) is too powerful! So there you are. Most economists talk as if it 
were a purely mechanical problem with which they were confronted - as if, in fact, it were 
always the same dear old Nature that was in front of them. But of course it is just the 
opposite. It is nature all right - but it is human nature this time. And it is because it is a 
purely human problem that it is so hopeless. It is best therefore never to discuss these 
matters [i. e. party politics and economic reform]' (MWA, 199). 
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In his book Wyndham Lewis and Western Man (1992) David Ayers 
sees Lewis's turn to race in Hitler as a reaction to his failure to find a stable 
ground for individual identity in the self: 
Where the concept of the self will not suffice to guarantee the 
existence of the individual, the concept of the European must step 
into the breach. Lewis advocates no justification for the concept. 
Although "blood" is the basis of race, Lewis is careful, [in Paleface] as 
in Hitler, to set it between inverted commas, deleted at the moment 
of utterance and thereby rendered irrelevant to the concept of race, a 
concept which, in its turn, is unthinkable without "blood". It is in the 
nature of Lewis' metaphysic to demand definition and delineation yet 
to undermine whatever distinction is drawn as arbitrary, 
fundamentally illusory. 22 
Ayers portrays Lewis as a proto-Derridean racist who places race under 
erasure to maintain a politically correct facade, and does not consider the 
possibility that he may have had serious doubts about the concept of race. 
Lewis does not just `advocate no justification for the concept' of race, he 
argues against it in The Lion and the Fox and Paleface, and displays 
uneasiness about it in Hitler even as he endorses it. Of course, this 
inconsistency does not redeem Lewis politically but merely indicates that 
his attitude to race is not as simple as Ayers suggests. Ayers' insight into 
what he calls Lewis's `metaphysic' is instructive, but he does not fully 
explore its implications for Lewis's `hypothetical premises about human 
kinds', to use Goldberg's phrase. 23 In particular, Ayers does not look at the 
question of Lewis's attitude to biological determinism: his assertion that 
the Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg's statement that "`the permanent lie 
is the `organic truth' of the Jewish counter-race" [... ] is a statement not far 
from Lewis' own' does not take into account the question of whether Lewis 
saw `organic truth' in any race. 24 
Lewis claims in Hitler that his support of Nazism is a political choice 
based on expediency rather than a philosophical choice based on truth. He 
22 Ayers, Wyndham Lewis and Western Man, pp. 193-94" 
23 Goldberg, Racist Culture, p. 47. 
24 Ayers, Wyndham Lewis and Western Man, p. 31. 
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claims that he has been forced to make such a choice because of 
`emergency' conditions, with the strong implication that if it were not for 
those, he would not endorse Nazism and in particular its race theory. 
Lewis writes that: 
Really, the point is, I think, that we "Aryans, " or whatever we are, are 
faced with extinction. We cannot afford just now to be philosophers, 
nor yet humanitarians. No one will be philosophical, nor yet 
humanitarian, with us. Yes, the above argument of Hitler's is an 
argument for an emergency. Everything now almost, since the War, 
seems a matter of life and death. It is not an argument for the 
scientific mind, but for the political mind. (H, 127-8) 
Lewis's position could perhaps be described, using the words of Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, as `a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a 
scrupulously visible political interest. '25 However, although Lewis's politics 
are not disavowed they are not exactly `scrupulously visible' either: he feels 
that `we' are faced with extinction, although he cannot explain exactly who 
this `we' is or what or who it is that poses the threat. His use of the word 
`Aryans' in inverted commas and its qualification by the phrase `or 
whatever we are', does not testify to any deep commitment to the concept 
of the Aryan race, but rather suggests that he is using this word because he 
cannot think of any others that will do. 
The `argument of the Fox and the Goose' Lewis refers to above, is his 
term for the arguments against miscegenation that formed an important 
part of Nazi race theory. Lewis paraphrases a passage from Mein Kampf in 
which, according to Lewis, Hitler `directs your attention to the particular 
pragmatical truth' of `the exclusiveness of Nature, in respect of the various 
life-forms to be found in the animal creation. ' Lewis cites the assertion that 
`Nature registers her protest' against miscegenation by either making its 
issue infertile or by `robbing them' of resistance `against sickness or enemy 
attack' (H, 125). Lewis's endorsement of such an argument here would 
25 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, `Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography', first 
published 1985, in The Spivak Reader, eds. Donna Landry & Gerald MacLean, (New York 
& London: Routledge, 1996), p. 214. 
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seem to entail a reversal of his earlier view in The Lion and The Fox that 
`the incalculable factor of racial intermixture' was central to `Any analysis 
of a great creative period' (LF, 298). Lewis goes on to write that 
this reasoning is intended to conduct us, it is obvious, is to a sense of 
the danger inherent in the drying-up or the blunting of our primitive 
instincts, which permits us to mate with people of an inferior race. 
(Racial "inferiority" and "superiority" is taken for granted almost. In 
any case, "I am superior to you" is the instinctive attitude of any 
living organism. ) Such a "bastardization" is race-suicide (for Nature 
will rapidly revenge herself upon us) - even though it may be 
certainly, in some cases, for the individual, something like the 
enjoyment of a maggoty cheese - much better fun than homely 
Cheddar! And this is not a moral consideration at all: it is a purely 
practical one. Race-loyalty is one of the elementary conditions of self- 
security and of self-survival. (H, 125-6) 
This is all fairly standard racist doctrine, although the reference to `the 
enjoyment of a maggoty cheese' perhaps goes further in its admission of 
`illicit' desires than mainstream Nazi propaganda. Race and race-survival 
are seen as natural and primitive instincts which do not need any 
additional justification, and as is indicated by the last paragraph, this 
notion of racial survival has a parallel in the survival of the self. David 
Ayers has suggested that Lewis's turn to Nazism occurred because Lewis 
came to see the preservation of the race as the only practical means of 
preserving the individual self. 
However, there is another instance, apart from the `maggoty cheese', 
where the assumption of racial superiority becomes a little problematic, 
namely the assertion that it `is the instinctive attitude of any living 
organism. ' This statement seems to universalise the sense of superiority - 
`any living organism', not even any human - and to subjectivise it as well - 
superiority is seen as the `attitude' of an organism towards itself and 
others, rather than as an objective biological fact. This subjectivisation of 
the sense of racial superiority involves a relativisation of racial hierarchy as 
well, in which racial values depend upon the position of the evaluating 
subject rather than an objective natural order. In Lewis's view it appears 
that all organisms have a subjective feeling of superiority, not only 
200 
Chapter Four: Race 
`objectively' superior ones, an opinion that would seem at odds with Nazi 
ideology, which saw only one point of view - that of the Aryan race - as 
valid and as such overriding of all others. Lewis's relation of natural 
hierarchy to subjective view point is apparent in the following passage, 
which takes the animal analogies used by Hitler and treats them with 
something less than seriousness: 
Why the donkey may not with impunity mate with the horse, is 
because the latter is the nobler animal, apparently. 
There is a difficulty here: for we are inclined to ask whether 
there is anything ultimately more desirable in being a horse rather 
than in being a donkey. On the face of it, a racehorse would be a 
jollier thing to be, it is true, than any moke that ever brayed. If it 
really came to the point, most of us given the choice would find 
ourselves in a racing-stable rather than chewing a turnip. Yet there is 
always something to be said for the donkey. It might even be the 
philosopher's choice. But it would never be the man-of-action's. (H, 
127) 
Given that Lewis saw himself more as a philosopher than as a man of 
action, he seems here to be identifying to some extent with the donkey, the 
animal that is generally assumed to be inferior. I am not suggesting that 
this redeems the book Hitler from its support of Nazism but merely 
pointing out that Lewis's attitudes toward race as articulated in his first 
and most famous `fascist' text are hardly identical with a self-confident or 
self-serving racism, but instead are self-conscious and ambiguous. That 
ambiguity and self-consciousness should enter the text at the point when 
race, and specifically racial superiority, is being discussed is significant for 
it suggests that this is a point where Lewis cannot accept wholeheartedly 
the Nazism he is in the process of supporting. I would argue Lewis's 
identification with the donkey quoted above indicates that he did not share 
the self-confident sense of biological superiority that was fundamental to 
the Nazi project. Nazi racial ideology involved the assumption of a 
distinction between the fully human and the sub-human, and while Lewis's 
work, both fictional and theoretical, attests to his fascination with the 
boundary between the human and the non- or sub-human he did not seem 
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able to place himself so automatically as could the Nazis on the side of the 
unequivocally human. Lewis was undeniably attracted to Nazi race theory 
and to the corporeal ground for politics it offered; however, despite his 
rhetorical endorsement of it, he did not find that ground to be as stable as 
it appeared. 
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The Hitler Cult: 
`Such a boomerang is a race theory' 
One of the best places to go for criticism of Lewis's endorsement of Nazi 
race theory is his own 1939 book The Hitler Cult, in which he put forward 
arguments against both Hitler, now seen as a `Jingo God', and Nazism, `the 
philosophical stuffing of the Jingo God' (HC, x). In this later book Lewis 
quotes the passage from Mein Kampf on miscegenation which he had 
approvingly paraphrased in Hitler (see above and H, 125-6) and argues 
against it, as, he claims, his pride is `slightly ruffled by the above zoological 
catalogue'. Lewis writes that: 
in reading the above passage I find that I object to the suggestion that 
my freedom of action should be curtailed, as if I were a finch or a 
wolf, creatures of so much more limited aptitude than myself. 
If I wanted to, I should certainly cohabit with a Negress, or wed 
(if I were not already married) Anna May Wong, if that beautiful 
Chinese and myself were of a mind to become man and wife. As to a 
Jewess, that is not an ethnological term, but belongs to a widely 
distributed and extremely mixed community. (HC, 67-8) 
Lewis objects to the metaphorical treatment of humans as if they were 
animals, a perennial concern and interest of his, as here he sees it as 
threatening his own status as human, and to the curtailment of his own 
personal freedom to indulge in miscegenation. It seems that he has 
returned to his earlier position of seeing biological categories as essentially 
restrictive and opposed to the freedom of the `personality'. However, his 
statement that `Jewess [... ] is not an ethnological term' suggests that he 
thinks that `Negress' and `Chinese' are, a suggestion supported by his later 
claim that 
a "colour-bar, " not only social, but also biological, does exist; and is 
quite sufficiently effective to prevent any really unsuitable cross- 
breeding. It is certainly powerful enough to discourage the 
magnificent Nordic Aryans of New York City from inter-marrying 
with the Negro to any great extent: or to put it in another way (and 
one of a type less familiar to the mind of Herr Hitler), to prevent the 
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Negroes from going out of their way from mixing with the Whites. 
(HC, 68-9) 
This invocation of the `colour-bar' does seem to suggest that Lewis might 
be less free to `cohabit with a Negress' than he first thought (it is 
interesting to note that Lewis imagines himself cohabiting with a Negress, 
but wedding a Chinese), although he does go on to write that `there have 
been many White Europeans, and not the least gifted among them, who 
preferred the dark skin to the fair. Gaugin [sic] and Baudelaire are 
hackneyed examples' (HC, 69). It is significant that he associates the 
transgression of this natural `colour-bar' with artists as it suggests that, as 
in The Lion and the Fox, race is still seen as a `very great reality' but only 
for those without `genius': those with genius are seen as able to transcend 
race, sexually at least. 
Lewis's appeal to `nature' as a guarantor of order is a confused 
business: he goes on to write, using the animal metaphors he dislikes, that 
`it is far better to leave these things to nature. Nature is not a pedant, not a 
patriot, but in her rough-and-ready way she sorts out the sheep from the 
goats. [... ] Nature is, if anything, too zealous a divider' (HC, 69). Lewis 
then, after commenting that `the Negro has displayed a certain lack of 
empressement in ascending the cultural ladder', turns his attention to the 
`Nazi objections to the participation of "Afro-Americans' in the Berlin 
Olympic Games' on the grounds that they should be considered as animals 
and so disqualified (HC, 70). Lewis asks whether `if you equate deer and 
Negro, does it mean that you reserve to yourself, because of your white 
skin, the privileges that as a man you possess over the quadruped? ' (HC, 
71) His response is that although `You would not eat him [... ] you might 
find it convenient to shoot him' (HG, 71), a response which correctly sees 
the murderous implications of the dehumanisation inherent in Nazi race- 
theory. Lewis sees this dehumanisation as ultimately rebounding on to the 
Nazis themselves, writing that: 
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all such ways of thinking as those propagated by the Nazis do involve 
inhumanities [... ]. But if you yourself become inhumane, it would 
seem to follow that you descend into a class yourself that is less than 
human. And then (on the analogy of the Negro and the deer) people 
will begin to feel that you are fair game as well: that it is in order to 
pot you just as we shoot animals. Which is exactly what is happening 
in Europe to-day. 
By putting others outside the human canon the Germans have, 
in the sequel, manoeuvred themselves into the same undesirable 
position. Such a boomerang is a race theory, after all. (HC, 71-2) 
Sixteen years later this point was made about colonialism by the 
Martiniquan poet and politician Aime Cesaire, who, using strikingly 
similar language, wrote that: 
colonization, I repeat, dehumanises even the most civilized man; [... ] 
the colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit 
of seeing the other man as an animal, accustoms himself to treating 
him like an animal, and tends objectively to transform himself into an 
animal. It is this result, this boomerang effect of colonization that I 
wanted to point out. 26 
In both cases the argument is basically the same: any system of ideas that 
sees others as subhuman in some way creates a category that will 
`boomerang' back on to the people who originally constructed the system 
of ideas for their own benefit, or, as Lewis put it `once you start erecting 
barriers you are apt to end by finding yourself outside, instead of inside, as 
you had thought' (HC, 72). What is interesting about Lewis's position in 
The Hitler Cult is that he invokes and constructs barriers as well as 
offering the above critique of them: the usual disparity between his racial 
theory and his racial rhetoric is at work. This can be seen in his use and 
rejection of zoological metaphors for humans, his approval of 
miscegenation and his invocation of the `colour-bar', and his own lazy 
racism and his sound objections to Nazi racism. In all these cases Lewis is 
seemingly attracted by racial rhetoric as a way of describing others but is 
26 Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, first published in French 1955, trans. J. 
Pinkham, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 41. 
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also aware of the `boomerang effect' of such rhetoric, the way in which, 
theoretically at least, it rebounds to affect his own status as human. As 
with Paleface the true meaning of The Hitler Cult cannot be found by 
choosing between the two positions - racist or anti-racist - contained 
within the text but is rather to be located in their coexistence: it is in the 
coming together of the `two general forms' of twentieth-century thinking 
on race, as identified by Goldberg, within a single argument that the 
meaning of The Hitler Cult and Lewis's writing on race in general is to be 
found. The first of those `two general forms', the one which `accepts the 
standard biological sense of race' and sees it as a reality underlying social 
epiphenomena, was very much a reaction to the transformation and 
destabilising of pre-modern guarantors of order and meaning - relatively 
unchanging social status, religion - whereas the second, which saw race `as 
mystificatory, a form of (self-deceived) false consciousness or misleading 
ideology', can be seen as a response to the reaction by those who stood to 
benefit the most from the possibilities that modernity brought with it. 
Lewis is trapped between these two positions: the first represents many of 
the values - aloofness, stability, hierarchy - that he wanted to preserve but 
to which, as an avant-garde artist of dual nationality, no `breeding', and 
uncertain finances, he had no `natural' or inherited claim; whereas the 
second held open the possibility that `men from nowhere' like himself 
could gain some of the privileges previously only available to the 
established elites, although it simultaneously undermined the structures 
and assumptions that had underpinned and made possible such privilege. 
Zygmunt Bauman emphasises the importance of boundaries in 
modern racism, writing that `Whatever remained of old boundaries needed 
desperate defence, and new boundaries had to be built around new 
identities - this time, moreover, under conditions of universal movement 
and accelerating change. '27 Boundary drawing is clearly of importance to 
Lewis, and almost everywhere in his work he insists on the bounded and 
defined against the unconstrained and amorphous, but it is an almost 
27 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 60. 
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abstract activity, detached from any stable referent or values: Lewis 
wanted there to be boundaries but he could not actually specify what it was 
that needed `desperate defence' and so the boundary-drawing exercise 
became something like an empty formal gesture. The boundaries that 
others drew around bodies, or on the basis of bodily difference, were 
replicated in Lewis's work but the bodily basis could not be replicated so 
easily and in effect the boundaries became groundless, referring to a vague 
idea of clashing consciousnesses that seemed to be, on the level of rhetoric 
at least, based on the body, but ultimately was not based on anything other 
that a perceived but unjustified need for there to be boundaries in place to 
protect something equally unspecified. 
Lewis, as we have seen in The Hitler Cult, was at times aware of the 
impact of boundary drawing on those who did the drawing but also felt a 
need for a clarity and rigidity in social order and a clear distinction 
between different types of people that required boundaries. Because of the 
rapid social changes that occurred in modernity social boundaries and 
separation could no longer just be assumed but had to be actively 
constructed: with specific reference to the Jews Bauman writes that 
With the rise of modernity, separation of the Jews did become an 
issue. Like everything else in modern society, it had now to be 
manufactured, built up, rationally argued, technologically designed, 
administered, monitored and managed. 28 
In his discussions of race Lewis seems to be aware of this newly artificial 
nature of racial boundaries: despite his sporadic appeals to nature, the 
racial boundaries he invokes are overwhelmingly selected on grounds of 
what he sees as political expediency - they are expressions not of a natural 
order, but of an artificial order that he hopes will work to ensure his own 
safety. Lewis wrote in The Art of Being Ruled that: 
28 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 57. 
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the character of our civilization, as defined by the great discoveries of 
modern science, with their unifying effect, must tend very rapidly not 
only to world-wide standardization, but to racial fusion. Or rather, 
this must be the consequence of the new conditions, unless this 
process is artificially held up, and national idiosyncrasies and 
differences artificially preserved and fostered, [... ]. (ABR, log) 
His appeal to the `ethnologically indefensible' concept of the Aryan race in 
Hitler can be seen as an attempt to `artificially' hold up such a `racial 
fusion' and while I do not want to excuse in any way the stupidity of his 
support for Nazism, it is important that we remain aware of the ambiguous 
position of the concept of race in Lewis's work and do not lazily assume 
that he simply reflected uncritically the standard doctrine of the Nazis. 
Indeed, given his ambiguous attitudes towards the reality of the body and 
its place in determining consciousness it should come as no surprise that 
Lewis did not share the faith in biologically grounded accounts of identity 
and the sense of self-evident biological superiority that were central to 
Nazi racial thinking. 
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America and Cosmic Man: 
`The Case Against Roots' 
The antipathy Lewis expressed to race in The Lion and the Fox and to 
roots and `the Real' in Time and Western Man was given one final airing in 
America and Cosmic Man (1948), in which he presented an illusory vision 
of the United States of America as a place in which all roots are erased and 
people somehow exist in a disembodied and entirely superficial paradise. 
Lewis begins his argument by contesting what he sees as the generally 
accepted `notion that to have roots (as if one were a vegetable or a plant) is 
a good thing for a man: that to be rootless is a bad thing for a man' (ACM, 
164). Lewis states that the `exact contrary, of course, is the case' and that 
`to be rooted like a tree to one spot, or at best to be tethered like a goat to 
one small area, is not a destiny in itself at all desirable' (ACM, 164-5). To 
be rooted is somehow to be less than human, it is a state, in Lewis's eyes, 
that is animal or vegetable: yet again the issue of race and origins blends 
into the question of what it is to be human, of what it is that separates and 
makes humans distinct from lower forms of life. Lewis writes that: 
I feel most at home in the United States, not because it is intrinsically 
a more interesting country, but because no one really belongs there 
any more than I do. We are all there together in its wholly excellent 
vacuum. 
The sight of the root depresses me; and I know in that country 
that everyone has left his roots over in Poland or Ireland, in Italy, or 
in Russia, so we are all floating around in a rootless elysium. (ACM, 
165) 
This utopia of superficiality is characterised by `a most pleasant 
disembodied sensation' and as an `escape from the family' (ACM, 167) and 
it seems that Lewis envisages the United States of America as a place 
where one also escapes any significant contact with other people: 
I am quite serious when I say that this is what Heaven must be like - 
agreeably inhuman, naturally; a rootless, irresponsible city [... ], 
where the spirit is released from all the too-close contacts with other 
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people (others who get "in your hair, " or are all the time "underfoot") 
but where everything is superficially fraternal. (ACM, 167) 
Lewis can ultimately only imagine an escape from roots, from what he sees 
as the determining presence of the racialised or nationalised body, as an 
escape from the body and from those `others who "get in your hair"', that is 
to say as escape from human reality altogether. The release of the `spirit' 
he imagines happening in America is also an `escape from the family', that 
is an escape from those others who are directly responsible for one's own 
physical existence. For Lewis, it seems, the very fact that people are born, 
that people are bodies which emerge from the body of another, means that 
complete freedom and autonomy can never be achieved. The anti-racist 
strand in Lewis's thought ends up as thoroughly anti-biological and anti- 
human: Lewis does seem to be able to imagine bodies that are not 
racialised or nationalised in some way and so the only way he can imagine 
an escape from the racial and national conflict of Europe is to escape from 
both Europe and the body entirely and enter into an utterly superficial 
image of America, that exists only as a disembodied and post-modern 
illusion in Lewis's own imagination. 29 Rather than re-imagine the body in 
a non-racial way Lewis ended up imagining it away altogether, in a move 
which displays the inattention to and non-recognition of physical reality 
that his best work warns against. America and Cosmic Man brings 
together Lewis's antipathy to both `the Real' and `race' in a vision of 
America in which awkward materiality has been entirely disposed of, and 
the physical world with all its entanglements and connections has become 
nothing but an ungrounded world of superficial images. However, as 
Lewis's fiction shows, `the Real' can not be avoided entirely, and the 
complacent idealism of America and Cosmic Man is just a fantasy, in the 
29 Dennis Brown has argued that America and Cosmic Man `prophesies the postmodern': 
this may well be the case, but the vision of `postmodernity' that Lewis prophesies is an 
entirely crass and unreal one. See Dennis Brown, `Prophesying the Postmodern: 
Wyndham Lewis's America and Cosmic Man' in Wyndham Lewis Annual, (Vol. 5,1998), 
pp. 9-22. 
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common sense of the word -a deluded and ungrounded piece of wishful 
thinking that cannot be sustained in the real world. 
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The question of the relationship of the individual to the crowd is a central 
one in Lewis's work, as it is in the culture of modernity in general. In this 
chapter I will examine Lewis's treatment of the crowd and chart the 
changes in how he imagines it and conceptualises its relation to the 
individual. I will look at one of Lewis's early fictional works, `The 
Crowdmaster' (1915) and the revised version of it published in Blasting 
and Bombardiering (1937); `The Code of a Herdsman' (1917), a fictional 
manifesto published as a supplement to the Imaginary Letters discussed 
in the Introduction; a number of essays from the 192os and 1930s -'Essay 
on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time' (1922), `The Politics of Artistic 
Expression' (1925), `The Foxes' Case' (1925), and `The Artist as Crowd' 
(1932); and finally the satirical novel The Apes of God (1930). 
Lewis did not have a single consistent attitude to the crowd or to the 
individual but throughout his work some persistent images, ideas, and 
patterns can be discerned: that not everyone is an individual; the crowd as 
an undifferentiated mass; the crowd as feminine; the crowd as hostile to 
the individual; the individual as vulnerable to the crowd; the 
interdependence of the individual and the crowd. The recurrence of images 
of the crowd in his work attest to its significance for Lewis, the variety of 
those images to the fact that it was a problematic phenomenon for him. 
Lewis was, of course, not the only modern intellectual concerned with the 
crowd. In his extremely useful history of crowd theory, The Crowd and the 
Mob: From Plato to Canetti (1989), J. S. McClelland charts the way it 
emerges and develops in modern times in the work of thinkers such as 
Thomas Carlyle, Hippolyte Taine, and Gustave Le Bon. McClelland argues 
that `the Western tradition of political thought' begins with the `profoundly 
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anti-democratic bias' of classical theorists such as Plato. ' Although 
McClelland is careful to document the classical origins of crowd theory, he 
sees the `mid nineteenth century' as the `turning point in the history of the 
idea of the crowd', writing that `from that time onwards at least any 
exercise in social theory which did not make room for the crowd at its 
centre looked makeshift, mistaken, or wilfully obtuse'. At this point in 
history, `The crowd', McClelland writes, `began to appear in any number of 
different guises: frenzied mob, misunderstood people, duped politics- 
fodder, vehicle of the ancient urge for justice, agent of regression to an 
animal past, threat to the present, hope for the future'. 2 Some of these 
guises, most notably the more pessimistic ones, play a significant role in 
Lewis's work. 
McClelland argues that: 
This important theoretical shift towards the crowd has its parallel in 
the world of politics. The crowd was claiming more of the attention of 
rulers at the same time as it was pushing its way into the centre of 
theoretical concern, and after 1848 a large part of the story of the 
invention of the modern state, its secret and not so secret police, its 
laws and gaols, its list of suspects and its contingency plans, its first 
tentative movements towards social welfare as a social palliative and 
its longing for conscription as a way of disciplining the unruly (the 
English crowd psychologist Wilfred Trotter called the armies of the 
Great War "killing crowds") could be written as the modern state's 
attempt to accommodate itself to and to cope with the crowd. The 
crowd was fast on its way to become a permanent threat to 
established patterns of social living, to a stable political order, and to 
a received notion of culture. 3 
Lewis's work is inspired not only by the crowds of revolutionary France 
and the `killing crowds' of the Great War, but also by the crowds of the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 and the crowds of the British General Strike of 
1926, an event which he saw as a failed revolution. 4 Lewis's work is 
1 J. S. McClelland, The Crowd and the Mob: From Plato to Canetti, (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), P. 2. 
2 McClelland, The Crowd and the Mob, p. 3. 
3 McClelland, The Crowd and the Mob, p. 3. 
4 See Edwards, Wyndham Lewis, pp. 304,341-2. 
213 
Chapter Five: The Crowd 
therefore informed not only by the idea of the crowd as a lethal threat but 
also by the idea that it can be nothing more than an absurd spectacle, 
effecting no real change. Lewis has a perception of the crowd as both 
threatening mob and manipulable mass, as a revolutionary force and the 
passive fodder of consumer society. 
I will not dwell on the detail of the history of crowd theory, but it is 
worth noting, in light of the ideas discussed in Chapter One, that 
associations had been made between the crowd and problems of reality. 
Thomas Carlyle, for example, in The French Revolution (1837) sees the 
crowd as an irruption of genuine reality into a world of staid appearance: 
Man's Existence had for long generations rested on mere formulas 
which were grown hollow by course of time; and it seemed as if no 
Reality any longer existed, but only Phantasms of realities, and God's 
Universe were the work of the Tailor and the Upholsterer mainly, and 
men were buckram masks that went about becking and grimacing 
there, - on a sudden the Earth yawns asunder, and amid Tartarean 
smoke, and glare of fierce brightness, rises SANscuLOZ-rIsM, many- 
headed, fire-breathing, and asks: What think you of me? Well may 
the buckram masks start together, terror-struck; "into expressive 
well-concerted groups! " It is indeed, Friends, a most singular, most 
fatal thing. Let whosoever is but buckram and phantasm look to it: ill 
verily may it fare with him; here methinks he cannot much longer be. 
Wo also to many a one who is not wholly buckram, but partly real 
and human! The age of Miracles has come back! 5 
Carlyle's images of men as `buckram masks' is not dissimilar to the unreal 
world imagined by Lewis in The Revenge for Love and elsewhere, but the 
glee with which he relates the violent rise of the crowd and the terror of the 
phantasms is completely different to anything to be found in Lewis's work. 
In Carlyle the rise of the crowd is figured with something like the `passion 
for the Real' that Lewis sought to avoid, but in both writers reality is seen 
as dualistic, and politics is seen to have an ontological dimension: the 
crowd not only changes social structures, but transforms the fabric of 
reality itself. 
5 Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution, 2 Vols., (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1955), 
Vol. 1, p. 171. 
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In Gustave Le Bon's The Crowd (1895) -a best-selling and 
influential work which McClelland sees as derivative and sensationalist, 
and which he claims `gives the lie to the idea that there is necessarily 
something furtive about plagiarism'6 - the problem of the crowd is also 
seen as a problem of reality. Le Bon sees the crowd as one of the defining 
features of modernity: `The substitution of the unconscious action of 
crowds for the conscious activity of individuals is one of the principal 
characteristics of the present age'. 7 This replacement of the conscious by 
the unconscious was also one of Lewis's great concerns. However, Le Bon's 
epistemology of the crowd is framed not only in terms of consciousness but 
of reality as well. Le Bon makes a distinction between `pure reason' and 
`practical reason', and claims that their teachings `are very often contrary'. 8 
Le Bon's distinction relies on the difference between things as they really 
are and things as they appear to be: 
From the point of view of absolute truth a cube or a circle are 
invariable geometrical figures, rigorously defined by certain 
formulas. From the point of view of the impression they make on our 
eye these geometrical figures may assume very varied shapes. By 
perspective the cube may be transformed into a pyramid or a square, 
the circle into an ellipse or a straight line. Moreover, the 
consideration of these fictitious shapes is far more important than 
that of the real shapes, for it is they and they alone that we see and 
that can be reproduced in photography or in pictures. 9 
Le Bon concludes that `In certain cases there is more truth in the unreal 
than in the real', a claim which chimes with Lewis's assertion that `We are 
surface-creatures, and the "truths" from beneath the surface contradict our 
values' (TWM, 377). Like Lewis, Le Bon sees `the real' as inaccessible, 
writing that: 
6 McClelland, The Crowd and the Mob, p. 197. 
7 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd, first published in French 1895, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1977), P. 3. 
8 Le Bon, The Crowd, p. 5. 
9 Le Bon, The Crowd, p. 5. 
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Visible phenomena appear to be the result of an immense, 
unconscious working, that as a rule is beyond the reach of our 
analysis. Perceptible phenomena may be compared to the waves, 
which are the expression on the surface of the ocean of deep-lying 
disturbances of which we know nothing. 10 
These images of waves and ocean depths are extremely similar to those 
used by Lewis in Time and Western Man, " and suggest that both thinkers 
share a similar epistemology. There is, however, an ambiguity in Le Bon's 
dualism, for he sees the crowd both as the surface phenomenon, guided by 
unconscious motives, and as those unconscious motives in person: writing 
both that, at times, crowds `appear to be guided by [... ] mysterious forces', 
and that `Crowds [... ] are always unconscious'. 12 
In Time and Western Man Lewis also associated the crowd and the 
unconscious, and sees these phenomena as forming one side of the 
defining conflict of modern life: 
In any case, a long time ago a battle was engaged between the 
Unconscious and the Conscious: and we have been witnessing the 
ultimate triumph of the Unconscious of recent years. The Individual 
and that part of him that is not individual, also joined issue: for the 
civil war was taken up, in the interior economy of the personality, 
sympathetically, at once. Inside us also the crowds were pitted 
against the Individual, the Unconscious against the Conscious, the 
"emotional" against the "intellectual, " the Many against the One. So it 
is that the Subject is not gently reasoned out of, but violently 
hounded from, every cell of the organism: until at last (arguing that 
"independent, " individual life is not worthwhile, nor the game worth 
the candle) he plunges into the Unconscious, where Dr. Freud, like a 
sort of mephistophelian Dr. Caligari, is waiting for him. (TWM, 300- 
1) 
Lewis's explicit association of the unconscious with the crowd makes clear 
that one strand of his thinking at least is in the same vein as Le Bon's. This 
passage also makes clear that Lewis saw the crowd not only as a political 
10 Le Bon, The Crowd, p. 6. 
11 For example, Lewis writes of `a multiplicity of wave-like surface changes only, while all 
the time the deep bed of Oneness reposes unbroken underneath' (TWM, 377). See 
Chapter One for a fuller discussion of this passage. 
12 Le Bon, The Crowd, pp. 6-7. 
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phenomenon external to the individual but as a physiological problem 
internal to the individual as well: the crowds of the unconscious are `Inside 
us' as well as outside. The unconscious, and hence the crowd, is seen as 
identical to the life of unmediated sensation associated with `the Real': 
The "Unconscious" is really what Plato meant by the "mob of the 
senses, " or rather it is where they are to be found, the mother region 
of "sensational" life. It is in our "Unconscious" that we live in a state 
of common humanity. There are no individuals in the Unconscious; 
because a man is only an individual when he is conscious. (TWM, 
301) 
This epistemological aspect of the idea of the crowd is significant, and 
suggests that there is a parallel between the suppression of the crowd and 
the repression of `the Real'. As we have seen, the repression of `the Real' 
was never fully achieved in Lewis's imaginative work, even though it is a 
mainstay of his theory. When viewed in this light, the individual is a 
function of `reality', and as such a product of belief. We have seen in 
previous chapters that alongside Lewis's valorisation of such figures he 
had a strong sense of their fragility, their absurdity, and even their 
impossibility. The tension between Lewis's values and his perception is 
also a feature of Lewis's thinking about crowds and individuals, and as we 
will see it was an uneasy and imaginatively fertile one. 
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`The Crowd Master': 
`to be of the Crowd and individually conscious' 
Lewis's first fictional engagement with the crowd was in `The Crowd 
Master', a fragment of an envisaged larger work, published in the second 
number of Blast (1915). The narrative is set in July 1914, a month before 
Great Britain entered the First World War, and follows a character called 
Blenner as he travels from Scotland, where he heard the news of German's 
declaration of war on Russia, to London, where he encounters crowds of 
patriotic volunteers, and meets a friend of his, an American called Multum, 
who has written a book titled `The Crowd Master'. Jeffrey Meyers, a 
biographer of Lewis, sees `The Crowd Master' as `a description of the blind 
masses roaring for their own destruction when war is declared', 13 but the 
narrative is concerned as much with the figure of the individual as it is 
with the crowd, and, as we will see, the individual it opposes to `the blind 
masses' is not simply distinct and free from the crowd but caught up with 
it in a complex relationship. The narrative stops, rather than ends, with the 
promise that `Further parts will be printed in the next number of "Blast"', 
but because of the war whose beginning is charted in the story there was 
no next number and the further parts did not materialise until 1937 when a 
revised version of `The Crowd Master' was published in Blasting and 
Bombardiering, Lewis's first autobiography, under the chapter headings 
`Morpeth Olympiad', `Journey during Mobilization', and `The War-Crowds, 
1914' (BB, 66-83). The journey from Scotland to London is based on one 
that Lewis took himself during mobilisation, 14 which may explain why he 
felt it appropriate to include, suitably revised, in his autobiography. The 
second version follows the same basic sequence as the first, although there 
are some key differences: the main character has been renamed Cantleman 
(Lewis's short story `Cantleman's Spring-Mate', featuring a protagonist of 
13 Jeffrey Meyers, The Enemy: A Biography of Wyndham Lewis, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 77. 
14 Paul O'Keeffe, Some Sort of Genius: A Life of Wyndham Lewis, (London: Pimlico, 
2001), p. 172. 
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the same name was reprinted in the same volume); the Multum character 
and his book have been completely removed; and Cantleman engages in 
some intriguing `crowd experiments'. 
It is unclear whether the second version of `The Crowd Master' was a 
straight reprint of basically unrevised material, both published and 
unpublished, from 1915 or whether it should be regarded as a work of 
1937. Lewis presents it as the former, claiming that he is `hand[ing] over 
the controls to Cantleman', and that the reader `shall see these things as I 
saw them, yes, but out of the eyes of a mask called "Cantleman"' (BB, 65). 
When the two versions are examined closely, a number of significant and 
revealing differences emerge, which cast light on Lewis's changing 
attitudes to the crowd and the individual. 
The description of the crowd that the protagonist encounters in 
London is more or less the same in both versions, with the major revisions 
being to the way the protagonist reacts to it. The crowd is described in 
ways which emphasise its mindlessness and suggests that it is some sort of 
grotesque organism. At the beginning of the text the crowd is described in 
liquid terms: 
Men drift in thrilling masses past the Admiralty, cold night tide. 
Their throng creeps round corners, breaks faintly here and there up 
against a railing barring from possible sights. Local ebullience and 
thickening: some madman disturbing their depths with baffling and 
recondite noise. ('Crowd', 94) 
The idea that the crowd is some sort of liquid suggests an involuntariness 
of movement: like a liquid, the crowd seems to spread out indiscriminately 
to fill all the available space; and the image of the tide implies that the 
crowd are controlled by elemental forces of which it is as unconscious as 
water is of gravity. Even the effects of the `baffling and recondite noise' of 
the `madman' is figured in terms which suggest an automatic reaction of 
the kind which makes liquids boil and reduce when heated sufficiently. 
The passivity and malleability suggested by the image of the crowd as 
liquid is reinforced by the description of their treatment by the police: 
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THE POLICE with distant icy contempt herd London. They shift it in 
lumps here and there, touching and shaping with heavy delicate 
professional fingers. Their attitude is as though these universal 
crowds wanted some vague new Suffrage. ('Crowd', 94) 
The `icy', and thus solid, police are presented as having the power to 
`shape' the crowd, which again suggests its pliancy and lack of initiative. 
Two new tropes are introduced in this passage which will prove to be 
significant in Lewis's work: the crowd as herd, and the crowd as feminine. 
The fact that these two tropes are introduced more or less simultaneously 
suggests that they may be practically identical: the crowd is a herd because 
it is feminine, and is feminine because it is a herd. The implications of the 
idea that the crowd is feminine will be explored further later on in the 
chapter. 
The crowd is also associated with war, not just the particular war that 
was beginning at that time but war in general, and with death 
THE INDIVIDUAL and THE CROWD: PEACE and WAR. 
Man's solitude and Peace; Man's Community and Row. 
The Bachelor and the Husband-Crowd. The Married Man is the 
Symbol of the Crowd: his function is to set one going. At the altar he 
embraces Death. 
We all shed our small skin periodically or are apt to sometime, 
and are purged in big being: an empty throb. 
Men resist death with horror when their time comes. 
Death is, however, only a form of Crowd. It is a similar 
surrender. For most men believe in some such survival, children an 
active and definite one. 
Again, the Crowd in Life spells death too, very often. The Crowd 
is an immense anaesthetic towards death. Duty flings the selfish will 
into this relaxed vortex. ('Crowd', 94) 
Another key opposition of Lewis's is introduced here: the individual and 
the crowd. The crowd is seen as antithetical to the individual as entry into 
it involves a breakdown of the boundary of the individual - the shedding of 
`our small skin' - and a `surrender' to a larger entity, a `big being' that is, 
however, just an `empty throb'. This loss of individuality in the crowd is 
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seen as analogous to the loss of life that is death. The association of the 
crowd with the loss of individual conscience and destructive tendencies is 
common in modern crowd theory which, particularly in its considerations 
of revolutions, often focuses on the mob's potential for animal violence. 15 
The English psychologist Wilfred Trotter, in his influential book Instincts 
of the Herd in Peace and War (1915), saw the formation of crowds as a 
natural reaction of human being, a `gregarious species', to the outbreak of 
war: 
The first feeling of the ordinary citizen [at the outbreak of the Great 
War] was fear [... ]. Side by side with fear there was a heightening of 
the normal intolerance of isolation. Loneliness became an urgently 
unpleasant feeling, and the individual experienced an intense and 
active desire for the company and even physical contact of his 
fellows. In such company he was aware of a great accession of 
confidence, courage, and moral power. 16 
`The Crowd Master' depicts the forming of such a crowd, which is at first 
figured as infantile: 
The Crowd was still blind, with a first puppy-like intensity. 
Great National events are always preparing, the Crowd is in its 
habitual childish sleep. It rises to meet the crash half awake and 
struggling and voluptuous movements. ('Crowd', 98) 
The patronising superiority that is implied by the likening of the crowd to a 
puppy is tempered by the suggestion that the crowd is a natural 
phenomenon, which lies dormant before coming to the boil at appropriate 
moments, functioning like a storage reservoir of national enthusiasm. The 
idea of the crowd as an elemental or atavistic force is not unique to Lewis, 
indeed it is one of the key ideas of crowd theory, central to the image of it 
as crude and unsophisticated but immensely powerful, and to the 
Enlightenment conceit that, like all natural phenomena, it can be subdued 
15 See, for example, McClelland on Taine, The Crowd and the Mob, pp. 127-37. 
16 Wilfred Trotter, Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War, first published 1915, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), Pp- 110-11" 
221 
Chapter Five: The Crowd 
and harnessed by the power of human rationality. The idea of the crowd as 
natural and atavistic can also lead to almost mystical accounts of its power, 
and Lewis presents it in quasi-religious terms: `Every acquaintance 
Blenner met was a new person. The only possibility of renewal for the 
individual is into this temporary Death and Resurrection of the Crowd' 
('Crowd', 98). This account of the crowd as the source of a spiritual rebirth 
is retained in the second version, but significantly with a snide `it appears' 
tagged on the end of the sentence (BB, 77). Significantly the reaction of 
Cantleman is described at greater length, and in terms which emphasise 
his separateness from the crowd: 
The war was like a great new fashion. Cantleman conformed. He 
became a man of fashion. But he was cold in the midst of the Melee. 
In the first days he experienced nothing but a penetrating interest in 
all that was taking place. His detachment was complete and his 
attention was directed everywhere. His movements resembled those 
of a freelance cinema-operator. (BB, 77) 
The coldness and detachment of Cantleman is not attributed to Blenner 
who reacts to the crowd far more enthusiastically. This difference between 
the two versions suggests that in 1937 Lewis was eager that his now 
avowed alter-ego display a separateness from the crowd that he was not 
given in 1915. The possible reasons for such a shift will be discussed later, 
but it is worth noting now that Lewis presents Cantleman's movements in 
the crowd as being like `those of a freelance cinema-operator', a figure 
whose detachment is due to his function as observer and recorder of the 
crowd in which he is immersed. 
In the first version of `The Crowd Master' Blenner is to some degree 
carried away by this force of renewal, and it is Multum who is seen as 
resisting the crowd and remaining separate from it. 
Blenner was not too critical a man to penetrate their disguises or 
ferret out their Ego. He was glad to see so little of it for once. 
Delightful masquerade of everyone. The certainty of feeling 
alike with everyone else was a great relief for over-paradoxical nerves 
- with everyone except Multum, who was as Crowd-proof as a Scotch 
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reservist. You could be less than ever certain that you were feeling 
like him. But he was a professional Crowd-officer. ('Crowd', 98) 
Multum's position in the crowd is similar to the one that Lewis would later 
give to Cantleman: 
He had a rather mysterious air; something up his sleeve, apparently. 
Whenever the Crowd raised its head he had this faintly 
bantering mysterious air. 
He appeared to be the only conscious atom of the Crowd. A 
special privilege with him: to be of the Crowd and individually 
conscious. ('Crowd', 99) 
Multum is distinct from the crowd and from Blenner because of his ability 
to be of the crowd, to experience what it experiences, and at the same time 
to remain himself and retain his sense of individuality, and perhaps, unlike 
Blenner, to be critical enough to penetrate the disguises of the people in 
the crowd. Multum is able to understand the crowd enough to write a book 
about it, a book which, as its title -The Crowd Master' - suggests further 
emphasises his fundamental detachment from and superiority to the 
crowd of which he can become part. The inclusion of a work of crowd- 
theory in the narrative is significant as it demonstrates an awareness that 
the crowd was a theoretical and literary phenomenon as well as a social 
one. Blenner's response to the Multum's book is interesting as it shows 
that for him the title has an immediate appeal that borders on the 
mindless: 
THE CROWD MASTER. What might that mean? His bright 
astonished eyes fixed on the words, drinking up a certain strength 
from them. 
An opposition of and welding of the two heaviest words that 
stand for the multitude on the one hand, the Ego on the other. 
That should be something! 
Did it really mean Master of the Crowd in the sense of 
possessive domination by an individual? It meant something else, it 
seemed evident. ('Crowd', 99-loo) 
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Despite Blenner's speculative astonishment at the book's title, his reading 
does not extend any further: 
Buying a book with him was like some men's going to the doctor: 
those who are cured by the passing of the professional hall door. 
There was nothing really the matter with Blenner. The moment he 
had got the book, the expense was justified[. ] He seldom read it. 
Then he chafed at the fee. ('Crowd', loo) 
We later learn that `Blenner [... ] had never really read Multum's book. He 
turned to it, and [... ] found it "stimulating"' ('Crowd', ioi). Blenner's 
attraction by a few choice and important sounding words and the ease with 
which he parts with his cash suggest an imprudent and suggestible 
spontaneity, qualities often associated with the idea of `the crowd'. The fact 
that he does not read the book but considers its purchase effort enough 
indicates a basic deficiency in his attempt to be intellectual. The attitude of 
superiority to the crowd which Blenner displays is shown to be practically 
groundless: he is exposed as merely a pseudo-crowd-master, a member of 
the crowd who would like to be its master but who cannot even summon 
up the intellectual energy to read a book. 
Multum on the other hand appears to be a more genuine crowd 
master, not in the sense of a crowd leader, but in a more Baudelairean 
fashion. In his prose poem `The Crowds' (1861) Charles Baudelaire wrote 
of the poet having a special relationship to the crowd: 
Not everyone has the gift of taking a plunge into the multitude: there 
is an art to enjoying the crowd; and they alone can draw from the 
human race a feast of vitality on whom a fairy has bestowed, while 
they were in their cradles, a taste for disguise and masks, a hatred of 
home life, and a passion for travel. 
Multitude and solitude: equal and interchangeable terms for the 
poet who is active and productive. Those who are not able to people 
the solitude are equally unable to be alone in a busy crowd. 
The poet benefits from an incomparable privilege which allows 
him to be, at will, himself and others. Like those wandering souls in 
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search of a body, he enters, when he so desires, into the character of 
each individual. l7 
With his `special privilege' of being able `to be of the Crowd and 
individually conscious' Multum seems to approximate to this Baudelairean 
ideal: `to be, at will, himself and others'. It is precisely this simultaneous 
detachment from and empathetic understanding of the crowd that 
Cantleman, the character who replaces Blenner as protagonist, tries to 
achieve with his crowd experiment in the second version of `The Crowd 
Master'. As we will see, Lewis's revised character is ultimately unable to 
claim the `incomparable privilege' that Baudelaire accords to the poet, and 
the nineteenth-century ideal of the flaneur undergoes something of a 
pratfall. 
There are significant differences between the characters of Blenner 
and Cantleman. Blenner is an ex-soldier with a troublesome leg, rather like 
the eponymous protagonist of Snooty Baronet (1932). When Blenner left 
the army he `became definitely, to his family's distress, a crank and very 
liberal, he began reading sociological books and wandering about London' 
('Crowd', 99). Cantleman, on the other hand, is a producer of books rather 
than a consumer: whereas Blenner buys Multum's book in `The Bomb 
shop' ('Crowd', 99), Cantleman `saboted the Bomb Shop, where his books 
sold well' (BB, 76). Cantleman seems to have absorbed the role played by 
Multum in the first version, and although the precise nature of his `bombs' 
is not revealed, he takes the place of the author of `The Crowd Master'. 
Cantleman is also involved in the production of a `review' much as Lewis 
was in 1914 (the first issue appeared 1 July 1914). By making Cantleman an 
artist and a writer Lewis is in one sense making the character more 
autobiographical, but it is possible that his revisions, although more 
`truthful' in career terms, obscure some of the unflattering truths of the 
first version by excising the protagonist's passive and crowd-like 
dependence on a sensationalist book he has never read, his admiration of 
'7 Charles Baudelaire, `The Crowds' in The Prose Poems and La Fanfarlo, trans. 
Rosemary Lloyd, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 44" 
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its charismatic author, and his attraction to the crowd. Blenner leaves 
Scotland because he `felt the need of the great Crowd' that he could find in 
London rather than the `imperfect Crowd' that he finds in Scotland: `the 
numbers being so slight, it was like a straining and dissatisfaction in 
Blenner, the pale edge of the mass he knew now would be forming, finding 
once more the immense common nature of its being' ('Crowd', 95). The 
omission of the protagonist's desire for the `common nature' of the crowd 
in the second version is significant as it indicates that such a desire was not 
one that Lewis wanted associated with his autobiographical image. There 
are two possible reasons for this: either the prospect of admitting to such a 
feeling embarrassed him as it detracted from his image as a cantankerous 
and stubbornly individual outsider; or given his experience of the First 
World War, and indeed the anti-war tone of Blasting and Bombardiering 
and his pacifist and pro-appeasement sentiments of the late 193os, any 
sign of earlier pro-war enthusiasm would seem inappropriate. Whatever 
the immediate reason may have been for the omission of this desire for 
`common nature' it indicates again that there is a repression of a basic 
physical commonality operating in Lewis's work. Just as, in Enemy of the 
Stars, Arghol tries to deny the truth, articulated by Hanp, that `all our flesh 
is the same', so Lewis, in his revision of `The Crowd Master', seeks to 
repress the presence, and indeed the desirability, of the `common nature' 
of the crowd. In the second version of `The Crowd Master' Cantleman is 
drawn to the crowd not by a desire to become part of it, but in order to 
exploit it as a source of inspiration for his writing. Cantleman embarks on 
a series of `crowd-experiments' which involve an attempt to become, like 
Multum, both of the crowd and critically detached from it. Cantleman 
deliberately lets himself be absorbed by the crowd in the hope that he will 
come to understand it: 
He allowed himself to be carried by the crowd. He offered himself to 
its emotion, which saturated him at length. When it had sunk in, he 
examined it. Apparently it was sluggish electricity. That was all. As 
such it had no meaning, beyond what the power of a great body of 
water has, for instance. It conducted nowhere : it was aimlessly 
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flowing through these torpid coils. The human cables had been 
disposed no doubt by skilful brains : they might be admirable. But 
not the electricity. (BB, 8o) 
Even though the crowd offers Cantleman no distinct meaning it is not 
completely mute: `human messages passed up and down' (BB, 8o). 
However, on interpreting these messages Cantleman is disappointed: `Like 
the spirit-writing of the planchette pencil, they were extremely stupid' (BB, 
8o). The association of the messages of the crowd with those of 
spiritualism, of which Lewis has a dim view, further reinforces the 
presentation of the crowd as mindless, just as the electrical imagery 
suggests, as did the tide imagery earlier, that the crowd is subject to 
elemental forces it cannot control. 
Cantleman tries to channel the emotion of the crowd, rather as a 
spiritualist medium channels supernatural forces, and his experiment 
involves him becoming the crowd in some way: 
he would not only mix with the crowd, he would train himself to act 
its mood, so that he could persuade its emotion to enter him 
properly. There he could store it, to some extent. Then he would, 
from time to time, hasten outside it. In isolation, he would examine 
himself in the Crowd-mood. (BB, 81) 
This acting the crowd's mood involves an abandonment of both his body 
and his mind, in similar fashion to the shedding of `our small skin' that 
Blenner felt in the crowd; however in Cantleman's case this abandonment 
is calculated rather than spontaneous: 
He went outside into the crowd again. He sank like a diver. He 
disposed his body in a certain way, slouching heavily along, fixed his 
eyes ahead of him. Soon he had become an entranced medium, or the 
next thing to it. (BB, 81) 
Cantleman finds his mind wandering, and thinks of `a bogus countess who 
was eager to finance a review' of which he was to be editor, and indulges in 
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fantasies about `his first number' (BB, 81). However, a sensation from the 
crowd interrupts his day-dreaming: 
Suddenly he experienced a distinct and he believed authentic shock. 
It could only come from the crowd! Evidently he had penetrated its 
mind - the cerebration of this jelly-fish! Hence the sting! He had 
received his first novel sensation. What was it exactly - could he 
define it? Well, it seemed to be that he was a married man. 
Unquestionably he possessed, and with extreme suddenness at 
that, that married feeling. He had never had it before - so he knew it 
must be genuine. Immediately he withdrew from the crowd. (BB, 81) 
The sexual language used here - penetration and withdrawal - together 
with Cantleman's `married feeling' indicate that the crowd has a libidinous 
charge for him, and the `authentic shock' he feels upon penetration 
suggests that he gains some sort of sexual pleasure from the crowd. The 
image of the crowd as a stinging 'jelly-fish' unites the idea of the crowd as 
feminine and the idea of the crowd as electrical, as Lewis often associated 
the feminine with what he called in Tarr 'jellyish attributes' (T, 314). 
Cantleman's immediate withdrawal on receiving this shock may suggest 
that he finds this experience troubling, that perhaps this merging with the 
crowd is one which calls his sense of detachment into question. 
After this `shock' Cantleman retreats to the masculine shelter of a pub 
to record the findings of his experiment, and reading them over feels 
`disappointed' and returns to the crowd for more. That Cantleman is 
presented as a writer in the second version of `The Crowd Master' is 
significant as it effectively conflates the figure of the artist-intellectual with 
that of the observant individual detached from the crowd, and suggests 
that the mastery of the crowd may stem from the act of representing it 
artistically. 
Walking through the crowd `as mechanically as possible' Cantleman 
heads for one of London's most famous phallic symbols: 
Trafalgar Square was an extensive human lake. He moved towards 
the Nelson Column. He might obtain a valuable note if he climbed 
up, upon the plinth. Hoarse voices were muttering all round him. He 
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felt the pressure of the visible ghosts whom he was inviting to 
inscribe their ideas on the tabula rasa he offered them. 
Their messages continued to be extremely confused. He noticed 
he had lost ground, even. He felt more and more solitary. Then free - 
single; and so divorced. (BB, 82) 
In contrast to his first experimental outing into the crowd, Cantleman now 
invites the crowd to penetrate his mind, rather than attempting to 
penetrate its. However, nothing significant happens; rather than feeling an 
`authentic shock' as he did when he penetrated the mind of the crowd, he 
feels no connection to the crowd at all, only a sense of his apartness. The 
failure of the crowd to penetrate Cantleman and `inscribe their ideas' on 
him may reinforce the idea of Cantleman's detached and impenetrable 
masculinity, but this failure results in him losing ground. His feeling of 
being `divorced' suggests a detachment born out of the failure of a previous 
coupling, rather than one stemming from untroubled masculine 
independence. 
Cantleman's final attempt to gain a sensation from the crowd results 
in another sexual feeling, but this time it is not the result of an `authentic 
shock' produced by the crowd but of a strange historical bathing fantasy: 
Upon the plinth of the Nelson Column he strained for a distinct 
sensation. It must this time be distinct. Nothing came at all. He 
strained again. He felt as detached as the stone Nelson. What a 
change from Trafalgar! he thought. What a change! Lady Hamilton 
floated into his mind. She had scent upon her limbs, which were 
sheathed in tight-fitting bathing drawers. She was going for a dip. 
She was Britannia. A wave slapped her, roguishly. Elle faisait le 
culbute. Immediately a sensation occurred. Cantleman produced his 
notebook. (BB, 82) 
That Cantleman's crowd experiments end with this somewhat silly sexual 
fantasy suggests that they are a failure, and that he has not penetrated the 
`crowd-mood' but become distracted by the image of a long dead 
aristocrat. Unlike Multum who was said `to be of the Crowd and 
individually conscious' Cantleman does not become part of the crowd and 
his individual consciousness seems too easily distractible to be properly 
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critical. However, Cantleman sees fit to blame the crowd, rather than 
himself, for this failure: 
The English Crowd is a stupid dragon. It ought not to be allowed out 
alone! I have lain in it for hours together and have received no 
sensation worth noting. As Crowd it is a washout. (BB, 83) 
Cantleman holds the crowd responsible for his lack of inspiration, which 
suggests that the activity of the artist is dependent on the crowd; that, 
contrary to Cantleman's ostensible individuality, the artist cannot function 
without a crowd and that if the crowd is a `washout' the artist will 
automatically be so too. The idea of the artist's dependence on the crowd 
seems to be at odds with the rhetoric of the piece, but here we can see the 
key tension in Lewis's thinking about crowds. For all his disdain for the 
crowd Lewis had a strong sense of its inescapability, and never saw the 
individual as being able to exist completely apart from it. 
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`The Code of a Herdsman': 
`you will grow confused by a similarity' 
`The Code of a Herdsman' (1917) was first published in The Little Review 
as part of the series of `Imaginary Letters' written by Lewis. The text is 
presented as a `set of rules sent by Benjamin Richard Wing to his young 
friend, Philip Seddon inclosed with a letter' ('Code', 25), and should be 
regarded as a fiction authored by Lewis and not, as John Carey does, as an 
`early essay' and a straightforward manifesto or documentation of his 
views at that time. 18 
`The Code' gives advice on how the Herdsman, who is said to dwell on 
a mountain, should deal with the herd down below, and the text seems to 
be a fine example of the modern intellectual's contempt for the modern 
crowd. The use of such phrases as `herd-hypnotism' and `herd personality' 
suggests a disdain for the masses which imaginatively continues the anti- 
crowd tradition of crowd theorists such as Taine and Le Bon. However, as 
`The Crowd Master' makes clear, Lewis was aware of the tradition of crowd 
theory as a cultural and publishing phenomenon, and his representation of 
the relationship of Blenner and Multum shows that he did not 
automatically assume that its adherents were themselves above or beyond 
the crowd. 
The fictional writer of `The Code' clearly appears to believe himself to 
be above the crowd and the Herdsman who is the recipient of the text is 
instructed to have a much more antagonistic attitude to the crowd than 
that explored in `The Crowd Master': 
Mock the herd perpetually with the grimace of its own garrulity or 
deadness. If it gets out of hand and stampedes towards you, leap on 
to the sea of mangy backs until the sea is still. That is: cast your mask 
aside, and spring above them. They cannot see or touch anything 
above them: they have never realized that their backs - or rather 
their tops - exist! They will think that you have vanished into 
Heaven. ('Code', 25-6) 
18 John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary 
Intelligentsia 1880-1939, (London & Boston: Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 184. 
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This mockery is very different to Cantleman's attempt to act the crowd's 
mood and assumes the distinction between Herd and Herdsman that is 
mooted but never fully established in `The Crowd Master'. The Herdsman 
is warned to `Always come down with masks and thick clothing' ('Code', 
30): the shedding of `our small skin' associated with the crowd in the first 
version of `The Crowd Master' is not an option for the Herdsman. Indeed, 
the Herdsman is instructed to remain neurotically swaddled at all times: 
`Stagnant gasses from these Yahooesque and rotten herds are more 
dangerous often than the wandering cylinders that emit them. See you are 
not caught in them without your mask' ('Code', 30). Given this concern 
about contamination by the Herd, it is perhaps unclear why the Herdsman 
would want to descend into it in the first place. This question is never 
raised, let alone answered, and it is a significant chink in `The Code' as it 
suggests that the Herdsman's commerce with the Herd is not entirely 
voluntary. Given the apparently unavoidable fact that the Herdsman must 
have contact with the Herd, `The Code' sets out the ways in which the 
Herdsman's assumed distinction is to be maintained. Complete isolation 
and detachment, although it may be desirable, is never an option for the 
Herdsman. 
One of the key distinguishing features of the Herdsman is the 
multiplicity of his personality. Far from being presented as a 
straightforwardly singular individual, the Herdsman is directed to `Cherish 
and develop, side by side, your six most constant indications of different 
personalities' ('Code', 26). This cultivation of multiple personalities is seen 
to strengthen rather than dissipate the Herdsman's individuality: `You will 
then acquire the potentiality of six men' ('Code', 26). As well as 
distinguishing himself from the crowd without, the Herdsman carefully 
develops a crowd within. This celebration of the multiplicity of the 
personality could be seen as indicating something like the proto-post- 
modern sophistication of Lewis's thinking: writing of Lewis's rhetorical 
question `Why try and give the impression of a consistent and indivisible 
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personality? ' in Blast, No. 2,19 Toby Avard Foshay speaks of `the primary 
conflict and irresolution of Lewis's proto-deconstruction'. 20 However, it 
could also be argued that in his theoretical embrace of the multiplicity of 
the personality Lewis is merely making a virtue of necessity, and claiming 
responsibility for the unavoidable. Moreover, it seems that by presenting 
this multiplicity as something that the personality strives for rather than 
being constituted by, he slyly returns to an effectively singular notion of 
the personality, albeit in the role of the instigator of its own inevitable 
fragmentation. The injunction `Contradict yourself. In order to live, you 
must remain broken up' ('Code', 29) shows that fragmentation is to be 
harnessed in order to sustain the life of the `you'. In `The Code' 
fragmentation, as well as multiplicity, is a strategy pursued for the benefit 
of the individual, who, although not indivisible as such, remains distinct 
from and superior to the crowd. 
The Herdsman's attempt to `Cherish and develop' his multiple 
personalities is an example of crowd control, only this time directed 
inwards. The notion of an internal crowd is an important one in Lewis's 
work but, this crowd is not always so obedient and manageable. Lewis's 
recommendation of an ostensibly multiple personality is itself couched in 
the language of snobbery: `Never fall into the vulgarity of being or 
assuming yourself to be one ego' ('Code', 27). Lewis enacts a partial 
inversion of a straightforward crowd/individual distinction: the Many are 
seen as singular, the One as multiple. But despite the apparent celebration 
of the multiple personality, there is still a `yourself present who has to be 
careful not to fall into the `vulgarity' of crowd-like singularity. Lewis does 
not by any means simply repeat the solipsistic individualism of, say, Max 
Stirner, the egoistic philosopher rejected by Arghol in Enemy of the Stars, 
but it is clear that the partial inversion of the crowd/ individual distinction 
does not represent its complete refutation or transcendence. Indeed, the 
19 Wyndham Lewis, `Wyndham Lewis Vortex No. 1.: Art Vortex: Be Thyself. ', in Blast, No. 
2, first published 1915, (Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow Press, 1981). 
20 Toby Avard Foshay, Wyndham Lewis and the Avant-Garde: The Politics of the 
Intellect, (Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992). 
p. 78. 
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multiple-individualism advocated in `The Code' could be seen as an 
evolved individualism, which, unable to sustain the complete isolation of 
the individual, allows in as much of the crowd as it can control in an 
attempt to stave off its obsolescence. 
The Herdsman's rejection of the external Herd extends to social 
groups traditionally viewed as superior to the general crowd, and `The 
Code' carefully makes a distinction between the Herdsmen and the 
aristocracy. The Herdsman is instructed: 
Do not play with political notions, aristocratisms or the reverse, for 
that is a compromise with the herd. Do not allow yourself to imagine 
"a fine herd though still a herd. " There is no fine herd. The cattle that 
call themselves "gentlemen" you will observe to be a little cleaner. It 
is merely cunning and produced with a product called soap. But you 
will find no serious difference between them and those vast dismal 
herds they avoid. Some of them are very dangerous and treacherous. 
= Be on your guard with the small herd of gentlemen! (27) 
This distinction between the traditional social elites and some idea of a 
new elite is a feature of Lewis's thought. Lewis seeks to maintain the 
hierarchical and basically dualistic structure of an aristocratic society, but 
change its content, so that artist and intellectuals like himself occupy the 
top rank, rather than established hereditary aristocrats. Despite the 
rejection of the aristocratic Herd, the Herdsman is not seen as an 
absolutely unique figure: as the form of `The Code' makes clear, there are 
at least two Herdsmen, and the question of whether they are merely `a fine 
herd though still a herd' is unavoidable. 
The writer of `The Code' warns the apprentice Herdsman against a 
`pitfall' that may be encountered when with the Herd: `surrounded by the 
multitude of unsatisfactory replicas, you will grow confused by a similarity 
bringing them so near to us' ('Code', 27). This `similarity' may lead the 
Herdsman to question whether the distinction between himself and the 
Herd really exists: 
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You will reason, where, from some point of view, the difference is so 
slight, whether that delicate margin is of the immense importance 
that we hold it to be: the only thing of importance in fact. = That 
group of men talking by the fire in your club (you will still remain a 
member of your club), that party at the theatre, look good enough, 
you will say. Their skins are fresh, they are well-made, their manners 
are good. ('Code', 27-8) 
The impression of others being `good enough' is to be countered, so the 
Herdsman is instructed, by examining them objectively: 
You must then consider what they really are. On closer inspection 
you know, from unpleasant experience, that they are nothing but 
limitations and vulgarities of the most irritating description. The 
devil Nature has painted these sepulchres pink, and covered them 
with a blasphemous Bond Street distinction. Matter that has not 
sufficient mind to permeate it grows, as you know, gangrenous and 
rotten. Animal high spirits, a little but easily exhausted, goodness, is 
all that they can claim. ('Code', 28) 
Distinction is to be maintained by the sort of objectifying gaze Lewis later 
theorised in The Wild Body essays, and which was discussed in Chapter 
Two. Indeed, this passage sets out some of the concerns that return 
throughout Lewis's work, in particular the notion that the appearance that 
people possess minds and are not merely things, is just that - an 
appearance - beneath which, in `the Real', they are merely mindless 
animal matter. `The Code of a Herdsman' differs from The Wild Body 
essays in that the consideration of `what they really are' is not turned back 
on to the observer himself, and the dangerous possibility that the observer 
is merely matter as well is avoided. The `delicate margin' between the 
Herdsman and the Herd is only one of several such `slight' yet `immensely 
important' differences in Lewis's work: the boundary between `reality' and 
`the Real', the distinction between laugher and laughed-at, and the 
difference between men and women all hinge on such `delicate margins'. 
All these `delicate margins' are haunted by the possibility that they do not 
exist, and that a real `similarity' does. 
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In his `Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time' (1922) Lewis 
argues that the presence of a `delicate margin' was central to art itself: 
In art we are in a sense playing at being what we designate as matter. 
We are entering the forms of the mighty phenomena around us, and 
seeing how near we can get to being a river or a star, without actually 
becoming that. ('Essay', 204) 
The idea that art allows us to get near to something real without becoming 
it, that art is a way of enacting a `delicate margin' between the virtual and 
the actual, puts art in the role of `belief theorised in Time and Western 
Man, and analysed in Chapter One. In terms of the crowds, art could be 
that which allows individuals to play at belonging to the crowd without 
actually doing so; or, put in another way, that which allows members of the 
crowd to believe that they are individuals merely playing at being of the 
crowd. In the 192os Lewis became increasingly interested in questions of 
the social role of art, and the way in which art and artists are related to the 
crowd. 
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Art and the Organisation of Society 
In his essay `The Politics of Artistic Expression' (1925) Lewis discusses the 
relationship of art and society, and argues that art is the unique aspect of 
human nature which distinguishes us from animals. As well as being 
constitutive of the uniqueness of humanity Lewis argues that art is 
necessary to the maintenance of a well-ordered society, and that in 
contemporary society it is in danger of complete disintegration. Lewis's 
concern here is not so much with the situation of the individual artist in 
the crowd, as it was in `The Crowd Master', but with the role that art can 
play in regulating the crowd, and maintaining an ordered and stable 
society. The social function of art is similar to the ontological function of 
belief, as both guarantee consistency and stability and keep something - 
`the Real' or the crowd - safely repressed. 
The essay begins with the hypothetical question: `If the peacock 
spoke, what would he say? If the peacock painted what would he paint? ' 
('Politics', 114). He concludes that the hypothetical peacock would `be in 
his functional role the whole time' and would `be able to talk about nothing 
else but the peacock. He would display none of the humility and 
eclecticism that is such a characteristic of the most highly developed men' 
('Politics', 115). The restriction of the peacock's imagination to its 
`functional role' indicates its fundamental difference from humanity: Lewis 
argues, the `principal thing that discriminates men from the other animals 
is that they desire to escape from themselves' ('Politics', 114). Lewis argues 
that humans, unlike animals, can imagine themselves to be other than 
what they are. The importance of art, in Lewis's eyes, stems from the 
importance of this desire to the unique constitution of human nature: 
It is in the fine arts, in their various forms, of course, that [human 
beings] display their mania for impersonation most clearly when they 
get the chance. That is a highly organized and humanly respectable 
way of being anything or anybody that comes into your head. 
('Politics', 115) 
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Art allows people, Lewis argues, imaginatively to take on roles that if they 
were actually acted out would be dangerous. To illustrate his point, Lewis 
uses the example of crime fiction, arguing that: 
No one accuses the author of Raffles of being a cat-burglar by nature 
or in fact. They quite understand that it is impossible for a "normal" 
human being to resist (if he gets the chance) impersonating this 
picturesque form of criminal, or some other equally unwelcome in 
real life. ('Politics', 115) 
Crime fiction is seen as a way to indulge a natural desire for illegal 
activities on a virtual level, without any real consequence: actual criminals 
are seen as those who are unable to express this desire in this artificial 
way, and so resort to actually realising it. Art is seen not as doing away 
with the violent desires imagined in crime fiction, but as regulating them 
by removing them to the virtual sphere of the aesthetic. Art is seen by 
Lewis as basically a process of sublimation, which plays a vital regulatory 
role on the social as well as the individual level. Art, and the virtual 
experience it allows functions as a non-violent and non-coercive means of 
maintaining social order: 
If there were no arts left, of any consequence, half the world would of 
course have to be policemen to restrain the other half from 
objectionable impersonations of a necessarily dramatic nature. But 
these dramatic, strictly unprofitable, and playful peculiarities are 
peculiar to men. Other animals, in their natural state, have only one 
role, that of their specific function. ('Politics', 115) 
Art is, paradoxically, seen as `strictly unprofitable' and at the same time as 
an agent of social cohesion and order, which fulfils the function of the 
policeman by other means. This functionless yet useful status of art is seen 
as socially rather than ontologically guaranteed, and as such is susceptible 
to social change. Lewis's fear is that the functionless sphere of the virtual is 
under threat in modern society, and that the illicit and dangerous passions 
that were indulged in an inconsequential and unreal fashion will become 
realised: 
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The fine arts have in the past been the guarantee that this 
contingency should under all circumstances be avoided. And their 
collapse would immediately, in precipitating everybody out of make- 
believe into reality, or tipping the scales to that vitalist side, change 
us into very dangerous creatures indeed for each other. It is a danger 
signal always for our race when the fine arts become too real; when 
the cry of life is set up in the theatre, as it was in Rome, or at the door 
of the craftsman's workshop. (`Politics', 116) 
With the collapse of art comes the intrusion of `the Real': the idea of `the 
Real' of life supplanting the `reality' of theatre unenthusiastically repeats 
Carlyle's notion of the crowd blasting away `Phantasms of realities'. This 
collapse of the detached and virtual status of art involves the aesthetic 
becoming actualised and functional: instead of impersonating other roles 
people start to act them out in reality. In the language of Marx's The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1851), another work which 
figures revolutionary crowds in theatrical terms, Lewis sees the stability of 
society as dependent on the `phrase' going beyond the `content', of what is 
virtually acted out in the aesthetic realm exceeding what is actually done. 
For Marx real revolution occurred when `the content goes beyond the 
phrase': for Lewis this is also the case, but he sees this prospect as bringing 
nothing but the disintegration of the carefully organised facade of the 
`reality' of civilisation. 21 Lewis expresses his fear of the breakdown of art in 
terms familiar from Chapter One: `Madness, for us, is to be real. The 
reality, without its veil of art, would be insupportable' ('Politics', 116). The 
unveiling which excited both Carlyle and Marx is seen by Lewis as a 
shedding of the aesthetic capacity which constitutes humanity, the 
disintegration of the virtual realm and a slide back into unimaginative 
animal existence where everyone is restricted to their `functional role'. 
Lewis uses a corporeal metaphor for this disintegration of the virtual 
realm of art. He writes that `Aesthetic expression is one of the traditional 
organs of civilized society' and argues that in modern society `The function 
21 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, first published 1851, in 
Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 302. 
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of this organ is being distributed all over the organism' ('Politics', 118). The 
disintegration which Lewis imagines is not only social and aesthetic but 
physiological as well. The Western aesthetic tradition was also concerned 
with the proper organisation of the body, in particular the hierarchy of the 
senses, as indeed was the post-revolutionary French tradition of ideologie- 
critique. In Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, and Radical Modernism (1993) 
Vincent Sherry has charted the influence of thinkers such as Julien Benda 
and Remy de Gourmont on Lewis, focusing on the way in which the 
political discourse of the senses developed in the mainly French tradition 
of ideologie-critique manifests itself in their work. Sherry provides a brief 
but extremely useful history of ideologie-critique, from its progressive 
roots in post-revolutionary France, to its more reactionary and 
conservative phase in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
outlining a theory in which the eye and vision became associated with an 
aristocratic sensibility of order, and the ear and hearing with demotic 
anarchy and populist demagoguery. 22 Sherry argues that this politicised 
view of the senses was central to Lewis's work, and forms a fundamental 
connection between his politics and aesthetics: he writes that Lewis's 
`ideology of ear and eye [... ] provides the structuring, unifying force for his 
magnum opus of the postwar years'. 23 
Lewis sees the collapse of the aesthetic as resulting in a redistribution 
of the organs of the body, an image that recalls the breakdown of 
boundaries, both physical and social, experienced in the crowd. For Lewis 
revolution, with its brushing away of `Phantasms of realities', is figured as 
a traumatic reorganisation on both the social and physiological levels. The 
traditional specialisation and organisation of the body fundamental to the 
discourse of the aesthetic collapses, and an organism with separate and 
defined organs is redistributed into an undifferentiated bodily mass, 
perhaps something like the `vague profound organs' and `thick well- 
22 Vincent Sherry, Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, and Radical Modernism, (New York & 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), PP. 9-42. 
23 Sherry, Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, and Radical Modernism, p. 98. 
240 
Chapter Five: The Crowd 
nourished coils' of the crowd imagined in `The Crowd Master' ('Crowd', 
94). 
Lewis's use of the particular corporeal metaphor of the organs is also 
significant as it shows that the distinction that is crucial to Lewis is not 
between mind and body but between the organised and disorganised body. 
Just as he does not oppose the `unreal' to `the Real' he does not simply 
counter the corporeal with the incorporeal but with the organised. Lewis 
does not want to do away with the body altogether, but he wants to ensure 
that all its parts are in their place and functioning properly. He does not 
see the `traditional organ' of `aesthetic expression' being completely 
destroyed in modern society but being reorganised in such a way that its 
traditional, regulatory function is disrupted, and the boundaries that it 
maintained breached. 
The arguments of `The Politics of Artistic Expression' tend to present 
art as something distinct from the crowd, perhaps even opposed to it. If 
the crowd is seen as the state in which humans are at their most animal, 
then art, being the most uniquely human of pursuits, is very much its 
antithesis. However, as we saw in `The Crowd Master', Lewis did not see 
the figure of the artist as fully detachable from the crowd, and even if art 
serves to organise and control the crowd, the energy with which inspires 
art is similar to, if not the same as, that which mobilises the crowd. As we 
saw in Chapter Four, in The Lion and the Fox Lewis saw the relationship of 
the individual personality to the race in similar terms, writing that the 
personality `uses aptitudes and forces that it derives from the things it is 
destined to combat' (LF, 296). This sense of the interconnectedness, even 
of the consanguinity, of opposed principles is an important feature of 
Lewis's work, and one which is crucial to his thinking about the crowd. 
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The Artist and the Crowd, the Artist as Crowd 
In his 1925 essay `The Foxes' Case', parts of which were developed into 
sections of The Lion and the Fox and The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis 
explores the relationship of both the artist and the hero to the crowd. 
Lewis's attitude toward the crowd in this essay is typically mixed: he sees 
the crowd as playing an essential part in the creation of great personalities 
and works of art, but at the same time sees these as in some way 
independent of the crowd that produced them. The image of the crowd as 
female, and the individual as male and in an uneasy sexual relationship 
with it that was introduced in `The Crowd Master' is also developed. 
Lewis lists `the conflict between the individual personality and the 
personality of the crowd' and `the effect in western countries of the 
democratic principle on the Person as hero' as among his key concerns in 
this essay, and the spectre of the masses of modernity is never far away 
from his arguments ('Foxes', 120). Although these introductory statements 
suggest Lewis is concerned with a fundamental antagonism between the 
individual and the crowd, his account of `The Person and his Origins', 
which forms the first section of the essay, begins by suggesting a 
fundamental similarity between these two principles: 
The expansiveness that manifests itself in inventive or expressive 
work of any sort is essentially a movement to multiply the 
personality. At its intensest, it is not so very far removed from the 
consciousness of the crowd, for in multiplying itself a crowd is 
formed. (`Foxes', 120) 
This `expansiveness' which Lewis sees as characteristic of artistic work, 
rather than, say, a concentrating and purifying inwardness, is seen as near 
to the `consciousness of the crowd' at the level of system rather than of 
content: it is the process of `multiplying' that forms the link between the 
initially opposed principles. As Lewis himself writes: 
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when we speak of the person or the personality in this connection, it 
is not as an opposite principle to what is sometimes achieved by 
numbers. It is of a system of relations concentrated in a certain way. 
(`Foxes', 120) 
This change of focus from the quantitative to the structural could be seen 
as a way of avoiding contact with the crowd on a theoretical level: the 
question is now not one of the few and the many, but of different 
`system[s] of relations', a reorientation which neatly disposes of the many 
and eludes the threat that they may have posed to the few. This 
formalisation of the crowd is a means to contain the crowd on a theoretical 
level and enables it to be viewed in terms amenable to the intellectual: the 
sheer physical numerousness and power of the crowd - those threatening 
features which made it an object of intellectual study in the first place - 
are soundlessly pushed out of the discussion altogether. 
But this formalisation of the crowd is not totally effective: the 
threatening physicality disposed of returns on a metaphorical level, and 
the `system of relations' is characterised in terms of sexual reproduction: 
If a thousand people could have a child, as two people can have a 
child, he would be rather like Shakespeare or Newton, or some other 
great "personality, " according to the quality of the crowd: and the 
crowd precedes, in that sense, the person, although the person is not 
the crowd. (`Foxes', 120) 
Lewis's attempted formalisation of the crowd slips back into an organic 
representation of the relation between the person and the crowd, in which 
the crowd goes forth and produces a person who then, presumably, 
multiplies his personality in `inventive or expressive work'. The use of the 
biological imagery of childbirth here works to suggest that the relation 
between the great individual and the crowd is a natural one, and as such a 
stubborn and unalterable fact of human existence. Lewis, however, sees 
this `natural' relationship as threatened by modern politics: `All egalitarian 
doctrines represent the philosophy of a childless crowd' ('Foxes', 120). 
This link between modernity and infertility is also made in The Art of 
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Being Ruled, where, as discussed in Chapter Three, Lewis sees the First 
World War as producing an antipathy to reproduction in both men and 
women, and modernity in general as resulting in a rise of male 
homosexuality (see Chapter Three above, and ABR, 247,239-40). In `The 
Foxes' Case', as in The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis links this lack of 
reproduction to an evasion of responsibility: 
The greatest and most painful responsibility of humanity is its "great 
men. " When people show signs of wishing to evade this responsibility 
one can be sure that that society to which they belong is in a bad way, 
and is probably preparing for dissolution. 
A crowd that cannot produce a person, as we understand person 
here, is a poor crowd, then. But even that is better than that 
particularly futile form of crowd which produces a lot of undersized, 
half-hearted, shrunken offsprings. The heroic crowd immediately 
produces a Lenin or a Shakespeare, even if the person so produced 
contradicts all the principles presiding at its conjunction. ('Foxes', 
121-2) 
As in the second version of `The Crowd Master' it is the crowd that is 
blamed for the individual's lack of greatness: the individual in this respect 
occupies a rather weak position, dependent on the crowd itself for the 
power to transcend it into greatness. Like the personality dependent on the 
very `forces' of race which it `combats', the individual is both in conflict 
with the crowd and produced by it. Using the language with which Lewis 
discusses the relationship of masculinity to the feminine in The Art of 
Being Ruled, we could say that the individual is `propped up' from the 
crowd and is in some way a performative phenomenon. Indeed, when the 
arguments of `The Politics of Artistic Expression' are taken into account it 
becomes clear that the crowd is opposed at a fundamental level to the 
virtuality of performance, representing as it does the animality of the 
actual. 
This invocation of Lewis's thoughts on gender is not merely an 
irrelevant yet intriguing bit of cross-referencing, for in `The Foxes' Case' 
Lewis presents the relationship of the writer to the crowd of the world in 
terms which are, in Paul Edwards' words, `offensively gendered' to 
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`modern eyes'. 24 `Employing the sexual image', Lewis describes this 
relationship as a `very ticklish' situation: `Charged with words, which are 
his seeds, he hastens along with a view to finding the organism for which 
they are destined. That is the instinctive, unreflective procedure, rather, of 
this fertile person' (`Foxes', 122). This natural `procedure' of the writer is, 
however, endangered in the modern world: 
But that would hardly describe the writer as we find him today. It is, 
perhaps, a bad image for writers in general. There are writers who 
evulgate themselves with the simplicity of birds, it is true, and seem 
only anxious to find where at best hand their business can be done, 
and for them the image would hold: but it would not for another sort 
who take their secret into the most intricate jungle they can find, 
protected by every allusive trap and device of language. In this way 
the writer becomes a fabulous beast to be hunted down and ferreted 
out; he appeals to people's sporting instinct. His "meaning" is 
stalked, his mental habits charted. He is the hunted and not the 
hunter, in short. (`Foxes', 122) 
Lewis's notion of the enforced feminisation of the modern writer is 
interesting not only because of the masculine values and anxieties it 
displays, 25 but because he blends this gendered view with one in which the 
crowd is central: 
In the procreation of the intellect there are no sexes, but only 
numbers. But the Many may roughly be taken to represent the 
feminine principle. There is one field in which there is the cows, and 
another in which the bull promenades, or that is the natural 
arrangement. But today there is one field only, full of cows, and in 
one corner a small herd of rather bovine and aggressive-looking 
cows, not unlike bulls. The bull as an entity has vanished. (`Foxes', 
124) 
The natural and virile `procedure' of the writer has been replaced by a 
performance in which the masculine individual masquerades as one of the 
24 Paul Edwards, Wyndham Lewis: Painter and Writer, (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2000), P. 291. 
25 The way in which the hunted and emasculated writer is said to retreat into an obscure 
and allusive jungle seems to be a critique, `offensively gendered' no doubt, of the anti- 
populist difficulty of much modernist writing. 
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feminine herd. The question `Are the Crowds then female? ' asked in `The 
Crowd Master' is answered in the affirmative, but the assumption that the 
individual opposed to the crowd is male is called into question, and the 
separation between the male and female fields removed. In the light of 
Lewis's views on gender in The Art of Being Ruled, published the year after 
`The Foxes' Case', this is perhaps not surprising: his claim that `There is no 
mysterious difference between the nature of the sexes' seems compatible 
with the cow-and-bull picture presented here (ABR, 150). However, in `The 
Foxes' Case' it is the male who has to perform the role of the female: `the 
world's stud-bull, intellectually speaking, must pretend to be a cow; or at 
least must disguise his function so much that he could pass for one of the 
herd, unless carefully examined' ('Foxes', 124). In The Art of Being Ruled, 
as discussed in Chapter Three, this situation is reversed and it is an 
essentially female being which must act the role of the male, but crucially 
both situations suggest that any notion of a clear separation that Lewis 
might have envisaged or desired is non-existent. `The Foxes' Case' presents 
a vision of modernity in which the natural relationship of masculine 
individual and feminine crowd has broken down into one amalgamated 
and neutered field. Yet again, separation is shown to fail. 
In the essay `The Artist as Crowd' (1932) Lewis's conception of the 
relationship between the crowd and the individual artist changes again. 
Rather than viewing the artist as an individual somehow born by the 
crowd, he now claims that artists are crowds: writing of `the 
incontrovertible fact that such artists as Shakespeare or Dickens are very 
little individuals at all' Lewis argues that `they are, as a matter of fact, a 
very great and numerous crowd' ('Artist', 174). Rather than the crowd 
`producing' great artists who are then independent of, or even opposed to 
it, as he claimed it did in `The Foxes' Case', Lewis now sees genius as being 
a result of an individual becoming a crowd: 
universal creators are in the truest sense mass-artists; and even such 
an artist as the author of Don Juan, at the moment of production of 
such a masterpiece, has ceased to be an individual in any very real or 
valid sense. The stamp of what we choose to call "genius" [... ] is 
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precisely that the individual has externalized himself, has become 
purely an instrument, almost a common-property, in fact. ('Artist', 
174) 
The genius is seen as an individual who can, to return to the words of 
Cantleman, `train himself to act its mood, so that he [can] persuade its 
emotion to enter him properly'. In Enemy of the Stars Hanp, very much 
under the influence of Arghol's self-centred philosophising, considers 
himself, and comes to the conclusion that: 
Too many things inhabited together in this spirit for cleanliness or 
health. Is one soul too narrow an abode for genius? 
To have humanity inside you - to keep a doss-house! At least 
impossible to organise on such a scale. 
People are right who would disperse these impure monopolies! 
(ES, 107) 
Here the presence of the crowd within the individual is seen as a cause for 
disgust. However, in `The Artist as Crowd' the image of the individual with 
humanity dwelling inside of him is redeployed, and this time seen in a 
much more positive light. However, Lewis's assertion that the truly great 
artist is the crowd does not mean that any member of the crowd can be 
one: `The Artist is one of the rarest of people (in spite of the vast crowds of 
counterfeits), the politician is one of the commonest' (`Artist', 173). This 
rarity means that `really [... ] the artist, whose chief virtue must be his 
egotism, is bound to appear as one of the capital offenders against the 
principles of a Commune' ('Artist', 173). Lewis's attempt to present the 
artist as a non-egotistic figure, amenable to `the principles of a Commune', 
results in the reclaimed image of the artist as crowd. The idea that an artist 
or an individual can embody the spirit of a people is not unique to Lewis by 
any means. However, it is interesting that Lewis expresses this idea quite 
as clearly as he does for it represents a u-turn from his previous belief that 
`the individual personality' is in conflict with the crowd. Lewis's idea that 
`The heroic crowd immediately produces a Lenin or a Shakespeare, even if 
the person so produced contradicts all the principles presiding at its 
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conjunction' (`Foxes', 122) is transformed into a far more harmonious 
vision, in which the individual produced by the crowd embodies the crowd. 
Although Lewis's turn to the idea of the artist as crowd may seem to 
break decisively with the undercurrent of disgusted elitism of his earlier 
thinking on crowds, his new found friendliness towards the `principles of 
[the] Commune' has its own dark side. Lewis's praise for Hitler in 1930, 
examined in Chapter Four, depends on such an idea of the man of the 
crowd, of the `individual [who] has externalized himself, [who] has become 
purely an instrument, almost a common-property, in fact' ('Artist', 174). 
Lewis writes that `Adolf Hitler is just a very typical german "man of the 
people" [... ] Hitler is The German Man' (H, 31-2); and that `the German 
Nation [... ] must always be infinitely more formidable when acting as one 
man' (H, 33). The idea that the individual is stronger when he is a crowd, 
articulated in `The Code of a Herdsman', is here supplemented by the 
notion that the crowd is more formidable when embodied in an individual. 
Lewis does not see Hitler as an egoistic hero, distinguished by his 
exceptional individuality, but precisely as an individual who has 
`externalised himself and become `common-property'. As I argued in 
Chapter Four, Lewis's support for Nazism entailed a reversal of his dislike 
for mass-society and the idea of race as a ground for identity; it also 
necessitated a new attitude towards the crowd. His image of a Nazi crowd 
as subject to `something like the physical pressure of one immense, 
indignant thought' (H, lo-11), and his support for the Nazi ideal of 
`Identical rhythms in the arteries and muscles' (H, 107), all rely on the 
image of the crowd as a giant undifferentiated organism. To paraphrase 
`The Code of a Herdsman', Lewis seems to have fallen into the vulgarity of 
assuming the crowd to be `one ego'. 
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The Apes of God: 
`A constantly agitated firmament of shadows' 
If Hitler demonstrates Lewis going over to the side of the crowd in a most 
enthusiastic and unwise manner, then The Apes of God (1930), published 
the same year as the articles which later became the book Hitler, shows 
another side to Lewis's thinking about crowds and individuals. The Apes of 
God can be seen as a satire on the crowd-mentality of the cultured upper- 
classes, those `vast crowds' of counterfeit artist Lewis complained of in 
`The Artist as Crowd'. The guided tour which Daniel Boleyn, the novel's 
unheroic protagonist, is given by Horace Zagreus, his svengali, can be seen 
as a journey of discovery within the crowd, seeking out its typical 
components for Herdsman-style mockery. The Apes of God is itself a very 
crowded book, stuffed with characters who are given little sense of 
personality or individuality, and one of the features of the book is the 
ultimate similarity between Horace and Dan and the art-crowd they 
frequent and seek to mock. Because of the crowded nature of The Apes of 
God I will not be able to examine it in its entirety, but will focus my 
attention on the last two parts of the book: `Lord Osmund's Lenten Party' 
and `The General Strike'. 
The guests at Lord Osmund's party have some of the typical features 
of the modern idea of `the crowd'. When the guests are first introduced 
into the narrative they are described as `a human tide' which `had its 
peculiar voice' (AG, 349). This portrayal of the guests as a tide is 
reminiscent of Cantleman's perception of the crowd as a `cold night tide' 
and the idea that it has a single `voice' rather than many `voices' gives an 
impression of homogeneity that is typical of the modern idea of the crowd. 
The fact that Osmund's party is a fancy-dress one is exploited to emphasise 
the false and theatrical nature of the crowd in attendance, and give it a 
sense of unreality: 
A constantly agitated firmament of shadows, lost in the timbered roof 
- the rushing, slovenly-dressed hired waiters -a scratch troop of 
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flustered women - everything sustains the air of restless 
improvisation, a sort of quaint, shabby lavishness, down to the cheap 
and perfunctory disguises of the guests. (AG, 350) 
Osmund's crowd is presented as essentially homogenous, the variety of 
costumes failing to disguise the essential uniformity beneath: 
As far as possible, then, the generality of this assemblage are 
physically identical: and the pattern is a pallid chorister of seventeen 
- gelded or drained of all the grossness of sex by a succubus or 
something at birth. (AG, 351) 
The presentation of the crowd as youthful and sexlessly homosexual allows 
Lewis to sneer at what he sees as its shoddy campness without according it 
any sexual energy: sexuality is used to emphasise the mindlessness of the 
crowd, but it is a useless and insubstantial sexuality, which poses no threat 
and involves no messy physical enjoyment. As we saw in Chapter Three, 
Lewis associated homosexuality - of the non-`true-blue' kind - as a 
fashion indicative of the homogeneity and weakness of modern society and 
its avoidance of responsibility, and the generality of the crowd presented 
here display these characteristics as well. The guests are not, however, 
presented as totally uniform: `To the above law of the pallid rabble of the 
osmundian social system, a few exceptions only can be distinguished, here 
and there' (AG, 351-2). Who exactly these `exceptions' are is never made 
fully clear, most of the obvious candidates being compromised in some 
way. Horace Zagreus, for example, is exposed as a charlatan who is very 
much one of the chattering classes he seeks to mock and dissect. Starr- 
Smith, the Blackshirt, does not represent a genuine fascist alternative to 
the inane crowd of guests, but is himself in cheap fancy dress: 
"Why do you suppose I am here with two more, who are volunteers, 
as `fascists' of all things, to-night? Nothing to do with Fascismo - the 
last thing - can you guess? It's because I picked up three khaki shirts 
for a few pence and dyed them black - the whole outfit for the three 
of us did not cost fifteen bob! That is the reason. " (AG, 509) 
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The fact that he had a ticket for six but could only muster three fake 
fascists is further proof that his politics is nothing more than another 
shoddy performance. 
The character who is most an `exception' to the crowd is Pierpoint, 
the mysterious guiding mind behind Zagreus's exploits and the issuer of 
several encyclicals that schematically enunciate Lewis's point of view. 
However, Pierpoint cannot be seen as a `character' in the normal sense, as 
he never directly appears in the narrative. This non-appearance ensures 
Pierpoint's individuality, but at the cost of making him completely 
insubstantial. Pierpoint may be above and beyond the crowd, but, unlike 
the crowd, there is considerable doubt whether he actually exists. Unlike 
Multum in `The Crowd Master' Pierpoint is not presented as both `of the 
Crowd and individually conscious' but as completely detached, relying on 
others for contact with and information about the crowd he criticises. This 
complete detachment may guarantee non-contamination but it also 
prevents Pierpoint from having any force as a character and makes his 
pronouncements unconvincing as statements in a work of fiction. 
Pierpoint occupies one position of absence in The Apes of God: 
another, opposed position is filled by the crowd of the General Strike of 
1926. The crowd of the Strike appears at the end of The Apes of God, or 
rather, to be more precise, it doesn't appear at all, but its presence is felt: 
`The whole townland of London was up in arms and as silent as the grave' 
(AG, 618). Daniel Boleyn does not realise that the strike is happening, and 
walks across London to meet some friends, a journey that is, in the opinion 
of his friends, extremely dangerous for a `gentleman'. However, Daniel 
does not directly encounter the strike, but is approached by a succession of 
concerned gentleman which, in his ignorance, he finds overly forward: 
A good many motor-cars were coming along the big street and Dan 
could not help remarking that several gentlemen driving in them 
alone looked at him, as if they knew him. [... ] He could not 
understand this unscrupulous behaviour. Usually people in motor- 
cars minded their own business and it was only from pedestrians that 
one had to fear any low familiarity coming from strangers, which one 
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was liable to meet with, and which made walking in London so 
unpleasant. (AG, 614) 
Ironically, the very people trying to protect Daniel from the supposedly 
violent but strangely absent crowd of strikers themselves become 
perceived by Daniel as a dangerous and threatening crowd, whom, he 
thinks, despite appearances, `could not possibly be gentlemen' (AG, 614). 
Intended acts of chivalrous upper-class solidarity are transformed into 
unwanted and threatening advances, charged with homosexual tension: 
the libidinously unrestrained revolutionary crowd does not appear as such 
but in the form of those ostensibly opposed to it, who take on some of its 
characteristics. Just as Pierpoint generates a number of pseudo- 
individuals, Zagreus being the most prominent, the General Strike 
produces a pseudo-crowd. 
Paul Edwards argues that the `reported violence' of the General Strike 
`lacks a sexual element' and so is not `directly Dionysian' in a Sorelian 
fashion. 26 While he is correct that the General Strike is not presented as a 
carnivalesque outpouring of libido, Edwards is wrong to say that it `lacks a 
sexual element': The pseudo-crowd of gentlemen and policemen that 
uncannily takes the place of the genuinely revolutionary crowd is perceived 
by Dan as a homosexual threat. When he encounters a bus full of 
policemen, Dan's reaction suggests something like `homosexual panic': `the 
sight of all those darkly-dressed brutes all together, with their peaked 
helmets, made him hot' and `he did not wish to catch their eyes' (AG, 614). 
And when he is offered a lift by a gentleman, Dan is threatened by the 
proximity involved: 
At length a gentleman by himself (or with the deceptive appearance 
of one) more forward than the rest, actually began to go slower with 
his machine and came in with it quite near to the edge of the 
pavement, until he could have touched him and the fellow smiled in 
the most open way, as if he had been acquainted. (AG, 614) 
26 Edwards, Wyndham Lewis, p. 356. 
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Dan's panic here provokes anxiety not only about increased proximity but 
about also the trustworthiness of appearances, is typical of upper-class 
anxiety about working-class crowds, and surely contains `a sexual 
element'. Dan is upset that he is so `rudely accost[ed] without on his side 
the provocation of a glance', a thought that betrays the possibility that he 
might have glanced, and connects with his concern not to catch the eyes of 
the policemen (AG, 615). Unfortunately for Dan, in trying to avoid this 
forward gentleman he finds his glance distracted by a window-display 
which only increases his sense of libidinous panic: 
Dan walked sideways a few feet, he was pretending all the time to be 
engrossed with the purchases, as if he wanted to buy what was there. 
Unluckily as it turned out, this was the inside of a lady's bedroom, in 
the shop. There were two ladies undressed. The ladies were nothing 
but wax and puppets only but they were two terribly lifelike 
undressed women, and wherever he looked their eyes seemed to be 
seeking him out to smile at him. All sorts of nether garments for nude 
ladies were there - some were horribly round and there were splits in 
them with buttons - he blushed all the way up the backs of his legs. 
He had a centripetal shame in him, for all this immodesty - though in this case it was wax decoy-ducks, and not actual ladies. For 
nothing in the world would he be found looking! (AG, 615) 
Again, Dan's panic is provoked by the untrustworthiness of appearances - 
even though the dummies are `nothing but wax and puppets only' they are 
still `terribly lifelike'; the possibility of sexual excitement - he finds the 
displayed underwear `horribly round' and its `splits' cause him to blush; 
and an anxiety about where to look - the mannequins' eyes seem to `seek 
him out' and he is determined not to `be found looking' at them. Faced 
with this uncanniness of the unreal, Dan tries to turn back to the real: 
It would be better he almost felt to confront that person who had 
halted behind him in his car rather than to go on standing there. But 
the gentleman had accosted some other passers-by and they had got 
into the car with him. He could see it going on plainly in the window- 
glass. There were other gentlemen passing slowly in cars he could see 
- one or two wore smiles, and one beckoned to a somebody 
invitingly. He rushed from where he had been standing without 
looking up. (AG, 615) 
253 
Chapter Five: The Crowd 
Qualities associated with the revolutionary crowd - an outburst of 
inappropriate sexuality, the breakdown of the security of appearances, a 
threatening physical proximity - appear even though the crowd itself does 
not. That the crowd manifests itself only by its effects and never directly 
appears as substantial physical cause indicates that it occupies the place of 
`the Real'. Like the `single, isolated, direct sensation' imagined in Time and 
Western Man, the crowd `however "real" [... ] in one way and perhaps 
violent' does `not yet bear with it the consciousness of reality or of belief 
and so has a `dream quality' (see Chapter One and TWM, 549). The 
General Strike is not directly represented as an event of mass 
demonstrations or mob violence but indirectly in the form of a 
phantasmagorical and untrustworthy cityscape, populated by 
ungentlemanly gentlemen and `terribly lifelike' mannequins. 
The intrusion of `the Real' of the crowd in the form of the absent 
General Strike is prefigured by Dan's discovery of `the Real' of his body, 
what Zizek calls the `palpitation' of `what goes on beneath the surface'. 27 
Unreasonably accused by Zagreus of behaving like a brute at Osmund's 
party, Dan examines his body, which he had considered that of a 'maidenly 
young man' and discovers that he is a 'blackguard and rib-breaker': 
he scrutinized the remarkable muscles in his hand - tracking them 
under the skin and lying in wait for them as if they were hidden 
fishes, as they rose to the surface disturbing the cuticle. Especially 
ferocious were those connected with the thumb. He had never 
suspected before the presence of all these monsters of muscles - only 
just inside! Thoroughly horror-struck, but determined to go through 
with it, he bent down and got hold of the leading muscles of his 
calves, which were well hidden but had great bodies like scottish 
salmon, and in each thigh there was at least a strapping life-size 
sturgeon. His body was swarming. (AG, 612-3) 
Although Dan's body is clearly not that of a brute, and his perception of it 
as such is entirely coloured by Zagreus's exaggerated and self-serving 
27 Slavoj Zizek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality, 
(London & New York: Verso, 1994), P- 116. 
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accusations, this self-scrutiny is significant, for it shows Dan becoming 
aware of his body as a composite object, which contains other, apparently 
non-human bodies within it. Like Margot's attempt to grapple onto 
Victor's fish-like muscles in The Revenge for Love (see Chapter One and 
RL, 163), Dan's awareness of `what goes on beneath the surface' prefigures 
a weakening of his sense of `reality'. This fragmentation of the body is 
near-simultaneous with the strange non-emergence of the revolutionary 
crowd, and both events represent the breakdown of what had been 
considered harmonious and unified `realities' - the individual and society. 
After six-hundred pages of unrelenting and tiresome description of the 
external surfaces of a small subsection of the privileged top layer of society 
`what goes on beneath' is finally introduced into the narrative of The Apes 
of God, exposing the superficiality of what went before. 
This intrusion of `the Real' at the end of The Apes of God is 
significant precisely because it is undramatic: rather than being torn apart 
by a violently physical mob, the `reality' of the upper-class crowd is 
ruptured by its own reaction to the never fully present threat of the 
working-class crowd. Likewise, Dan's sense of his own personal `reality' is 
broken by self-scrutiny of the mundane muscles of his hands and legs: his 
bodily surface is not invaded or even threatened but `what goes on 
beneath' makes itself known nevertheless. Lewis's portrayal of `the Real' of 
the body and of the crowd attests to their inseparability from what appears 
to be opposed to them: even though `the Real' does not appear as such it is 
always there, inseparable from the surface `reality' which seeks to hide it 
from view. 
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The central question of this thesis is one of grounding: Lewis's work deals 
extensively with the problem of what can function as a ground - for 
identity, for distinction, even for reality itself - in the modern world. The 
sense that the basis for existence is a problem is one of the fundamental 
features of modernity, and of the culture it produces. Lewis's concerns 
about grounding indicate an anxious feeling of groundlessness, a feeling 
that what was once stable can no longer be taken for granted. For example, 
Lewis's concern with race does not arise from a self-assured conviction of 
racial superiority, or even a certainty that racial distinction exists and is 
significant, but from an anxiety about what it is that grounds cultural 
difference, on both an individual and a collective level. His insistence that 
Shakespeare's genius cannot be attributed to the biological factor of race is 
a result of his concern that everything can be grounded in the body, leaving 
the mind redundant. His turn to the corporeal rhetoric of Nazi racial 
ideology reflects a feeling that all other grounds for cultural distinction 
have already been pulled from beneath his feet, and that the body is the 
only solid thing left on which politics can be based. These two examples 
illustrate the double nature of his anxiety about grounding: on the one 
hand, he is concerned that grounding can be too solid and rigid, leading to 
a reductive determinism that extinguishes the role of the individual; and 
on the other hand, he is worried that the absence of any ground at all leads 
to a vacuous homogeneity in which nothing of value can be discerned at 
all. 
Lewis's anxiety is exacerbated because he is not able to just simply 
believe in what he wants to believe in. As we saw in Chapter One, belief 
was for him a key philosophical concept, without which the reality and 
stability of the world could not be guaranteed; but as we have also seen, 
the idea of unmasking, of exposing `the Real' thing behind the facade of 
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belief, was a central feature of his imagination. This mismatch between 
what he believed in - or wanted to believe in, or believed that he believed 
in - and what he could see and imagine is a central tension in his work, 
and is a template for the contradictions between theory and rhetoric that 
characterise his work. 
The body is significant in this tension between belief and perception 
because in Lewis's work it can function both as an emblem of the solidity 
and definition which he wanted to believe in, and as the agent of the 
breakdown of distinction and difference which he could not help but 
perceive and imagine. Lewis himself was at least partially aware of this 
double valence of the body, as is shown by, for example, his rather 
tortuous argument about the difference between Nazi `blood-feeling' and a 
Romantic and Whitmanesque version of the same thing. As we saw in 
Chapter Four, Lewis argues that the Nazis `invoke [blood-feeling] on behalf 
of a greater concentration' whereas Whitman and those like him seek `to 
enlist this sort of fleshy second-sight in the service of diffusion' (H, lo6). 
The difference between `concentration' and `diffusion' is never really 
explained, and ultimately this distinction is only one of rhetorical 
emphasis, not grounded in anything solid. Lewis's turn to the rhetoric of 
the body as a ground of racial and cultural difference is as much about 
belief as it is about any notion of the body as real and solid. Even at the 
height of his enthusiasm for the corporeal Lewis cannot find the 
unadorned body an adequate ground for anything, and he is obliged to 
clothe it in a rhetoric of `concentration', simultaneously admitting that the 
same objective ground can also service the diametrically opposed rhetoric 
of `diffusion'. The body on its own grounds nothing, but belief in it can 
ground anything. Although this formulation is theoretically consistent with 
his claim in Time and Western Man that `we are surface creatures only' 
and that `reality is simply belief it remains unsatisfactory as belief remains 
ungrounded, and the question of what exactly should be believed in is left 
open and undetermined. In Hitler, Lewis claims to believe in 
`concentration' rather than `diffusion', but he cannot disguise this choice as 
anything other than an ungrounded personal preference. 
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For Lewis, the body may have seemed to promise a stable ground in a 
rapidly changing and uncertain world, but the solidity it delivered was one 
of undifferentiated thingness in which distinctions and difference were 
erased altogether rather than grounded more firmly. The problem for 
Lewis is that while the unmediated body delivers nothing but mindless 
reification, to do away with the body altogether leads to an unreal vacuum 
in which nothing is grounded and nothing seems to exist. Like Margot in 
The Revenge for Love, Lewis grapples on to the body when he needs to 
ground his sense of `reality', and like Margot he finds himself confronted 
with the unmanageable spectre of `the Real'. This ability of the body to 
represent both the solidity of `reality' and the disintegration of `the Real' is, 
as I have shown, one of its key features in Lewis's work. Like the peons in 
The Childermass the apparent solidity of the body vanishes when looked at 
too hard. 
Lewis's recourse to the body as the final ground for identity and 
belief, and the failure of the body to provide what he desires it to, is well 
illustrated by his turn to the eye as the basis of his critical position in Time 
and Western Man. In the preface to the second, more theoretical book of 
Time and Western Man Lewis attempts to adumbrate his `exclusively 
"one-sided" position', and to do so tries to give `some compendious idea of 
the manner in which [he] regard[s] the claims of individuality' (TWM, 
131). Lewis claims that, although man is `the most detached and eclectic of 
creatures', his life must be `centred upon some deep-seated instinct or 
some faculty' if he is to find `a natural exclusiveness necessary to proper 
functioning' (TWM, 132). This `proper functioning' consists of the 
possession of enough stability and solidity to resist the flux of the world: 
For our only terra firma in a boiling and shifting world is, after all, 
our "self. " That must cohere for us to be capable at all of behaving in 
any way but as mirror-images of alien realities, or as the most 
helpless and lowest organisms, as worms or as sponges. (TWM, 132) 
The `self here is seen as the basis for `us', as some `deep-seated' 
phenomenon, almost beneath individuality as it were, which supports the 
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individual in their `eclectic' pursuits and critiques. Yet this idea of the self 
does not satisfy Lewis's search for a ground to his intellectual activities, 
and he seeks to establish what this deep-seated self is, in turn, grounded 
upon. 
Lewis claims that he `will fix [his] attention upon those things that 
have most meaning for [him]', and that in so doing he will `do [his] best to 
modify or defeat' anything which `seems to [him] to contradict or threaten 
those things', and equally try and `strengthen' those things which agree 
with them (TWM, 132). Lewis is aware of the possibility that such a 
confrontational and oppositional mode of self-formation may lead to `the 
heraclitean "injustice of the opposites"' but sees such an injustice as 
inevitable: `But how can we evade our destiny of being "an opposite, " 
except by becoming some grey mixture, that is in reality just nothing at 
all? ' (TWM, 132). Having easily reconciled himself to the idea of being an 
`opposite', Lewis continues to define his `deep-seated' basis, emphasising it 
`exclusiveness' and autonomy: 
this fixation shall be upon something fundamental, quite underneath 
all the flux: and this will in no way prevent my vitality from taking at 
one time one form, at another another, provided, in spite of those 
occupations, on the surface, of different units of experience, the range 
of my sensibility observe the first law of being, namely to maintain its 
identity; and that the shapes it chooses for experiment shall agree 
with that dominant principle, and such shapes not be adopted 
without rhyme or reason, at the dictate of fashion or some casual 
interest, just because they happen to be there, in an eternal mongrel 
itch to mix, in undirected concupiscence, with everything that walks 
or crawls. (TWM, 132) 
Lewis's search for identity and a `dominant principle' on which to ground 
his critical position results in a model of self-formation in which power is 
central: 
I have allowed these contradictory things to struggle together, and 
the group that has proved the most powerful I have fixed upon as my 
most essential ME. This decision has not, naturally, suppressed or 
banished the contrary faction, almost equal in strength, indeed, and 
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even sometimes in the ascendant. And I am by no means above 
spending some of my time with this domestic Adversary. All I have 
said to myself is that always, when it comes to the pinch, I will side 
and identify myself with the powerfullest Me, and in its interests I 
will work. (TWM, 132-3) 
In Lewis's riotous model of the self a part seizes control and promotes its 
own interests, rather than governing for the benefit of the whole. Lewis 
grounds his position not in terms of ethical or rational rightness but in 
terms of power: out of many contenders it is the `powerfullest' which gains 
ascendancy and the right to govern. Selfhood is seen as the product of 
violent contingency rather than of sublime necessity, and Lewis does not 
try to hide the fundamental partiality of the self produced in this way: 
As to what this formally fixed "self' is, and how to describe it, I have 
already plainly indicated how I would go about that. From the outset 
I gave away the principle of my activity, and made no disguise of its 
partisan, even its specialist, character. So my philosophic position 
could almost be called an occupational one, except that my 
occupation is not one that I have received by accident or 
mechanically inherited, but is one that I chose as responding to an 
exceptional instinct or bias. (TWM, 133) 
The `self is ultimately seen as grounded in choice rather than determined 
by biological factors, and significantly this choice is figured in terms of 
labour: it is an `occupation'. The political model for Lewis's idea of 
selfhood is not the divine right of kings or the popular will of democracy, 
but the violent struggle of occupational syndicates. The philosophical 
position from which Lewis launches his criticism of modernity is a 
thoroughly modern one, modelled on the specialisation and competition of 
modern labour, rather than on any ancient or organic template. 
Lewis grounds this specialised position in the body, or, more 
precisely, in a particular organ of the body: 
Whatever the Marquis de Sade said about life or things in general, 
you could be in no doubt as to what his remarks would come back to 
in the end; you would know that they all would have the livery of the 
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voluptuary, that they would all be hurrying on the business of some 
painful and elaborate pleasure of the senses, that they would be 
devising means to satisfy an overmastering impulse to feel acutely in 
the regions set aside for the spasms of sex. With as much definiteness 
as that, whatever I, for my part, say, can be traced back to an organ; 
but in my case it is the eye. It is in the service of the things of vision 
that my ideas are mobilized. (TWM, 133-4) 
The eye is not chosen as the central organ of Lewis's philosophy because of 
any innate qualities which elevate it above other organs, but because it is 
the one to which he is occupationally attached. By explicitly grounding his 
philosophy in occupational interest rather than on a supposedly 
disinterested reason, Lewis allows, even if he does not claim, a degree of 
relativism: if another organ had proved to be the `powerfullest', then it, 
rather than the eye, would have mobilised his ideas. Theoretically Sade's 
position is as valid as Lewis's, as it too `can be traced back to an organ', and 
is based on the `overmastering impulse' of a particular part of the self. The 
eye is, to use the language of Tarr, merely one of the `indignant plebs' of 
Lewis's `glorious organism', but the one which has proved the 
`powerfullest' and so taken command. 
Lewis eye-based specialist position may seem like a weak one on 
which to base philosophical argument: a matter of personal interest and 
preference, rather than of disinterested logic and rational discourse. 
However, even putting aside any such criticisms, Lewis's choice of the eye 
as the ground for his philosophy runs into difficulties in Time and Western 
Man itself, and on its own terms. In the chapter `The Object Conceived as 
King of the Physical World' Lewis takes on the arguments of philosophers 
such as Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, and C. D. Broad whom 
he sees as dangerously relativistic and too concerned with time and flux, at 
the expense of his preferred qualities of space and stability. Lewis takes 
issue with the importance accorded to the observer by these theories, in 
particular Broad's claim that: 
Whenever a penny looks to me elliptical, what really happens is that I 
am aware of an object which is, in fact, elliptical.... When I look at a 
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penny from the side, what happens is this: I have a sensation, whose 
object is an elliptical brown sensum: and this sensum is related in 
some specially intimate way to certain round physical object, viz. the 
penny. (Quoted in TWM, 387) 
Lewis sees this argument as against `Common-sense', which, he argues, 
`supposes that a penny keeps its shape and size as we move about, while 
out "sensa, " or complex of appearances of the penny alters' (TWM, 387). 
Lewis sees this view of the world as `of the nature of the cartesian return to 
naked, direct, vision' which is, in turn, `affiliated with Bergson's plunge 
into the sensational flux' (TWM, 388). As we saw in Chapter One, Lewis's 
epistemology was opposed to unmediated sensation - the naked and direct 
plunge which he complains of here is extremely similar to what Zizek calls 
`the passion for the Real'. His argument is complicated when he 
remembers that he claimed to base his philosophy on the eye and that his 
ideas were mobilised in `the service of the things of vision' (TWM, 134). 
Lewis portrays the world of sensation he is arguing against as one in which 
vision is primary, claiming that it is a world in which `the image comes to 
life, and the picture, under suitable conditions, moves and lives inside its 
frame' (TWM, 392). Lewis also argues that in such a world an illusion 
`would be real - since it appeared real', a formulation that is remarkably 
similar to his own assertion that `Reality is in fact simply belief (TWM, 
392,351). Lewis is aware of the apparent contradiction between his claim 
that vision was primary for him and his criticism of its primacy for others, 
and tries to explain that if looked at properly there is no contradiction at 
all. Lewis recalls that he `intimated that this essay was to be an attempt to 
provide something in the nature of a philosophy of the eye' and points out 
that this description of his position could be seen as `the opposite of the 
truth' (TWM, 392). However, Lewis claims that this opposition only holds 
if `you wish to isolate the Eye' and adds that `it is against isolation that we 
contend' (TWM, 392). Lewis claims that his position is not based upon 
such isolation, writing that `we wish to repose, and materially to repose, in 
the crowning human sense, the visual sense', and that `we refuse [... ] to 
retire into the abstraction and darkness of an aural and tactile world' 
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(TWM, 392). Lewis claims that vision on his sense is on the side of `reality', 
writing that: 
That sensation of overwhelming reality which vision alone gives is 
the reality of "common-sense, " as it is that reality we inherit from 
pagan antiquity. And it is indeed on that "reality" that I am basing all 
I say. But "a philosophy of the eye" would be a description 
diametrically opposed to the truth, if it were to be the expression of 
our technical position in this phase of the argument. (TWM, 392) 
Lewis proposes a `philosophy of the eye' which does not `isolate' the eye: 
however, as we saw earlier, his model of selfhood, from which the idea of 
the `philosophy of the eye' develops, relies upon the separation of organs 
and the fragmentation of the body. In the later argument Lewis specifically 
attacks the fragmentation of the body, arguing that it is a cause of the 
larger social problems he diagnoses. The image-centred world and the lack 
of reality of which he complains is, he argues, produced by the separation 
of the senses of vision and touch: 
it is because of the subjective disunity due to the separation, or 
separate treatment, of the senses, principally of sight and of touch, 
that the external disunity has been achieved. It is but another case of 
the morcellement of the one personality, in this case into a tactile- 
observer on the one hand and a visual-observer on the other, giving 
different renderings of the same thing. Its results must be the 
disintegration, finally, of any "public" thing at all. (TWM, 393-4) 
The `morcellement of the one personality' of which Lewis complains of 
here was the precondition for the model on selfhood he proposes earlier in 
the book. There, as we saw earlier, personality is seen as distinctly non- 
unified, with opposed factions clashing in a power struggle for overall 
control. Lewis's concern about the `disintegration [... ] of any "public" thing 
at all' is also at odds with his earlier account of his critical position. There, 
in his account of his `exclusively "one-sided" position', he unabashedly 
proclaimed `its partisan, even its specialist, character' and was frank about 
its occupational basis: considerations of the public good, even on a highly 
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abstract epistemological level, were not mentioned at all, and his 
identification of his interests with the `powerfullest Me' set the 
individualistic tone. Lewis's later arguments characteristically provide 
interesting criticism of his earlier position: 
we would emphasize that our ideal, objective, world, which was 
wrought into a unity - the common ground of imaginative reality on 
which we all meet - is being destroyed in favour of a fastidious 
egoism, based on a disintegration of the complex unity of the senses, 
and a granting of privileges to vision, in its raw, immediate and 
sensational sense. (TWM, 394) 
Lewis's earlier cultivation of the `powerfullest Me' and the mobilisation of 
his ideas `in the service of vision' are good examples of this `fastidious 
egoism' and its fragmentation and favouritism of the senses. However, it is 
important to note that in the above passage Lewis writes of vision `in its 
raw, immediate and sensational sense', which implies that the idealised 
vision which mobilised him was one which was not raw, not immediate, 
and not sensational. The idea of a non-sensational sense is hard to 
visualise, but, using terms from The Childermass, would seem to be more 
similar to Pullman's `intellectual consciousness' than Salters' `optical 
consciousness' (C, 89). The `vision' in whose service Lewis claims his ideas 
are mobilised appears to be not only non-sensational but non-optical as 
well, presented more as an intellectual abstraction than as a physical 
reality. 
This hostility to vision in its most basic sense may seem self- 
contradictory but is not wholly surprising as there is a distinctly anti- 
optical strand in Lewis's work. In his `Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art 
in Our Time' (1922), for example, Lewis argues that vision is opposed to 
imagination, claiming that `The practical and, as we say, "prosaic" 
character of the function of our visual sense does not enable us to 
experience through it normally a full emotional impression' ('Essay', 214). 
Lewis also claims that the insufficiency of vision affects social 
relations: `We are all, in a sense even, so thoroughly hidden from each 
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other because we see each other' ('Essay', 214). In this essay this 
insufficiency is presented in a negative light, with the superior qualities of 
the imagination opposed to it. Lewis does not see vision as insufficient in 
terms of knowledge but in terms of emotion; in fact, in terms of 
knowledge, he sees vision as over-sufficient: `We are given by the eye too 
much: a surfeit of information and "hard fact", that does not, taken 
literally, tally with our completer values for the objects in question' 
('Essay', 214). This `incessant analysis of the objects presented to us' 
results in `the stripping of things and people by the eye of their more 
significant and complete emotional vesture' ('Essay', 214). In this sense 
vision can be seen as fundamentally comic as it is objective rather than 
subjective, and objectively there are no `persons' but only `things' absurdly 
pretending to be `persons'. In `The Meaning of the Wild Body' Lewis wrote 
that `fundamental self-observation' was a `dangerous form of absolute 
revelation' which had lethal effects (`Meaning', 158). To avoid this 
dangerous and depersonalising objectivity vision, in Lewis's eyes, cannot 
be taken straight: 
To make up, for the picture presented to us by the eye, a synthesis of 
a person or a thing, we must modify the order for which the eye is 
responsible, and eliminate much of the physical chaos that only 
serves to separate us from the imaginative truth we are seeking. 
(`Essay', 214) 
This modification of visual data enables it to function imaginatively: 
Everything received through the eye to the outside world has to be 
"treated" before it can be presented to the imagination with a chance 
of moving it. The law of this "treatment" is, first, a process of 
generalization. An intense particularization may, however, on the 
principle of extremes meeting, have the same effect. But, broadly, it is 
by a generalization of the subject-matter that you arrive at the 
rendering likely to be accepted by the imagination. I am using the 
word "imagination" to stand for that function of the mind that 
assesses and enjoys the purely useful work performed by the other 
faculties; the artist-principle in the mind, in short. ('Essay', 215 
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This modification and treatment of the raw data received by the eye puts 
Lewis's idea of vision more in line with his epistemological dislike for the 
`the Real'. However, it renders problematic the notion that the eye can 
function as a ground for his critical identity, as it makes vision in Lewis's 
preferred sense a secondary phenomenon, itself grounded on a primary 
sensational process to which it is opposed. Lewis's generalised vision is 
grounded upon vision `in its raw, immediate and sensational sense', the 
vision to which it is opposed. This pattern of grounding a positive value on 
a negative value to which it is opposed is recurrent in Lewis's work: the 
mind is secondary to and predicated on the body, and the conceptual pairs 
of 'reality'-`the Real', person-thing, masculine-feminine, genius-race, and 
individual-crowd are all, at some time, seen as functioning in this way. On 
a more general level, one of process as well as of objects, the separation 
that Lewis so values and desires can be seen to be secondary to and 
predicated on a fundamental inseparability. As he writes in The Lion and 
The Fox, personality `uses aptitudes and forces that it derives from the 
things it is destined to combat' (LF, 296), and this sense of the 
intermingling and consanguinity of opposites is inescapable in Lewis's 
work, even if he does not want it to be. 
The grounding of positive values in the negative values to which they 
are opposed is a problem for Lewis not because he denies that this is what 
he is doing - in Time and Western Man, for example, he rhetorically asks 
`how can we evade our destiny of being "an opposite, " except by becoming 
some grey mixture, that is in reality just nothing at all? ' (TWM, 132) - but 
because, even though he admits it, Lewis does not seem able to accept the 
insecurity fundamental to it. His attempt to ground his critical position in 
the organ of the eye is an attempt to find a secure identity in a single 
substantial bodily thing rather than in the abstract process of opposition. 
The problem for Lewis is that even by knowingly becoming `an opposite' 
the `grey mixture' which he seeks to avoid is never entirely escaped, a 
problem that is articulated more clearly and more comically in his fiction 
than in his theoretical work. Separation is never fully achieved, and the 
primary bodily matter from which the secondary phenomena of mind and 
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its correlates emerge is never absolutely transcended, and the prospect of 
comic collapse is always present. 
Lewis's attempt to ground his identity in the eye demonstrates the way in 
which the body functions in his work: invoked as a ground it disintegrates 
when looked at too hard, but nevertheless does not disappear entirely. This 
tendency of the body both never to be there and always to be there is its 
most significant feature in Lewis's work. Its failure to function as a solid 
ground does not result in Lewis falling through to yet another potential 
ground. The body cannot be fully appropriated but neither can it be 
completely discarded: it is not just another `false bottom' in an infinite 
regress of possible grounds. 
Lewis is stuck with the body: it fails to provide a solid ground for 
identity, and yet it refuses to melt completely into air. This persistence of 
the body makes it a crucial sticking point in Lewis's work: it is stuck in the 
middle of the modern tensions of integration and separation, of reification 
and dematerialisation, of the thing and the person. The idea of the body 
never settles, never solidifies, never fully grounds itself or anything else, 
but perpetually oscillates between opposed conceptual poles and produces 
a series of compelling and contradictory images which attest to its 
implacable significance in Lewis's work. 
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